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Abstract
In 1992, the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH)
clearly established the need to revitalize some of the most distressed and isolated housing
environments in the U.S. In response, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) created HOPE VI, initially a demonstration program that evolved to support
revitalization and integration models not only for the dilapidated projects, but also for the
equally distressed surrounding neighborhoods. This dissertation seeks to illustrate the
complexity of implementing integration efforts that seek to reverse public housing isolation by
addressing two premises: 1) the integration of public housing constitutes a complex social,
economic, cultural and physical matter that can, nonetheless, be clarified and coherently
categorized with the help of a cross-national sample of fifteen HOPE VI revitalization efforts;
and 2) public housing isolation is a multi-faceted issue that can best be understood through
careful historical and morphological analysis of an individual public housing development,
such as Boston's Mission Main.
The dissertation is structured to highlight the mechanisms of an "isolation to
integration" dynamic by analyzing, in its first part, pre-redevelopment isolation conditions and
integration strategies for a fifteen-city sample (Chapters 2 and 3); and, in its second part, by
detailing that dynamic for the Mission Main case (Chapters 4 and 5).
More specifically, Chapter 1 traces the origins of an isolationist project mentality and
its impact on design during sixty years of policymaking. Chapter 2 introduces pre-
redevelopment conditions as well as revitalization strategies for each of the sampled
developments. Chapter 3 classifies integration strategies according to physical, socio-
economic and organizational variables. Finally, Chapter 4 investigates the roots of present-
day isolation in Mission Main, while Chapter 5 details the complex implementation process
that characterized the Boston example.
Results show that public housing isolation has origins outside the development, as
revealed by morphological analysis of embedded external forces; and that re-designing the
social and physical connection between project and neighborhood is a complex process
influenced as much by pre-redevelopment conditions as by the desires of residents,
designers or policymakers to foster integration.
Chair of the Dissertation Committee: Dr. Lawrence J. Vale
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH)
clearly established the need to revitalize some of the most deteriorated and distressed
housing environments in the U.S. In essence, the Commission stipulated that the
isolation of public housing developments was key in perpetuating patterns of social
stigmatization and physical dilapidation (NCSDPH, 1992: xiv). In response, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) created HOPE VI, initially a
demonstration program that would provide models of revitalization and integration not
only for the dilapidated projects, but also for the equally distressed surrounding
neighborhoods.
Between 1993 and 1998, HUD has invested over $2 billion in public housing
redevelopment. The HOPE VI program has become the single largest source of
capital for public housing authorities (PHAs) in need of re-developing their most
distressed developments. During this period, the widening focus of the program has
notably embraced re-design principles devised by the New Urbanism movement.
Combined with principles of income-mixing, homeownership and Family Self-
Sufficiency programs, this all-encompassing federal program has given planners and
designers opportunities to propose revitalization strategies that not only aim to
integrate isolated sites into their neighborhoods, but also -- in some cases -- to re-
connect those neighborhoods to the redeveloped communities.
The main organizing thread of this dissertation is the study of the complexity of issues
which constitute the "isolation to integration" paradigm, whose influence extends
beyond the project's edge to include the surrounding neighborhood. Through the lens
of urban design, the following chapters take stock of how public housing has evolved
from a haven for the temporarily submerged middle-class, to a locus of social despair
and physical isolation, to finally become a tabula rasa for the creation of a mixed-
income and traditionally planned mini-neighborhoods. This dissertation seeks to verify
two major assertions: 1) that the integration of public housing constitutes a complex
social, economic, cultural and physical matter that can, nonetheless, be clarified and
coherently categorized; and 2) that the isolation which integration efforts seek to
reverse is itself a multi-faceted issue that can best be understood through careful
historical and morphological analysis of an individual public housing development.
Finally, this dissertation seeks to not only highlight the complexity of the isolation to
integration paradigm, but also to make some recommendations about how to assess
the implementation of integration.
First Assertion: Clarifying and Categorizing Integration Efforts
The HOPE VI program has produced an array of integration strategies throughout the
nation that may be compared, categorized and typified. One basic goal is to establish
whether there is a consensus - among key actors involved in redevelopment -- about
the form socio-economic and physical integration should take. One method of
examination is to assemble, in the first part of the dissertation, a cross-national
sample of fifteen redevelopment projects funded with HOPE VI grants, and use a
comparative analysis method to: 1) present and classify pre-redevelopment conditions
of the sites and surrounding neighborhoods (Chapter 2); and 2) categorize the fifteen
integration efforts by using three sets of variables: physical, social and organizational
(Chapter 3). The integrative value of each strategy is highlighted.
Results from this comparative analysis make clear how the integration component of
physical criteria, for instance, identifies certain types of integration strategies which
are shared by a group of developments. They also establish "degrees of integration",
whereby efforts to morphologically connect the site to its edges (the majority of cases)
contrast with efforts to differentiate the community from its surrounding (a minority of
cases).
This thesis should inspire policymakers, designers and residents involved in future
HOPE VI schemes -- or other comparable efforts elsewhere -- to organize and
interpret qualitative data so that efforts to integrate are less based on assumptions
than on objective environmentally-derived and socially-defined criteria. The proposed
analytical framework -- which is founded on understanding the dynamic of isolation to
integration -may be reproduced in another research context with the goal of devising
guidelines for large-scale revitalization.
Second Assertion: Highlighting the Roots of Isolation
The isolation of public housing projects is part of a larger transformation process
ingrained in the neighborhood scale of urban transformation. Since integration
strategies are proposed as solutions to social, economic and physical isolation of
public housing and surrounding neighborhoods, it is crucial not only to identify the
manifestation of isolation, but also the origins of the process. This dissertation seeks
to identify sets of forces which have contributed to isolate public housing
developments. Thus the second part of the dissertation focuses on one development
from the nationwide sample -- Boston's Mission Main -- in order to qualify the
underlying process of isolation which precedes integration countermeasures. Chapter
4 details the interplay of morphological and socio-economic forces involved in the
neighborhood becoming a traditionally isolated entity, from colonial times to this day.
Chapter 5 tells the eventful redevelopment story for the Mission Main site and
illustrates how implementing integration can be hampered, in practice, by complex
"realities".
The dissertation provides strong incentives for conducting a detailed morphogenesis a
site's edges in order to better inform the revitalization process and identify the source
of problems -- physical and social -- it aims to tackle. This study is a preliminary step
in designing a more widely focused research that would lead to the long-term
evaluation of revitalization "success", in accordance with residents' needs and
expectations.
Research Approach
This dissertation is an extension of two major studies on the subject of public housing
redevelopment and integration. The first one is The Final Report from the National
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH) which in 1992
introduced the idea that developments in most need of attention should be overhauled
with the help of an all-encompassing program that addresses the physical issues of
isolation and offers socio-economic solutions to residents' powerlessness and
joblessness. More specifically, the NCSDPH noted that severely distressed public
housing developments should not be considered separate entities from their
neighborhoods, which were often as distressed. It thus recommended a more
"entrepeneurial" approach to revitalization, i.e. an approach that would address the
conditions that go beyond physical rehabilitation to encompass the larger
neighborhood: its residents and institutions, the residents of the development, the
PHA staff, the local government, as well as Federal and State agencies. This
approach has been translated into the HOPE VI program, which not only provides
direct redevelopment subsidy, but also makes it possible for PHAs to form
partnerships with nonprofit organizations, the private sector and residents. The
subsidy can also be used to leverage additional revitalization funds.
Furthering the questioning initiated by the NCSDPH, this dissertation investigates how
the program's integration ideal is translated into the physical and social fabrics of
public housing developments, across the nation. Louie's thesis (1994) illustrated what
the assumptions about this integration ideal meant for the project/neighborhood
initerface. She found that these assumptions have led to two re-design philosophies:
one toward project-neighborhood integration and the other toward the sustaining of
project enclaves. While her research was based on a six-city sample of the earliest
grantees, this dissertation will ascertain whether these re-design trends -- three years
into the program -- are still predominant and based on vaguely-defined assumptions.
The second source is a HUD-sponsored report authored by a Cambridge-based
consulting firm -- Abt Associates -- entitled A Historical and Baseline Evaluation of
HOPE VI. The three-volume report, filed in 1996, is the first in a series of long-term
effectiveness evaluations of HOPE VI. For each of fifteen sites, local research
affiliates will track interventions and outcomes over a ten-year period. Abt's mandate
is to synthesize results and provide a cross-cutting national portrait of public housing
redevelopment. Among the general themes studied by Abt were the physical structure
of developments, their management systems, the social and economic well-being of
residents, and the conditions of neighborhoods surrounding the developments. It
should be highlighted that the first Abt report contained a minimum of information
about the proposed re-design guidelines for each case. The summarized descriptions
of physical plans presented only the broadest design objectives, with an emphasis on
the number of new units.
The analytical content of the dissertation's chapters is founded on Abt's findings,
which may be summarized as follows: 1) most developments exhibit serious design
and site flaws.' This finding is indicative of the fact that isolation or integration may be
differently interpreted by actors involved in the redevelopment process; 2) residents
Interestingly, the consultants highlighted that while "outside" researchers found existing conditions to be rather poor, the
majority of residents reported them to be "very" to "somewhat" satisfactory (Abt, 1996: iii). This finding is telling of the fact thatisolation and integration may be interpreted differently by actors involved in redevelopment.
are extremely poor, poorly educated and heavily dependent upon the safety net of
welfare; 3) even though distressed, neighborhoods are mixed-use areas where
residents are less poor than their public housing neighbors. The consultants also
found that in spite of the lack of basic goods and services at the edges of the sites,
there remained a rich network of community resources like churches and non-profit
organizations; 4) all HOPE VI strategies are based on a common set of
redevelopment goals: de-concentration, mixing incomes, demolition or rehabilitation,
family self-sufficiency and resident management; 5) all local research consulting
teams recommended site-specific indicators for long-term impact of HOPE VI on
physical and management structures, as well as on residents; 6) the success of
HOPE VI initiatives will largely depend on the quality of the partnership among PHAs,
HUD, the mayor's office, local government, the private and non-profit sectors and
tenants.
According to Abt, developments are often not considered part of the neighborhood in
which they are located (Abt, 1996: 4-19). Isolation mainly derives from physical
differentiation: public housing is architecturally separate, visibly deteriorated and
without any streets to connect to the adjacent fabrics. Physical isolation leads to
tensions between neighborhood residents and public housing tenants, the former
tending to think that public housing breeds crime and distress, and that social chaos
spills from the development toward the neighborhood. Tensions also emanate from
distrust between tenants and PHAs. In Houston and Boston, this difficult relationship
has created problems in implementing HOPE VI strategies (Abt, 1996: 4-19). In sum,
there seems to remain a prevalent deterministic notion that the poor environmental
qualities of public housing developments have had a negative impact on the social
and economic life of the neighborhood. One of this dissertation's objective is to
highlight - by using Boston's Mission Main -- the issue of public housing's
"responsibility" in exercising such a negative influence on the adjacent neighborhood.
At least 80% of the HOPE VI grant is earmarked for physical redevelopment. In 1996,
Abt found that HOPE VI plans were "remarkably similar in their design". The firm
based this observation on the fact that most plans included similar design features:
the implementation of townhouse types in a less dense pattern, landscaping,
additional outdoor lighting, and parks and green space to make the housing more
attractive (Abt, 1996: 5-16). Considering the importance of design in the HOPE VI
venture, and considering that detailed and critical descriptions of physical guidelines
were absent from Abt's report, this dissertation presents an opportunity to devise an
analytical tool for evaluating revitalization. Heavy emphasis is placed on the impact of
policy on the re-design of communities. Special attention is given to systematically
categorizing and analyzing the integrative component of design decisions by using a
comprehensive set of morphological variables involved in forging a socio-spatial
connection at the project-neighborhood scale, and also at the project-unit scale.
Research Objectives
The two main objectives of this research project ate :1) to conduct a systematic
analysis of the physical and social variables involved in integration efforts by using,
like Abt, a cross-national sample of redevelopment strategies; and 2) to identify which
factors play a role in isolating public housing projects from their surrounding
neighborhoods. In this framework, specific research objectives emerge:
Defining the Isolation to Integration Paradigm (Chapter 1)
- Identify the themes which constitute the "isolation to integration" paradigm;
- Provide an operational definition of "integration";
- Extricate the origins of an isolationist mentality which, during sixty years of
policymaking, has exerted a negative impact on the design of public housing;
Making Sense of Integration - Nationwide
a) Describing the Context for Integration (Chapter 2)
- Highlight, from a cross-national sample of HOPE VI sites, the physical and social
characteristics of pre-redevelopment neighborhoods;
- Categorize those characteristics and identify the physical and social elements of
the redevelopment strategy for each site;
b) Analyzing Integration Efforts (Chapter 3)
- Identify, illustrate and classify integration strategies at various scales of
intervention in the built environment (from the neighborhood to the building scale);
- Highlight the integrative content of each category of efforts (at all scales), in order
to define overall types based on "levels of integration" (i.e. from the least to the
most integrative efforts);
Detailing the Isolation to Integration Dynamic - Specific Example (Chapters 4 and 5)
- Highlight the roots of present-day isolation found at the edges of a case site;
- Evaluate the complex issue of HOPE VI implementation in view of complex
"realities".
Method and Data Collection
The method of investigation is twofold: Chapters 2 and 3 constitute a comparative
analysis based on a sample of fifteen HOPE VI sites; Chapters 4 and 5 use one of the
sites, Boston's Mission Main, to conduct a case study analysis. Chapter 1 establishes
an overall analytical framework founded on the duality of the isolation and integration
paradigms.
Chapter 2 is structured to provide three categories of information: first, it describes the
sample's selection process and presents types of pre-development conditions;
second, it paints portraits of both pre-development conditions and revitalization
guidelines for each site. Finally, it summarizes this information into general principles
of revitalization which are further tested in Chapter 3.
Chapter 2's descriptive information is organized into a brief history and an account of
current neighborhood and future site conditions. Data are extracted from two sources:
the application plans for HOPE VI revitalization submitted by the grantees, and/or the
baseline reports produced for Abt Associates by a team of research associates. While
these baseline reports were published by the Housing Research Foundation in August
1996 and usually comprised some thirty pages, the revitalization plans -- obtained
from either collaborating consultants or the authorities -- are substantial 400-plus page
documents detailing current neighborhood conditions (physical, administrative, social),
along with the actual redevelopment plan. Most of the plans date from 1993 to 1995,
with a few later exceptions. For most of the sites, the information is updated by a few
interviewed designers who were asked, over the telephone or in person, to describe
the latest version of the plan, discuss their design objectives and contrast them with
the HOPE VI vision.
Chapter 3 constitutes the main analytical core of the dissertation. It aims to make
sense of nationwide integration efforts by conducting a detailed comparative analysis
of the proposed revitalization plans. To achieve this goal, three categories of variables
are proposed: physical, socio-economic and organizational. The physical analysis --
which forms the major thrust of the chapter -- is loosely based on a typo-
morphological method consisting in reading the built environment at different scales of
aggregation, from the largest to the smallest inter-related elements of the urban whole
(i.e. the neighborhood, block, street and building scales). The information is
subsequently classified into types of integration strategies -- at each morphological
scale -- which are shared by a certain number of sites. Diagrams are used to
punctuate and illustrate the categorizations. Socio-economic data are also gleaned
from the revitalization plans. Since most sites, at the time HOPE VI application were
written, were not occupied by post-redevelopment residents, this part of the analysis
does not offer an evaluation of residents satisfaction. Instead, it concentrates on
highlighting guidelines for achieving socio-economic integration. Descriptors include:
the involvement of residents in planning process, the content of support and
community services, along with economic development programs. Finally, the
comparative analysis includes an organizational component aim to decipher
management models common to sites. In summary, Chapter 3 offers a cross-national
typology of integration efforts based on the overall level of integrative measures --
physical, socio-economic, cultural -- embedded in the plans.
Chapters 4 and 5 form the second part of the dissertation, which is devoted to
analyzing one specific example of redevelopment. Chapter 4 aims at detailing the
process of isolation through time. A morphogenesis method extricates and illustrates
the origins of present-day isolation forces, as they were and continue to be integral
parts of the overall urban transformation process. Chapter 5 concentrates on the
integration strategy embedded in the redevelopment plan. Sources of information for
this chapter include: monographs on Mission Hill's history, newspapers and
photographs archives, ancient and more recent maps, as well as municipal archives.
Designers and local newspapers help complete the redevelopment strategy's portrait.
Dissertation Organization
In Chapter 1, the isolation to integration paradigm provides a useful theoretical thread
to frame the interplay of public housing policy and design. First, the chapter includes
an operational definition of integration, which includes physical, socio-economic,
political and cultural dimensions. Then it highlights the origins and evolution of an
isolationist "project" mentality during sixty years of policymaking -- from the reform
era2 to Hope VI - in order to understand the government's evolving desire to have
subsidized housing stand out in the early days, only to make it fully integrated in
recent decades. Ultimately, the presentation of the HOPE VI program includes the
review of key integrationist design and policy issues such as demolition, density, New
Urbanism, income-mixing, homeownership and supportive services, which are further
discussed in following chapters.
Chapter 2 presents the sample and its selection process. Each of the sample's
developments are described and analyzed to highlight pre-redevelopment conditions
of sites and surrounding neighborhoods, as well as the nature of the redevelopment
strategies. This information yields a typology of pre-redevelopment neighborhood
conditions and a summary of issues involved in nationwide redevelopment strategies,
i.e. resident involvement, public/private partnerships, income mixing, site design
guidelines, housing programs and community programs. Sources of data for this and
the next chapter include HOPE VI Grant Application documents for each selected site
and updated information supplied by a few designers involved in the revitalization
schemes.
Chapter 3 presents results of the comparative analysis among a national sample of
integration strategies, as they relate to three sets of physical, socio-economic and
organizational variables. By characterizing and illustrating the integrative component
of each variable, types of integration strategies common to a group of developments
emerge. Among the selected physical criteria, "fencing" -- for example -- provides
information about the typical way some sites relate to (or indeed are "connected" to or
"disconnected" from) their neighborhood edges. Similarly, social criteria such as the
2 The reform era (also called the Progressive era) refers to the period that roughly covers the last three decades of the 19 '
century and ends with the First World War. Authorities and housing activists in large cities such as New York sought to
describe and bring a solution to overcrowding conditions found in tenements of the so-called slum districts.
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"location of the community center" yields knowledge about typical links established
among social programming, the location of facilities housing these programs and
users from the site and surrounding community. This chapter is intended as an
illustrated "catalogue" of typical methods currently used by planners and designers
around the country to integrate sites to neighborhoods and neighborhoods to sites.
Chapter 4 isolates one case -- Boston's Mission Main -- to make clear which factors
were and continue to be involved in the progressive isolation of the project from its
surrounding neighborhood. By conducting a "morphogenesis," the chapter in fact
confirms that four salient forces of transformation -- ranging from a pre-public housing
topography of income to post-public housing aggressive institutionalization -- have
been responsible, since colonial times, for the isolation of the Mission Hill
neighborhood and the Mission Main site. Therefore isolation has been an integral part
of that neighborhood's transformation process and stems not "from within" the site but
rather "from without".
Chapter 5, in conclusion, further explores the Mission Main redevelopment solution
to the isolation problem, and speculates about the difficulties of successfully
implementing integration in practice. The Mission Main revitalization story is in itself an
interesting and eventful tale which relates the difficulties encountered in trying to re-
connect the project and its residents to the rest of the surrounding neighborhood. The
Mission Main experience shows not only how its redevelopment strategies compare
with the national sample, but also offers a glimpse into the highly complex human
drama of revitalization.
Chapter 6, finally, offers recommendations for assessing future HOPE VI and other
similar revitalization ventures vis-a-vis the urban design impact of redevelopment. It
sketches general structuring guidelines for evaluating isolation and for implementing
integrative re-design strategies.
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework established for this dissertation is based upon the duality of
issues which constitute the "integration to isolation" paradigm. This framework follows
the idea that a historically isolationist project mentality has recently been overhauled --
within the HOPE VI context -- to embrace an integrationist orientation. This chapter
argues, first, that a policy of isolation has historically had a legible impact on the
design and deterioration of public housing environments Second, it posits that the
origins of this isolationist philosophy may be deciphered at key periods of
policymaking: during the reform era, after the 1937 Housing Act, during the post-War
years and in the last twenty years. In the end, the study of the HOPE VI integration
ideal includes the review of key design and policy issues such as demolition, density,
New Urbanism, income-mixing, homeownership and social services programs.
Chapter 1 introduces the assertions and definitions that drive the overall investigation
into the isolation and integration paradigm for public housing transformation. It also
offers a review of key policy decisions regarding the public housing program which,
from the reform era to the 1990s, have had a direct influence on the design of public
housing environments. Finally, it investigates how the cyclical interplay of isolation and
integration has provided designers, policymakers and residents with a complex
understanding of public housing integration.
1.1 - Isolation to Integration: Framework
The HOPE VI program signals a whole new movement in dealing with the severe
deterioration and isolation of public housing. This movement is founded on the
revitalization of previously isolated public housing residents and environments, and on
their integration back into the larger urban fabric that surrounds them. Integration
refers to the physical, social, economical and political re-connection of project with
neighborhood. This dissertation's main goal is to make sense of efforts, on the part of
policymakers and designers around the country, to break the cycle of a public housing
isolationist mentality and introduce a discourse centered on physical and socio-
economic integration.
The framework for this first chapter follows the idea that a historically isolationist
philosophy of public housing design has in the last decade -- and within the context of
HOPE VI -- been overhauled to embrace an integrationist orientation. To understand
this shift, the following chapter proposes a three-tiered exploration of the "isolation-to-
integration" paradigm: first, by introducing a working definition for the concept of
isolation and integration; second, by highlighting the impact traditionally isolationist
policies have had on public housing design; and finally, by discussing the meaning of
integration in the specific HOPE VI context.
1.1.1 Isolationist Project Mentality
The impact of policy on public housing design has been mostly influenced by the
government's ambivalence to interfering in a traditionally private sphere of production,
and to challenging society's skepticism vis-d-vis public ownership. As a result, national
housing policy commanded that public housing should not be made to visibly compete
with the private market stock. It also imposed on local Authorities a penurious
mindset of stark economy to prevent any appearance of undeserved luxury. But "by
going along with the notion that public housing should provide only minimal
accommodations, administrators have given the opposition its greatest ammunition"
(Bratt, 1986: 346).
This chapter argues that the very foundations of the public housing program rest on
an isolationist mentality whose roots may have sprung as early as the reform era. This
mentality has subsequently pervaded sixty years of policymaking until the HOPE VI
program shifted the orientation toward integration. Today's severely distressed public
housing developments owe much to that prevalent mindset. Large public housing
developments conjure images of un-defensible swaths of open space and institutional-
looking apartment blocks standing apart from adjacent fabrics. They convey an intent
to treat and house certain groups in ways which segregate them from the rest of urban
society.
In 1992, the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH)
established a clear link between public housing developments and their surrounding
neighborhoods, stating that "the conditions found in severely distressed public
housing often appear to be related to the conditions found in distressed urban
communities" (NCSDPH, 1992: 38). The Commission also recognized an isolationist
mentality whereas "the public housing program has a history of being treated in
isolation from other local government services and planning activities. Developments
are constructed at undesirable locations, which are removed from the city center and
thus community services" (NCSDPH, 1992: 64). Much of the burden for isolation is
related to design factors: sites are poorly located, developments are isolated from
social and commercial services and they lack proximity to mixed-income, mixed-use
neighborhoods (NCSDPH, 1992: 78).
1.1.2 Integration Orientation
The definition of "integration"' is complex since there are as many assumptions of its
meaning as there are actors involved in the process. For policymakers and design
professionals, the concept of integration carries assumptions about how public
housing residents should live, relate to or "fit in" with their neighbors in the adjoining
neighborhood. Since HOPE VI now offers them opportunities to re-design whole
developments from scratch, designers may be tempted to impose a certain vision for
the form an environment should take, and how its community should behave in it. This
vision might not, however, correspond with the needs or wishes of very low-income
residents. This tension between the interpretations of "professional/outsider" and
"resident/insider" is apparent in some examples form the sample. At Boston's Mission
Main, for instance, designers proposed that re-weaving the Mission Hill street network
through the site would be a morphologically and socially integrative measure.
1 Louie (1994) has devoted much of her MIT Masters thesis to defining project/neighborhood integration, mainly basing her
arguments on neighborhood theory. The following owes much to her work.
Residents (those living on and off the public housing site) were however more
concerned by the negative impact of traffic on the integrity of their identifiable -- albeit
isolated -- territory.
In addition to reflecting many viewpoints and assumptions, the idea of integration also
refers to a physical and social content. The most obvious trait of physical integration
has to do with the potential of a development to connect with its edges, and vice-
versa. Connection, in this sense, relates to the possibilities of extension of urban
elements (such as streets linking two adjoining areas, extended greenways or
mirroring street fagades); or of uses (such as shared community or retail facilities).
Physical integration also implies notions of continuity and permeability of certain
urban elements. The presence of large swaths of undefined open spaces or the
absence of streets within the public housing superblocks have proved strong
indicators of isolation. Physical integration relates to the notion of correspondence or
similarity between project and neighborhood. Replicating patterns or types found
outside developments' boundaries has much to do with a sense of belonging to a
seamless, unified territory. Continuity and permeability are characteristics of physical
integration notably advocated by Jane Jacobs (1961) who recognized that many
groups can share large bounded entities, especially along the edges (or seams) of
adjoining entities. Meshing edges are strong integrative means forming a fine-grained
pattern of diversified uses.
Finally, the creation of a place-based community is the most visible of integration
means. The place-based community fosters a sense of belonging to a place or
neighborhood that offers identifiable boundaries and characteristics. Re-design
strategies (which will be examined at length in subsequent chapters) are mainly based
upon the re-weaving of residential fabrics -- those within and without the site -- by
using the street as the main connecting element. Strategies also involve the re-
shaping of site and development according to principles of Defensible Space, so that
residents gain control over their territory. For instance, the creation of a clearly defined
hierarchy of public space enhances residents' potential to identify with and take
charge of their residential environment.
In its social dimension, integration refers to the fostering of a sense of "fitting in", and
to the creation of a community of public participation. Thus integration is closely tied to
the notion of belonging to a place or neighborhood, not only in the sense of being
included in a collectively identifiable and physically integrated place, but also in the
sense of mutual responsibility for that place. In other words, integration means the
creation of opportunities for social interaction. Within the HOPE VI framework, the
redevelopment of public housing aims at facilitating the interdependence of residents
with the surrounding neighborhood, and thus permits easier contact with the job
market or community services. Integration as interaction also means the fostering of
neighborliness, a sentiment at the base of interactive community life. Inclusion and
acceptance are other closely related notions of integration. Integrative methods aim at
providing equal opportunities to residents which may have been neglected and
isolated.
Integration also implies a participatory process whereby residents are involved in
the management of the development and the shaping of their dwelling environment's
destiny. The redevelopment of public housing sites with HOPE VI funds instigates
models of resident participation, models which help organize a community of public
participation and involvement toward mutual ends.
Physical and social integration are inter-linked, especially in the context of HOPE VI.
When both aspects of integration complement one another, re-weaving project with
neighborhood might be deemed "successful". It is thus understood that physically
integrated spaces (continuous, permeable and diversified) encourage positive social
interaction. In all of the plans studied, this complementary nature is strongly
emphasized, as was recommended by the NCSDPH.
The matrix below illustrates how integration ideas translate into actual redevelopment
strategies. It also contrasts these integration strategies with the perennial mentality of
isolation, and how these two mindsets (or policies) have impacted design and socio-
economic issues.
Site Design
SuperDiocK contiguration;
Configuration and orientation of
buildings failing to foster
Defensible Space
tsreaKing up oT superDiocKS to
create traditional street/block
patterns;
Defensible Space as implicit
strategy
Streets eradicated, especially Re-creation of porous streets to
Neighborhood during slum clearance weave with surrounding fabric;
Links Housing types and implementation
patterns to mirror edge conditions
Density Differentiation of density ratios Reduction of density to replicate
ratios in surrounding context
Replacement One-for-one replacement Upheld in early HOPE VI but
H ousing requirements subsequently dropped
Architectural differentiation; Types imported and adapted to
Housing Types Institutional-looking hierarchy of private/public space
patterns
4pact
SSUeS
Support
Services
Rehabilitation/modernization
programs;
Re-building on existing footprnts
Services concentrated and
centralized within the site for
resident population
Favored "tabula rasa" intervention
Commitment to socio-economic
programs for Family Self-
Sufficiency;
Intent on relocating community
facilities toward edge so that
shared by site and neighborhood
residents
Income ceilings; Income-mixing;
Tenancy Admitting preference given to Lifting of income ceilings to attract
those in lowest income groups "working" families
No neighborhood shops or No neighborhood shops or
businesses on site; businesses on site (with a few
Retail Lack of accessible exceptions), but use of site
neighborhood-type services, revitalization momentum to
mainly because of edge restructure edge retail base
deterioration
Participatory
Process
Absent from original planning
process
At the basis of all revitalization
schemes
Matrix Contrasting the Impact of Both Isolationist and Integrationist Policy on
Design and Socio-Economic Issues.
1.2 - From Turn-of-Century Reform to HOPE VI: The Origins of an Isolationist
Design Philosophy
This section traces the origins of an isolationist public housing design philosophy. To
understand these origins, a review of 2 0th century policymaking episodes
characterized by major ideological shifts highlights the isolating effect of policy on
Table 1.1 -
ftonomi
Demolition
public housing design. More specifically, four such periods are singled out: 1) the
reform era, during which a "containment" mindset formed; 2) the New Deal years,
when government first instigated an interventionist policy; 3) the post-War years, when
societal shifts paralleled an ambiguous policy; and 4) the latter decades of the
program, when a shift toward allowances and privatization announced an integration
orientation. The four periods framework attempts not only to analyze the impact of
policy on the inception of a consistent public housing design philosophy through
cycles, but also to highlight a discernibly isolationist "project" mentality.
1.2.1 - Reform
To understand the impact of policy ideals on design philosophy, one must first explore
the origins of the public housing program. The goal here is to understand the mindset
which eventually led to separating projects from neighborhoods.
Strategies for housing low-income populations in the late 1 9 th and early 2 0 th century
are most often characterized as exercises in environmental determinism. To a large
degree, the housing discourse of the latter part of the last century is tied to
immigration policies which permitted the poorest of foreign-born groups to settle in
dense downtown districts in overcrowded sub-standard tenements. Inspired by a
strong Puritan ethic, critics of the tenement problem believed that inadequate housing
conditions bred dilapidated morals and acted as a general threat to the decently
housed. The kaleidoscope of strange races that inhabited the cramped tenements
was considered a potential source of chaos threatening the urban balance. Soon this
idea that security was closely related to environmental determinants introduced
notions that certain groups living in certain types of places should be contained and
separated to stave off "contamination".
New York is the best known and studied locus of 1 9 th century tenement housing.2 It is
also the birthplace of an American low-income housing policy, albeit a brand of
2 The tenement housing type was born out of the necessity to maximize density within the constraint of New York's 25'X1 00' lot
system. These typically 5- or 6-story buildings were also called "railroad flats", and would have rooms organized like train
cars, sometimes up to nine rows of rooms from fagade to back. During the 1860s, political pressure to tackle the tenement
problem forced New Yorks Council of Hygiene and Public Health to conduct a survey of tenement conditions. The result was
the 1867 Tenement Housing Act, which provided the first comprehensive set of construction regulations to address specific
problems related to tenements. The 1867 Act first made official the subsequently inextricable link between "health" and
"design". It proposed a regulatory framework to ensure minimum sanitary standards such as ventilation. The Act was revised
in 1879 to affect matters of lot coverage. The result was the creation of the dumbbell tenement or Old Law tenement, which
covered 80% of the lot. Neither Acts were substantially enforced (for a complete historical and typological study, see Plunz
(1990)).
"restrictive" policy primarily concerned with molding social reality through the
manipulation of design. Tenement types were not designed by architects whom at that
time usually devoted their expertise to more "monumental" undertakings. Even after
MIT opened the country's first school of architecture in 1868 and the Ecole des
Beaux-Arts had produced a strong following, American architects would not hear the
plight of the poorly housed (Plunz, 1990: 40; Mumford, 1938: 181). Thus matters of
housing the poor were entirely left in the hands of intervening liberals eager to
address the larger urban population's moral sensibilities and fears:
"Articulate men of the age were obsessed with fear -- fear that the American dream was being
destroyed, that the American social system was decaying, that the country was undergoing
radical changes for the worse.. .The gentler classes trembled at the crowds of immigrants
pouring into the cities and worried.. whether America could survive the passing of the symbolic
frontier." (Friedman, 1968: 29).
The champions of the containment discourse and subsequent policy of restriction
were New York reformers Jacob Riis and Lawrence Veiller. Photojournalist Riis first
alerted New York's population to its tenement crisis with stark images of immigrants
crammed in extremely poor settings. "How the Other Half Lives", published in 1890,
was presented as a scientific report. The photographs were accompanied by text
attacking both the tenements' physical conditions as well as the immigrants
themselves for having seemingly "caused" these conditions. According to Riis, there
existed a close connection between weakness of character and the dilapidated
tenements. The "evil influence" of tenements "[touched] the family life with deadly
moral contagion" (Riis, 1890: 2). Riis, at a safe distance behind his lens and his
religious beliefs3, exposed a double-edged look at the ill-housed, at once objective in
its investigative method and prejudicial in its interpretation. In fact, Riis' views were
tinted by his belief that the single family house remained the best place for an
immigrant to become a successfully integrated American. Nevertheless, Riis' none too
objective report was largely responsible for spurring a reform-minded housing
movement founded on principles of exclusion and isolation at the turn of the century.
Lawrence Veiller's reform work, while closely related to that of Jacob Riis, aimed at
providing New York and other metropolitan areas with a strategy to intervene and
attack visible manifestations of poverty in tenement districts. Like Riis, Veiller had
relied on strong images and maps when he organized the 1900 Tenement House
3 Vale (1997: 154) has described in details the Christian undertones of Riis' message.
Exhibition to expose the horrors of the slums.4 Like many reformers, Veiller believed
that "we all lived up to our environment;" 5 that however poignant, the plight of poorly
housed immigrants had much to do with their moral character. Veiller's solution to the
tenement problem, however, remained a building-per-building policy of containment
and minimum standards.
Veiller and Riis were the strongest voices within a reform camp Friedman (1968)
likened to the "social-cost approach" to housing policy. Through policies of
containment founded on strictly physical interventions, this camp basically opposed
any legislation which would prompt the government to intervene in the housing
business (Lubove,1962:180). Thus Veiller and Riis contributed to the
"institutionalization" of a deterministic view that people and buildings share equal
responsibility in threatening the urban order. They also introduced the idea that
housing policy meant the containment of that threat through a legislation of restriction.
Another camp -- concerned with a "welfare approach" inspired by European
experiments in municipal housing -- would argue for a constructive housing legislation
buttressed by government intervention. In the minds of housing activists like Edith
Elmer Wood and Catherine Bauer, the "new goal was not simply the prevention of
poor housing through restrictive legislation, but the creation of physically integrated,
aesthetically satisfying residential environments" (Lubove,1962:185). Their argument
was also based on economic logic: the private sector could no longer take sole care of
the increased demand for good housing. In fact, numbers showed that in 1919, two
thirds of the population could pay neither rental nor purchase price.
These movements' efforts, much like the restrictive philosophy behind them, were
limited to a piecemeal, building-per-building scale of intervention. During WW1, a
shortage of homes for shipyard workers threatened the defense industry. Thus it took
a national emergency for government to get involved in the business of housing
provision. In 1916, under the Shipping Act, the U.S. Emergency Fleet Corporation was
4 His efforts culminated in the 1901 Tenement Law - also called New Law -- which went further in prescribing maximum land
coverage by tenements so that natural light could penetrate either from the back or the side of buildings. However much more
sophisticated than its 1867 and 1879 precedents (notably because it included the first privacy provision) the emphasis
remained on physical conditions.
Quoted in Friedman (1968:35). The first efforts to directly supply housing to the urban poor were sponsored by philanthropists
like Alfred T. White of New York and Robert T. Paine of Boston, who had financed the construction of a few examples of
model dumbbell tenements and inspired a limited-dividend movement (Plunz 1990: Chapter 4; Friedman, 1968:75-85).
organized. It authorized buying land to build housing for those involved in national
defense. The program produced the first examples of planned, government-
subsidized large scale communities. It proved that government could participate in
solving the problems of city growth, a domain traditionally left solely to private
entrepeneurs. Housing could be produced "without scandal, without extravagance,
without the sky falling, or the Constitution going on the scrap heap".6 It was a short-
lived federal program that produced little publicly-owned housing and was soon
abandoned "with almost indecent haste" (Friedman, 1968: 96).7
In sum, housers of the reform era were inspired by two philosophies: one, restrictive
and intent on staving off potential contamination from socially isolated populations; the
other, proactive and intent on implicating the government in creating physically and
socially integrated environments. While this last philosophy inspired some of the most
influential planning experiments in the U.S. -- as well as the government's first foray
into the housing business --, the first approach planted the seeds for an isolationist
mentality. This mentality was anchored in the view that populations with special or dire
needs were threatening and should be treated separately; that policy should aim at
restricting certain practices and, ultimately, at shaping character. Much of the reform
philosophy has subsequently permeated sixty years of public housing policymaking to
create socially and physically "separate" environments for people in need of decent
shelter.
Based on ideas which often confused physical issues of built densities with social
problems of overcrowding, early restrictive policies introduced a method of dealing
with poverty and shelter through buildings and standards. No consideration was given
to the relationship between dwelling and open space, for instance. Vale (1996: 159)
remarked that "such an unthinking provision of open outdoor public space prefigured,
unwittingly or not, the equally ill-defined site plans of many mid-twentieth century
public housing projects". This points to another facet of what would eventually turn
into an isolating project mentality, that the poor do not share equally in public life
"outside" the bounds of the project.
6 E. E. Wood (1931), quoted in Cole (1975: 21).
By 1919, all units built under this first public housing program were ordered to be sold, but not before reformers were
convinced that government should play and active and direct role in housing the poor.
1.2.2 - The 1937 Housing Act
Finally, an interventionist approach was prompted by another emergency, the great
Depression. Unprecedented pressures on the government forced it to implement
public building measures to address the needs of the poor and to create jobs. Among
those measures was the first public housing program which harbored a strong
isolationist mentality. This attitude manifested itself in three main areas of policy: 1) at
the ideological level of public intervention within a capitalist system; 2) the area of
exclusionary tenancy mechanisms; and 3) within isolating slum clearance strategies.
Government Ambivalence
Under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, newly-elected President
Roosevelt created the Public Works Administration (PWA), a comprehensive building
program which authorized issuing loans for the construction of low-cost housing and
slum clearance projects. The housing industry, at the beginning of the 1930s, was but
one of many sectors of the economy in need of assistance: unemployment rates were
high, wage levels were depressed, the monetary and fiscal systems were in
shambles, and the public's faith in capitalism was deeply shaken by the Crash.
Concurrently, urban slums were seen as chronically un-safe, un-healthy and
threatening cesspools of poverty which had to be dealt with. They also offered an
opportunity for economic investment.
The housing division of the PWA set the stage for the passage of the Wagner-Steagall
Housing Act of 1937 which created the U. S. Housing Authority (USHA) and
established the first locally-administered public housing program. Goals of the Act
sought, first, "to alleviate present and recurring unemployment," and then "to remedy
the unsafe and unsanitary dwellings for families of low-income, in rural or urban
communities, that are injurious to the health, safety and morals of the citizens of the
nation" (Straus, 1944: 22). Public housing was seen as a multi-purpose activity: a way
of stimulating employment, of assisting the crippled housing industry, of eliminating
slums and of increasing the stock of low-cost, low-income housing (Meehan, 1979:
16).
Created from scratch, the public housing program had to overcome many obstacles.
Mainly, it had to placate strong opposition from wealthy and powerful private interests,
namely the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), which considered
housing to be the private sector's chasse gard6e. NAREB favored federal support for
mortgage insurance to stimulate homeownership and home sales but opposed all
other government incursion in the housing business. Such private lobbying would
govern the government's inclusion of explicit protective mechanisms within the law.
Among them were the creation of local Housing Authorities to transfer titles of public
property8, as well as the adoption of a "no-frills" attitude which ensured a physical
differentiation between houses publicly and privately owned.
Opposition also came from within mainstream American society which believed that
public ownership was intrinsically wrong since poverty was a deserved state that could
be avoided through hard work and self-reliance. When President Hoover called a
national Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership in 1931, the idea that
owning one's home was an ambition shared by virtually all Americans was already
deeply ingrained. Homeownership was a measure of an individual's social worth or
status. So when government decided to interfere in this area, homeowners believed
that low-income housing implemented nearby would lower the re-sale value of their
property (Perrin, 1977:143). This belief ultimately contributed to enforce physical and
social separation (often by way of exclusionary zoning mechanisms) of public housing
projects in the city from single-family homes in the suburbs.
From the beginning, government's interventionist take on public housing policy was
influenced by pressures from real estate interests and middle-class sensibilities. As a
result, public housing policy incorporated an ambiguous view of low-income housing
provision. While recognizing the need to provide shelter, it also sought to protect the
private industry and the deeply ingrained middle-class values. The ambivalence of the
public housing program was probably reinforced by the temporary nature of
emergency measures. Yet it translated into the design of developments which were
made to look different from privately built housing, so that they would clearly be
identified as subsidized environments. It also translated into the poor location of public
housing projects, which were most often ensconced in cleared slums, away from the
suburban mainstay of middle-class ideals.
8 Lawyers argued that the government's power of eminent domain to acquire land to be cleared was not a public purpose. In
Boston, for instance, a South Boston family refusing to move and make way for wrecking crews argued not only that slum
clearance was not a public concern, but that the primary object of the 1937 law was to stimulate the building industry and not
to provide low-income housing (Jamaica Plain Press, Nov. 23rd, 1939). A 1935 ruling to that effect (U.S. Vs. Certain Lands in
City of Louisville) was however sidestepped in 1936 when a New York court held that slum clearance was indeed a public use
since it protected and safeguarded the entire public from the menace of the slums (Friedman, 1968: 101-2).
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Exclusionary Tenancy Mechanisms
The basic legal framework of the 1937 Act was simple: a federal grant would take care
of the hard costs related to the direct provision of housing, i.e. the cost of acquiring
land, razing slums and building anew. The yearly costs of maintaining the property
would be covered by the actual rents charged to tenants. This latter mechanism was
included so that tenants were made partly responsible in sharing the cost burden.
Policy also made sure that public housing built under the 1937 Act would be inhabited
by those who could pay for their own way. Developments would mainly be filled with
deserving but underpaid workers, the innocent victims of economic reverses, who
needed a 'break' to tide them over the lean years. The deeply ingrained ideal that "in a
healthy housing project and in a healthy society members of the deserving, working
poor predominate" would form the thrust of national policy for years to come
(Friedman, 1968: 109).
The conditions of tenancy were also a pivotal variable of the public housing discourse.
In 1937, the tenancy policy was based on principles of exclusion: admission depended
on a tenant's ability to pay rent, but all who could afford housing on the private market
would systematically be excluded. Under pressures from the real estate sector, rent
ceiling mechanisms were enforced whereby the maximum allowable income was 80%
of the area's median income level. The idea was that the private sector's clientele
could not be lured into publicly owned housing, even though the number of market-
generated affordable housing units was often miscalculated (Meehan, 1979: 24).
While they were first introduced as measures affording those temporarily (but
deserving) submerged a place to regroup, rent ceilings incurred the increasing
concentration, separation and stigmatization of people in developments basically built
to stand out - not only physically but also socio-economically -- from what surrounded
them.
Isolating Slum Clearance and Reconstruction Strategies
The 1937 Act coupled public housing construction with a slum clearance program, a
dual goal which pleased both reformers troubled by the social-cost of "physical"
slums, and reformers concerned with the welfare of temporarily submerged tenants.
Straus however highlighted that "the purpose of public housing is not to wipe out
slums but to provide good homes and healthful living conditions for low-income
families... Under the USHA program, slums are eliminated in the same measure that
new housing is built; the effect of the program is that the community exchanges bad
housing for good" (Straus, 1944: 48). The Act had an "equivalent elimination"
agreement under which the city was required to vacate and/or demolish as many slum
dwellings as the local housing authority would build in replacement. The equivalent
elimination clause was designed to ensure that: 1) it would be impossible for public
housing to become a large-scale resettlement program, moving the urban poor toward
the fringe, by then increasingly reserved for the middle-class. Thus projects would
mostly remain safely tucked in razed inner-city slum areas, in clearly separate "slums
of hope". And 2) public housing could not spur a large increase in the overall housing
stock. Not interfering with the private sector was further ensured by provisions to have
public housing look different from what was privately produced: houses were sturdy,
functional, cheap and without frills (Friedman, 1968: 112; Bratt, 1988: 337; Churchill,
1945: 122). Housing advocates of the time argued that public housing had to be made
sturdier if it were to last the sixty years during which government agreed to make
loans to local authorities. The idea of durability was one step away from the idea of
austerity, a principle which conservatives put into law, adding a clause to the Wagner-
Steagall Act that prohibited "the use of elaborate or expensive design materials" (Von
Hoffman, 1997: 48).
Thirty years later, Friedman put a heavy burden on the government's endorsement of
no-frills provisions, which were privately imposed and probably the most visibly
influential variable involved in enforcing a post-1937 isolationist project mentality:
"That public housing should not have any 'frills' was almost taken for granted. No one stopped
to consider that attractive urban architecture benefits everyone if it benefits anyone...
Congress... was cost-conscious; it did not want its public housing, any more than its jails, to be
luxurious... These limitations, along with a bureaucratic propensity toward timid architecture,
virtually ensured that public housing would be minimum housing in looks and life-style; it would
be physically better and safer than the slums, but it would never grace the landscape and bring
pleasure to the eye. That was the price paid for keeping government in bounds" (Friedman,
1968: 113).
Other critics like Meehan were more careful in blaming design for fostering an
isolationist philosophy. His argument was that, while the quality of public housing
construction was often poor and sometimes grossly inadequate, this was generally
untrue of "first generation" public housing developments, i.e. pre-War or pre-1950s
production. Design inadequacies were characteristic of "second generation"
developments which were plagued by a chronic decline in maintenance, due to faulty
fiscal policies and by shifting socio-economic conditions. Thus construction of no-frills
post-1937 public housing developments could not be blamed for incurring physical
and social isolation.
In any case, the public housing program was halted in 1944 with the onset of the
second World War. "Prematurely ossified,"9 it would be resuscitated in 1949, with the
main difference that public housing would no longer be an emergency measure of
temporary help, but a permanent shelter program for those excluded from mainstream
society (Bratt, 1986: 339).
This section has illustrated how the mindset of the American middle class (and the
real estate industry) has been influential in shaping a public housing policy of
separation. Public ownership of housing went against the deeply rooted idea of
homeownership as a symbol of individual status and American values such as hard
work, patriotism and family life. Thus access to public housing had to be deserved and
had to be made to look different, two precepts which would contribute to further isolate
and stigmatize the urban poor. The ambivalence of government vis-e-vis intervention
in the housing industry, exclusionary tenancy mechanisms and isolating slum
clearance tactics all contributed to anchor the idea that providing decent shelter meant
reserving visually different and geographically separate projects for people with
different needs. Again, a policy of containment and isolation born of the reform
mindset encouraged to restrain certain groups to certain places in the hope they
would improve; and to restrain government intervention so that it would not interfere in
the private sector.
The Impact of the 1937 Law on Design
Superblock Configuration
At a time when housing was becoming a hotly debated issue, a group of architects,
planners, economists and social critics formed, in 1923, the Regional Planning
Association of America (RPAA) to promote the advantages of large-scale community
planning. Inspired by War housing, the RPAA10 also pushed the notion that
9 Bauer (1957), in Mitchell (1985: 277).
10 The RPAA formed around a nucleus of two architects: Charles Whitaker, editor at the AIA Journal, and Clarence Stein,
appointed chairman of New York's Commission of Housing and Regional Planning by Governor Smith. Other members
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government involvement in urban housing and planning should not only be a matter of
emergency, but should become permanent national policy. The restrictive approach to
housing, as devised by the New York reformers, had also by then been deemed
inadequate. Thus the RPAA introduced the notion that environments are dynamic,
complex entities whose physical, social, cultural and economic aspects should be
grasped at the larger regional scale. They stressed the need for adequate sunlight,
recreational and community facilities, privacy and open space to create complete and
fulfilling environments. These holistic notions were directly tied to the Garden City idea
whereby housing was not just a matter of shelter or reform-minded piecemeal
intervention, but an element linked to other social needs of the city as a whole.
Already, Parker and Unwin had realized the new English towns of Welwyn and
Letchworth, the first examples of a Garden Cities. And Raymond Unwin, in his 1912
"Nothing Gained by Overcrowding", had demonstrated the futility of urban congestion
exemplified by the wasteful relationship between street frontage and roadwork. This
concept led Stein and Wright to devise their "superblock" concept, which would
influence the design of public housing for decades to come (Mumford, 1938: 184,490).
When in 1928 Stein and Wright built Radburn -- the first completely planned American
community for the motor age -- the superblock construct was at the base of the
planning experiment. The idea was to safely segregate houses from the noise of
streets and benefit from a communal open space linked to a park. The superblock
configuration itself was not new: Parker and Unwin had introduced it in their plan for
London's Hampstead Garden Suburb. It was the use of the superblock as an "inter-
connectible" planning unit that was ground-breaking (Stein, 1957: 44). This latter
innovation was a direct application of the Neighborhood Unit principle as proposed by
Clarence Perry in the 1929 Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs, and in
which each superblock was planned in relation to a school, a playground and a
swimming pool (Stein, 1957: 17).
Mumford agreed that "to preserve quiet and increase safety, no through streets should
be permitted within a residential community, and to effect economy, service roads
should be reduced in number and width to the smallest area possible; good planning
saves enough on streets to pay for parks" (Mumford, 1932: 188). Straus extolled the
included architects Henry Wright and Frederick Ackerman, critic Lewis Mumford, developer Alexander Bing, and economist
Stuart Chase.
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economic and social advantages of large-scale developments. Only an environment
planned on a large scale could afford to include "play areas, wading pools, community
rooms, and small parks", in brief "the opportunities for a better kind of life, emotional
and physical" (Straus, 1945: 123).
Although tremendously influential in housing circles, the Radburn and Sunnyside
experiments did not impact the overall stock of low-income housing. Nevertheless, the
notion of the neighborhood as the key planning unit along with the superblock concept
were soon appropriated by public housing designers, but with the intent to serve
isolated projects and not the neighborhoods in which they were implemented. The
U.S. Housing Authority, Churchill wrote in 1945, "did spread throughout the country
the idea of the superblock and the beginning of thinking in terms of neighborhood
planning. It failed, notoriously, to integrate the projects either with any general plan for
the city or with the character of existing neighborhoods" (Churchill, 1945: 123). Bauer
blamed public housing designers, eager to discard the "chaotic individualism and
wasteful crudity of the ubiquitous gridiron street pattern,"" for embracing English-
rooted principles of large-scale community design in such a rigid fashion as to reject
its healthy "experimental" nature. The result was to impose de-humanized, unilateral
"collectivist" principles unsuited to American society.
The RPAA is probably responsible for acquainting public housing designers with the
social, economic and environmental advantages of the superblock construct. But in
the context of a penurious and no-frills policy, the public housing superblock stood out
not only as an alien morphological element amidst 1 9th century neighborhood
patterns, but also as an ill-programmed space devoid of a sense of place. Jacobs
(1961: 20) mainly blames the RPAA for demonstrating and popularizing the idea that
in the context of planning for low-income populations, the street is a bad environment
for humans and houses should turn away from it. In the post-War years, superblocks
became no-man's-lands, rendering residents vulnerable. The superblock became
inextricably linked to the idea of the isolated project.
Apartment Buildings
At the inception of the 1937 Housing Act, there was an assumption on the part of
housers, that the apartment building represented the best architectural type for
subsidized housing. This assumption was rooted in an economic argument stating that
ownership of a detached house, in times of economic depression, offered too limited
an option and too strong a burden for the temporarily submerged middle-class. This
assumption was also based on stylistic criteria which on the one hand translated
strong criticism of the commercially-developed 1920s bungalow tracts; and, on the
other hand, were influenced by government-funded European social housing
programs. These programs yielded a functional, streamlined image for housing
structures, an image already championed by the modernist architects and introduced
in the U.S. by Catherine Bauer when she wrote Modern Housing in 193412
In their housing discourse, European Modernists sought to introduce normative
standards and impress a new scientific approach to human behavior. In Germany
especially, architects Ernst May and Walter Gropius had experimented with a brand of
functionalism and standardization that would embody the daily needs of the mass.
Notions of community housing -- Seidlungen -- and of strip housing -- Zeilenbau -- had
been developed at the Bauhaus and permeated the 1920s housing program for
Frankfurt. This new vocabulary was very different from the English Garden City's
curvilinear designs which inspired Stein's residential townhouses for American garden
suburbs. Henry Wright, on the other hand, had become by the 1930s an enthusiastic
proponent of the European modernist movement. In his Rehousing Urban America
(1932), he condemned America's old fashioned clinging to the single-family dwelling;
he was in favor of linear and low-cost German multi-family types.
The imposition of a largely homogeneous architectural type -- the apartment building-
contributed to further isolate subsidized populations from the aspirations of
mainstream America. Not only were people singled out by income, they were also
differentiated by the type of housing imposed from above by planners and
policymakers.
Bauer, in Cole (1975: 666).
12 Catherine Bauer, was also very impressed by Europe's rationalized solution to housing. In her treatise, she introduced
examples of European housing policies and advocated that the American government should be involved in the provision of
low-income housing. In her book, Bauer sought to present Americans with new living standards, planning methods as well as
means of financing and control for the creation of modern environments.
1.2.3 - The 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts
After the War, it became increasingly difficult for housing activists to convince
everyone of the necessity of a public housing program that was not tied to emergency
measures. In fact, the Wagner-Ellender-Taft Housing Act of 1949 took four years to
successfully pass, and only with the thinnest margin.13 During the 1940s, a new
discourse had evolved within the planning community which equated blight with land
overcrowding inherited by chaotic 19 th century land patterns. "Conservative
businessmen, civic leaders, planners and liberal housers for various and sometimes
conflicting reasons concurred that urban revitalization necessitated federal
intervention" (Bauman, 1988: 233-4). By then, the public housing program had taken a
serious beating from the NAREB and its conservative allies. Housing advocates,
eager to save the program, expected to strengthen their position by accepting
government subsidies for private development in exchange for some units of public
housing to re-house those displaced by revitalization (Hays, 1985: 176). The 1949
Housing Act was indeed born out of an uneasy alliance between two foes: those who
saw economic development as national policy's main goal, and those considering the
focus to be the supply of low-income housing. Proponents of clearance and
revitalization were willing to swallow the "bitter pill of public housing" if it were
sweetened with the promise of renewal (Hays, 1985: 177).
In the end, the Act seemingly made housing its main concern. It established a national
goal to procure a decent home in a "decent environment for every American".
Congress authorized the development of 165,000 units each year for the next five
years.14 The law provided mechanisms for funding large-scale redevelopment,
ostensibly for slum clearance in tandem with the construction of public housing for
displaced families (Mitchell, 1985: 194).15 Planning for large-scale post-War
developments proved one of the more isolationist measure of public housing policy,
introducing alien superblock patterns and abstractedly imported architectural types in
inner cities.
13 The public housing program escaped complete deletion by a margin of 5 votes in the House of Representatives (Meehan,
1979: 32).
Only 250,000 units were actually funded during the whole of the 1950s (Meehan, 1979: 32).
15 The 1949 Act had a "predominantly residential requirement" which ultimately proved toothless because it did not require post-
clearance construction to be residential or for low- and moderate-income people, nor did it specify that displaced slum
dwellers had to be relocated in new housing built elsewhere (Weiss, 1988: 263).
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The duality or ambivalence in policy goals was, in the post-War years, only one of the
problems which would eventually influence the fate of the public housing program.
Major shifts in the social and economic fabrics within the city as a whole were mirrored
in public housing developments. During and shortly after the War, special
dispensations allowed War workers and veterans to live in public housing
developments which were kept full. Tenant incomes were above levels imposed by
regulations, thereby permitting local Authorities to operate at the lowest costs. But at
the dawn of the 1950s, many of these tenants over the income limits were forced out.
Occupancy fell and maintenance costs started to steadily increase. Thus
environments which were first conceived as way stations for the temporarily
submerged working poor, gradually became havens for a concentrated mass of
dependent persons -- mostly displaced or migrating minorities -- unable to improve
their lot on their own. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, public housing populations
became increasingly segregated by race and income to mostly include Blacks, the
elderly, single female heads of households and the unemployed (Meehan,1979: 34;
Bratt, 1986: 339; Mitchell, 1985: 195). Exclusionary tenancy mechanisms coupled with
profound societal shifts produced deeply isolationist methods of differentiating whole
populations and house them in equally differentiated environments.
Meanwhile, the financing system for operating public housing developments remained
unchanged in the face of such shifts. In accordance with the 1937 Act, local housing
authorities were still responsible for operating costs and relied on rents as their only
source of income. According to Meehan, the fiscal arrangements made by Congress
in 1937 were one of the most important factor in the eventual breakdown of the
conventional public housing program. In his view, the rigid fiscal strategy for operating
public housing - which was based on a stable relationship among costs, rents and
tenants' income -- could not adapt to face such important post-War societal pressures
as inflation, demographic change, energy costs and urban renewal displacement. By
the late 1960s, many large local housing authorities could not offer the level of
services disadvantaged tenants needed and they ultimately became the slumlords
they were supposed to have replaced (Meehan, 1979: 36). The lack of services and
upkeep accelerated the severe deterioration of public housing developments
throughout the country to the extent where these large portions of neighborhoods
became completely isolated physically and socially.
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With the onset of the 1954 Housing Act, urban redevelopment made a place for urban
renewal programs. Less importance was given to public housing construction. The Act
"gradually dubbed public housing a handmaiden of renewal rather than a blushing
bride of redevelopment as it had been under the law of 1949" (Bauman, 1988: 246).
Urban renewal, in the literature, was equated with mass displacements of poor
populations to build high-income housing, and to a mounting barrage of criticism
culminating in the 1960s (Wilson et al.; Anderson). Weiss called public housing "the
political infrastructure of urban renewal" (Weiss, 1988: 264). While proponents of
urban renewal welcomed it as a powerful corrective tool destined to redress the errors
of a chaotic urban planning past, critics questioned its emphasis toward rebuilding
downtowns in the interest of those in business circles. The logic of urban renewal was
that slum areas, especially those disgracing central business districts, should be razed
to make place for higher income housing and institutional uses. Providing tangible
symbols of civic progress would not only augment property tax bases and enhance
the appearance of formerly run-down central sections, but also lure back middle-class
leadership exiled in the power-mower belt (Abrams: 570).
The end-result of razing whole urban neighborhoods and scattering residents
destroyed the valuable and unique social ties that have developed over decades.
Already in 1957, Catherine Bauer warned that "Operation Fix-Up" would bring a
relocation crisis that could not be ignored.16 Evidence of urban renewal's social costs
prompted critics like Gans to condemn and caricature the program in these terms:
"Suppose that the government decided that jalopies were a menace to public safety and a
blight on the beauty of our highways, and therefore took them away from their drivers.
Suppose, then, that to replenish the supply of automobiles, it gave these drivers a hundred
dollars each to buy a good used car and also make special grants to General Motors, Ford and
Chrysler to lower the cost - although not necessarily the price - of Cadillacs, Lincolns and
Imperials by a few hundred dollars. Absurd as this may sound, change the jalopies to slum
housing, and I have described, with only slight poetic license, the first fifteen years of a federal
program called urban renewal" (in Wilson: 537).
The post-War housing laws, which enabled urban renewal mechanisms, were more
centered upon a preoccupation with shoring up the buildings trades, than with
providing decent shelter to every American.
The Impact of Post-War Policy on Design
Type and Site Configuration
The previous section has alluded to the poor design quality of second-generation
public housing buildings and sites. It also introduced the idea that planners and
housers, inspired by European experiments, advocated the multi-unit or apartment
building type as best suited for "project" planning.
Design, according to Bauer (1957), was partly responsible for what she famously
termed "The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing", especially the typological imposition
of vertical, "beehive type" living on low-income families who are inclined to prefer
ground-level living. She was most critical of the size of projects and of their
standardized aesthetics, which were reminiscent of a monotonous, dense and
institutional-looking architecture of charity:
"The public housing project therefore continues to be laid out as a 'community unit', as large as
possible and entirely divorced from its neighborhood surroundings, even though this only
dramatizes the segregation of charity-case families. Standardization is emphasized rather than
alleviated in project design, as a glorification of efficient production methods and an expression
of the goal of 'decent, safe and sanitary' housing for all. But the bleak symbols of productive
efficiency and 'minimum standards' are hardly an adequate or satisfactory expression of the
values associated with American home life" (in Mitchell, 1985: 283).
During the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in some larger cities, high-rise projects came
to dominate the production of a second generation of public housing. Again, European
modernism proved a prevalent source of influence. Le Corbusier's visions of vast,
unencumbered open spaces dotted by slick towers were especially powerful.
Designers came to subscribe to the notion that elevator buildings equipped with airy
gallery-corridors would reproduce the vitality and complexity of earth-bound sidewalks
in the air. They also considered that low-income families had the same desire to live in
skyscrapers as wealthier city dwellers (Von Hoffman, 1997:48). An economic
argument also alleged that large-scale structures would make for savings in
construction and site design costs. But in reality, these towers were austere slab
constructions with double-loaded corridors and skip-stop elevators, abstractedly sited
onto superblocks of ill-programmed open spaces. Costs soon soared with the
maintenance of elevators, vandalized interiors and dilapidating open spaces. The
inadequacy of high-rise housing for low-income families became all the more evident
when middle-income Americans massively elected to dwell in post-War suburbs. Thus
16 Bauer (1957), in Mitchell: 278
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in the 1960s and early 1970s, the public housing program which had sanctioned the
construction of giant projects came under severe criticism.
In his seminal study on Defensible Space - which presented solutions to the impact of
an isolationist mentality -- Newman (1973) introduced the idea that improved
architectural and site design features can discourage criminal behavior while
increasing residents' control over their territory. These influential principles prompted
many housing authorities to re-define private backyards and fence shared courtyards
so that residents could identify intruders. A decade earlier, Jane Jacobs had written
that the public domain of the street - as it was differentiated by private spaces --
acted as a means of control for residents. Taken together, these ideas have had
significant influence on designers in the last twenty years of public housing policy and
design, encouraging them to reconsider the relationship between the public front and
the private back of units, a relationship made clear as it had been in traditional
neighborhoods.
Standardization
Among principles discussed in 1930s Europe, the idea of Existenzminimum was
thought as a dispassionate guarantee of efficiency in providing housing for the
masses. It was discussed, notably, at the 1929 Congrds international d'architecture
moderne (CIAM) in Frankfurt, and by Le Corbusier in 1931 when he proposed that the
minimum habitable cell equaled 140 square feet per person (Rowe, 1993: 58).
Modernists stated that since every individual harbored the same basic needs,
standards for living space should be universalized and consequently easily mass-
produced. Mass production was an important part of the modern housing discourse
since it stipulated that a strong link between standardization and production could
achieve great economies of scale.
In the name of standardization, however, the post-War years produced several
generic environments that concentrated populations with similar disadvantages. Post-
War public housing policy had to address major societal shifts. As a result, projects
became homogeneous havens for the poor. People in need of shelter were
considered more and more a monolithic group with one common trait: their income.
17 Sociologist Lee Rainwater(1 970) brushed a painfully desperate portrait of life at St-Louis' Pruitt-Igoe and Oscar Newman
(1973) confirmed that the design inadequacies of high-rise environments were responsible for harboring criminal behavior
Thus design of public housing, as influenced by minimum standards, was devoted to
setting one part of the population apart in its own neighborhood, on the basis of
income segregation. When income segregation coincided with racial segregation,
projects became utterly isolated. A strong connection was established among
minimum standards of design, certain types of residential settings and the distinctive
homogeneity of a readily identifiable socio-economic underclass. Such was the fate of
public housing developments, those aesthetically sparse, institutional-looking
environments which effectively stigmatized disadvantaged and racially different
residents. In the end, any aesthetic appeal or lesson in functionalism Modernists might
have introduced to the mass production of low-income housing in the U.S. was
severely undermined by such popular associations. Catherine Bauer considered the
notion of minimum standards an important one that was oversimplified. When
imposed as "doctrinaire stylism" to post-War public housing environments, they
increasingly had to contend with complex social circumstances (Cole, 1975: 664).
1.2.4 - Privatization, Allowances and the Shift to Integration
Criticism of urban renewal programs did nothing much in favor of increasing the
production of public housing units.18 Mounting discontent nevertheless spurred a flurry
of amendments to the national policy during the 1960s, regarding aspects as varied as
tenancy and privatization. The Acts of 1956 and 1961, for instance, provided subsidies
not to families but to the elderly, a group which seemed the perfect public housing
tenants: they paid their rent on time, they could live in high-rise towers and they
provided a wholesome and deserving "everybody's mom and pop" image (Meehan,
1979: 37). Then in 1965, legislation initiated the first incursion of the private sector into
the production of public housing. Section 23 authorized low-income families to rent
units of privately owned housing: the authority entered into a long-term contract with
landlords and paid the difference between units' market rent and a proportion of the
tenants' income. Over 100,000 units were financed through this program which
eventually morphed into the Section 8 Existing Housing Program of 1974 (Bratt, 1986:
341). The amended law also permitted private entrepeneurs to sell local Authorities
finished "turnkey" products. To the delight of the National Association of Home
Builders, the government was seeking to relieve itself of the burden of growing
and rendering residents powerless.
18 The Act of 1949 made a commitment to build 810,000 units of public housing. Twelve years later, only 289,000 had been built
(Mitchell, 1985: 195).
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criticism toward institutionalized design19 (Meehan, 1979: 39). In 1967, the federal
government authorized local Authorities to contract out management services with
private firms. With the enactment of the 1968 Housing and Urban Development Act,
Congress set a private and public production goal of 26 million new or rehabilitated
units in the next decade, six million of which were targeted to serve low- and
moderate-income households. Public housing construction reached an all-time high of
91,000 units in 1971 (Bratt, 1986: 341). Forays in public/private partnerships were
made the main thrust of national policy with the Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1974. Between 1965 and 1974, the turnkey program accounted for the provision of
169,000 units. After 1974, the leasing policy accounted for 230,000 units compared to
an all time low of 7,000 conventional units produced in 1977 (Meehan, 1979: 16;
Mitchell, 1985: 195). Already in 1957, Bauer had foreseen the possibility of
encouraging public/private partnerships, in order to subsidize various forms of private
housing that would incorporate the popular desire for ownership (in Mitchell, 1985:
283).
Meanwhile, the gap between tenants income and Authorities maintenance costs
continued to widen, while much needed social services remained lacking. The
Housing Act of 1968 sought to expand the "social" dimension of public housing by
authorizing a number of on-site services -- such as educational and occupational
counseling - and by encouraging tenant participation in management. By 1969,
amidst loud protestation on the part of over-burdened tenants, the Brooke Amendment
sought to adjust the amount residents paid towards rent to a maximum of 25% of their
income. At the dawn of the 1970s, the watchword became "tenant participation". The
era of what Bauer had called "built-in management domination" was coming to an
end.20
After the Nixon administration's moratorium stopped all public housing activity in 1973,
other watchwords appeared: "housing allowances" or "portable subsidies". In the early
1970s, studies found that national policy should shift from a costly and inefficient
supply-side basis to an income-supplement rationale. The benefits of income
19 Other modest "privatization" mechanisms were included in Section 23 of the 1965 Act: public housing units could be sold to
tenants but this practice mainly targeted detached, semi-detached or rowhouse types; units could also be sold to non-profit
organizations willing to provide and maintain low-income housing. None of these provisions were much used (Meehan, 1979:
20 Bauer (1957), in Mitchell: 284.
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supplements were founded on notions of equity, i.e. no favored few were getting
better housing than those forced to fend for themselves in the private market. This
social justice argument was most often refuted by critics citing that other national
subsidy program, the deduction of mortgage interest on homeowners federal income
tax (Bratt, 1986; Dolbeare, 1986). In effect, the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974 introduced the Section 8 Existing Housing Certificate Program, a policy
based on the provision of certificates worth in subsidy what households would pay to
rent a privately-owned dwelling.
In twenty years, HUD has come to increasingly rely on its tenant-based certificates
program, to the point where "it sends an unmistakable federal signal that troubled
public housing projects should either be redeveloped into marketable places where
current residents will vote with their subsidies to stay, or should be phased out in favor
of subsidies that are not project-based." (Vale: 1996). The former part of this signal is
currently being tested by the HOPE VI program: it is estimated that at least one-third
of the residing population is expected to remain on the redeveloped site and another
will choose to find shelter elsewhere. In any case, policymakers now hope that these
"de-concentration for reconstruction" strategies, as advanced by Vale, will provide
equal choice for those with the least opportunities and that some of the better-
educated and better-employed will chose to stay.
* * *
Ever since Catherine Bauer announced her loss of faith in the public housing program,
design has borne much of the brunt for causing public housing's failure. The much-
publicized photographs and film footage of the crumbling and imploded Pruitt-Igoe
project in St-Louis, in the mid-1970s, helped forge a consensual image of failure: the
menacing forest of decrepit high-rises dotting a desolate landscape of fear. This
convention would endure for decades, in spite of the fact that only 7% of family public
housing consists of high-rise structures of more than 200 units, and that most of these
units are located in New York where vertical living is culturally sanctioned (Bratt, 1986:
344-5). Another convention established that all public housing is characterized by bad
conditions, even though surveys have confirmed that only 5% to 8% of developments
are severely distressed (Epp, 1994:12). In 1992, the National Commission on
Severoly nictrancim PiHlic Housina (NCSDPH) explored the variables of distress and
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drew a portrait of physical deterioration, increasing levels of poverty, inadequate
services that reached only a portion of residents, institutional abandonment, and
neighborhoods often as blighted as public housing developments. The NCSDPH
specified that: over 80% of households (in family public housing) lived below the
poverty line or with incomes lower than 20% of the local median; that households
headed by single females with dependent children are predominant; and that the
number of extremely poor households, those with incomes less than 10% of area
median income, had increased dramatically form 2.5% to 19% of the total population
between 1981 and 1991. Mainly to blame were the post-War shifts in tenancy,
whereby preference was given to the poorest of the poor. The list of physical
inadequacies was also impressive and covered issues related to poor site location
and site design, excessive scale and density, inadequate building and unit design,
inappropriate use of high-rise types for families with children, poor materials and
construction standards, and lack of facilities for resident services and programs (Epp,
1994:3; NCSDPH).
Throughout the literature, the most consistent argument for criticizing the program's
poor performance rests on national policy's perennial ambivalence toward housing the
poor. From the reform to the Depression era, then from 1937 to this day, public
housing policy was the subservient goal of larger redevelopment programs. Whatever
language was used in 1937, 1949 or 1954, rehousing the poor was basically
considered a matter of slum clearance, i.e. an isolationist exercise in the containment
of threats to the community's health, morals and aesthetic sensibility. Government's
incursion in the housing domain has consistently sought validation -- before an
intrinsically hostile constituency -- in the form of elimination and isolation rather than
provision. The ambivalence of government vis-e-vis its role as eliminator and provider
is legible in the multi-purpose policy of which housing the disadvantaged has never
been the main goal.
Reformers like Catherine Bauer maintained that public ownership of housing -- as
Europeans had discovered earlier -- made sense: governments can borrow more
cheaply than private developers and they can waive both taxes and profit. But no
amount of government benevolence could reverse the deeply rooted American
individualist ethos favoring homeownership. As reformers soon learned, the European
evnarianna in niuhlin ownershio could not be duplicated in a nation where beliefs and
values impeded on its readiness to deal with the problem of what to do with the poor.
Reformers themselves, wrote Mumford, "still [clung] to the myth of individual initiatives
[while] society [was] confusing issues of good housing with the very limited and
abstract matter of ownership" (Mumford, 1932: 183).
Briefly during the 1960s, but mostly after 1974, the government further realigned its
policy toward integration by encouraging privatization and homeownership
mechanisms which were more in line with traditional American aspirations. This trend
has culminated in the HOPE VI program's aspirations to attract the relatively well-off
and stable "working poor" elements within subsidized environments. The policy
however remains multi-purpose, as explored in the next section, including other
important goals like the revitalization of neighborhoods, economic development,
demolition and income-mixing.
1.3 - The Current Public Housing Policy Debate
"But these grounds have so many handicaps to begin with, and so much needs to be done from
scratch, that considerable public money will be needed for salvage: money will be needed for
site replanning and designing itself, which will take a heavy investment in time and imagination
because this time it cannot be done routinely or by people ignorant of what they are doing and
why; money will be needed for construction of streets and other public spaces; and probably
money will be needed for subsidy to at least some of the new building construction".
Jane Jacobs (1961), on salvaging public housing.
"We understand that design alone, no matter how brilliant, cannot solve every human problem.
Design can and should be part of the solution, but only a part. It must be accompanied by
economic and social change, what President Clinton calls community empowerment. For
example, we need a much broader income and social mix in public housing environments. We
must stop warehousing and isolating the poorest of the poor, and instead create mixed-income
racially integrated environments with upward mobility and role models for youngsters growing
up in these communities."
Henry Cisneros, as HUD Secretary, AIA meeting, Chicago (1995).
The HOPE VI program is part of HUD's national mission to reintegrate public housing
residents into the broader neighborhood, to create communities of choice and
opportunity, and to re-introduce a broader mix of income levels. HOPE VI is an
assistance program that embodies HUD's vision for "reinvented" public housing by
focusing on people, not projects. Thus HOPE VI intends to reverse the isolationist
project mentality by way of resolutely integrationist mechanisms. HOPE VI grants are
used to revitalize public housing by simultaneously addressing physical and human
needs an provii-ng c ie o-..f Lc e I Lr H s
needs and providing communities of choice 1Ut IUW-111UIII I :I bUUIILb. HUD Ias gr own
convinced that the most promising revitalization tactics are those which attack both
the isolation of the public housing authority (by working in partnership with actors from
the broader community) and the isolation of the public housing development and
residents (by blending public housing units into mixed-income communities).
The following section is composed of two parts: 1) it presents the program's policy
foundations; and 2) it introduces their impact on design issues.
1.3.1 - Policy Issues of the HOPE VI Program
Since the program's creation in 1993, HUD has maintained many of the HOPE VI
program's original goals while making important adjustments to some regulations
along the way. During the program's short life, funding cycles have highlighted
particular issues: problems of major renovations and support services, in 1993;
leveraging direct funds to create mixed-income communities, in 1994; establishing
Campuses of Learners, in 1995; incorporating New Urbanism principles, in 1996; and
preparing for the reform of welfare, in 1997.21 Each of these elements has now
become a part of many HOPE VI plans and thus requires some elaboration. In the
following section, these elements or commitments are introduced in order to identify
which of them have remained constant through funding cycles and which have been
amended.
The Recurring Themes
HOPE VI regulations have remained consistent in their commitment to three
components of the program: physical revitalization, supportive and community
programs and income-mixing. Following is an overview of the recurring themes
inherent to these perennial requirements.
Physical Revitalization
The most constant of HOPE VI's commitment has been the revitalization of public
housing through the re-design of sites and buildings. Basically, 80% of HOPE VI grant
is earmarked for the physical reconfiguration of the site and the construction (or
rehabilitation) of housing units. The main thread of all HOPE VI plans is that in order
for public housing to be economically and socially integrated into the surrounding
21 Epp summarization, Harvard Seminar, Nov. 1997.
community, physical revitalization (and integration) must constitute the cornerstone of
the redevelopment program. Most of the plans propose to weave the project back into
the larger community fabric. Heavy rehabilitation and demolition are methods used to
replicate established neighborhood patterns and to import housing types that reflect
those found in the adjacent edges. The following section describes in more depth the
major HOPE VI design issues tackled by grantees.
Community and Supportive Services
The remainder of the grant (20%) is to be spent on social services programs in two
areas: community and supportive services, both devised by authority and residents.
Community services aim at involving residents providing of services to their neighbors.
In many of the cities receiving HOPE VI money, public housing tenants are strongly
encouraged to devote a minimum of hours per week to community service. The
Corporation for National and Community Services, with HUD, has established content
guidelines for these programs. Community services are meant to engage individuals
in meaningful service on a volunteer basis through limited stipends, in collaboration
with a variety of organizations.
There is no "one size fits all" community and supportive services component to HOPE
VI. Instead, programs for each development reflect the diversity of existing
neighborhood resources, community needs and vision. Nevertheless, priorities have
included: transportation system improvements, on-site education and recreation
programs for youths, adult employment training and education, economic
development initiatives, crime prevention programs, childcare, senior activities, and
family support services. Most services are administered in cooperation with
neighborhood partners and providers such as Boys' and Girls' Clubs, YMCAs, health
clinics, churches, colleges and public library branches.
A few of HOPE VI grantees have elected to incorporate an on-site "campus of
learners" as part of the social programming component. This campus acts as an
innovative framework for the delivery of educational services, supportive services and
economic development initiatives. Private and public sector resources are tapped as
collaborating providers in this pro-active framework. The campus of learners idea was
introduced early in the HOPE VI program, mainly as a core strategy for services
delivery, It creates a scial learninn laboratory in which individuals of All ages can
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access resources to meet educational and economic needs. The idea is that school
should be emphasized as the center of a child and family-focused delivery system. A
typical campus of learners model would include a neighborhood-based elementary
school as the cornerstone, and a multi-purpose support and community service center
to provide critical linkages to an array of educational opportunities, family support
services and resources.
Income Mixing
National experience has shown that large concentrations of very-low income
populations in housing enclaves are difficult to manage. They also are said to have a
substantial negative impact on physical and social conditions in the surrounding
neighborhood, which is often as distressed as the public housing community
(NCSDPH, 1992: 38,67). New HUD policies now encourage increasing the economic
diversity in public housing to enhance the long-term sustainability of both public
housing and the neighborhood within which it is located.
Mixing groups of different income levels in distressed public housing developments is
thought to provide many benefits for the resident population. For one, the increased
number of employed persons is seen as a means to provide role models for children
and the unemployed. People with jobs are considered elements of a network of
information for those seeking employment. The logic of income mixing also applies to
businesses and institutions, which are supposedly more likely to invest in communities
with more disposable income to support their services. A broader mix of incomes
within a public housing development is designed to reflect the economic portrait of the
surrounding neighborhood, thereby proving an integration measure that will
complement physical revitalization.
One goal of income mixing is also to upgrade existing physical conditions to "market"
standards. The idea is that in order to become a mixed-income community, a
revitalized public housing environment must "attract the working poor" while
continuing to cater to the very low-income populations. In order to achieve that goal,
redevelopment schemes must address issues of design, amenities, management,
safety and security. Thus in the current context, making subsidized environments
attractive is as much a question of policy as it is of design.
Before the implementation of the HOPE VI program and under HUD's regulation that
at least 75% of units must be made available to very low-income households, many
public housing developments were unable to attract a broad range of families. When
working families' income increased, other housing options in their community became
more attractive than the "projects". This trend is verified by the fact that waiting lists for
Section 8 certificates/vouchers is, in some cities, much longer than the list for
conventional public housing units. Within the HOPE VI framework, the idea is to help
low-income families move out of severely distressed developments and convert those
places into mixed-income communities. Low-income tenants who choose to remain
on the site will be living in a significantly improved social and physical environment.
Thus Section 8 certificates are considered an essential ingredient of the income mix
strategy. In fact, HOPE VI development teams, on average, have found that one-third
of tenants have indicated their intention to stay put at the site, while one-third stated
that they would move to another development and the last third said they would use
their Section 8 vouchers to move into market units off site. While there is a
consensus that income mixing is an essential component of public housing
redevelopment, some have suggested that site's deteriorated edges (which will have
to absorb the surplus of displacees) might very well become subsidized loci of
substandard housing conditions or "Section 8 ghettos" (Barnett, 1986: 169; Glenn
Interview).
The idea of planning mixed-income communities is not new. Among precedents are
redevelopments like Chicago's Lake Parc Place, a low-income project overtaken by
gangs and criminal activity in past decades. The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA)
vacated the site in the 1980s and remodeled two of its high-rises into a privately
managed, carefully screened mixed-income community with an equal proportion of
low-income welfare recipients and employed households. A "project" which was
largely believed to be a blighting influence on its adjacent neighborhood has now
become a catalyst for low-income housing construction by the CHA.
The HOPE VI program's uniqueness is founded on the symbiotic relationship between
public housing developments and the larger communities in which they are located.
22 In New Haven, for instance, the waiting list for Section 8 certificates is 6 times longer than that for public housing. New Haven
Plan (1995: 4-3).
Epp, Harvard Seminar on HOPE VI, November 1997.
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The program recommends "holistic" processes and solutions that incorporate the
involvement of residents in the dynamics of physical, social and economic planning.
HOPE VI Revitalization Plans typically extend outside the boundaries of the site and
encompass the often complex revitalization of the surrounding neighborhood. Thus
residents and their development team have to include inter-agency coordination as
part of the participatory challenge. The complexity of the HOPE VI endeavor demands
that residents and planners make sure that the new plan for the site "fits" into the
multiple goals of several other government agencies concurrently planning
revitalization for larger parts of the city.
Homeownership
Homeownership is an important element in the notion of stabilizing neighborhoods. It
is alleged to have several positive, although indirect, effects on the quality of life in a
community. Homeownership augments residents' investment -- both financial and
psychological -- in the neighborhood, increases the average length of residency, and
enhances the development of strong neighborhood institutions.
Most HOPE VI redevelopment ventures include the abolition of ceiling rents and the
implementation of Family Self-Sufficiency programs to increase the opportunities of
public housing residents to purchase their unit and become first-time home buyers.
On-site homeownership opportunities are often coupled with citywide programs such
as the HUD-sponsored "Homeownership Zones". By encouraging public/private
partnerships to give low-income citizens more access to homeownership, the federal
government hopes to add eight million homeowners to existing numbers and reach an
all-time high rate of nationwide homeownership by the end of the decade. Ever since
government's began to provide housing, homeownership has proved a powerful
political and cultural counterpoint. Since the 1960s, public housing policy has
contained some privatization component and some thirty years later, homeownership
has become an essential and inevitable goal of revitalization.
Homeownership is considered an essential if ambitious part of the HOPE VI
redevelopment process. Its projected effect not only comprise upward mobility for low-
income tenants, but also an important leverage tool for achieving stability within the
new mixed-income and larger community by bringing in non low-income tenants.
Homeownership is expected to bring increased opportunities for Authorities and their
organizations to disperse supplementary affordable housing on scattered sites in non-
impacted neighborhoods. 25
Adjusted Orientation
This following section introduces the requirements of the HOPE VI program which
have been significantly amended: abandoning the one-for-one replacement
requirements, permitting (and indeed favoring) demolition without having to re-use
building footprints and favoring the leveraging of private funds to add to the direct
subsidy.
One-for-One Replacement
The HOPE VI Program's Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) stated, in 1993, that
units to be demolished or disposed of under the program must be replaced on a one-
for-one basis. The HOPE VI funds could be used for conventional public housing units
or other forms of replacement housing such as Section 8 certificates. The 1993
Appropriation Act allowed, as replacement housing options, to: 1) Allocate one-third of
the replacement in the form of Section 8 vouchers; and 2) restore the remaining two-
thirds with conventional public housing units and other specified homeownership
programs. Project-based assistance was also permitted under Section 18 of the 1937
Housing Act. Before 1996, Housing Authorities had to tailor their replacement
programs to these regulations and the needs of both public housing and neighborhood
communities. Relaxing the one-for-one replacement requirements -- along with the
requirement that demolished public housing had to be rebuilt upon the same building
footprints -- has permitted planners, designers and residents to consider the
demolished development a clean slate for revitalization. In fact, after 1996 most plans
included a complete demolition component. But in complement of voucher"
replacement strategies, HUD now required grantees to use the HOPE VI funds as
seed money to obtain additional non-federal monies.
HOPE VI Plus and the Leveraging of Funds
In 1994, HUD introduced the HOPE VI Plus concept to encourage grantees to pursue
leverage strategies. In practice, HOPE VI funds -- earmarked for the redevelopment of
24 Cin~rnnm HOPF VI CNU in Charleston, May 1996. In fact, this rate was attained in October 1997.
25 Epp at Harvard, Nov. 1997.
a maximum of 500 units -- would be used as seed money to attract other private or
government investment and create additional affordable and/or market rate housing,
or even expand the socio-economic component of the revitalization scheme.
1.3.2 - Design Issues
This section focuses on the physical implications of the policy requirements introduced
above.
Density and Demolition
As explained above, the post-1996 relaxation of the one-for-one replacement
requirement made the demolition of existing structures the preferred option for HOPE
VI redevelopment. This strategy allows a higher degree of flexibility in creating plans
that truly integrate the patterns of surrounding neighborhoods to the redeveloped site.
Experience has shown consistently that high densities of low-income families
clustered onto a single development prove very difficult to manage. Recent trends
point toward much smaller scale developments, for both families and the elderly. Thus
many HOPE VI redevelopments are now seeking to break up superblock
configurations and reduce densities that have contributed to isolating and stigmatizing
whole communities.
The advantages of total demolition and new construction planning schemes are
evident: they permit a more comprehensive control of overall physical integration. New
construction provides the ability and flexibility to maximize the overall livability of each
home, i.e. external and internal circulation, natural light and orientation.
Reconstruction also permits manipulating density to mirror that of the surrounding
neighborhood and generally create more private open space. The introduction (or re-
introduction) of the neighborhood street grid allows improved circulation, certainly, but
also the creation of a morphologically coherent urban environment.
The reduction of on-site density generally means a proportionate reduction of the
number of on-site publicly subsidized housing units. Replacing those units is usually
taken care of by leveraging HOPE VI funds and encouraging public/private
partnerships to appropriate scattered sites and build supplementary low-income
housing throughout the surrounding neighborhood. Replacement strategies also rely
on% the- disribution of Setfion 8 ertificates= to fu ndi then relocantion oif dispersed tnants.
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These scattered site units are often the cornerstone of a Family Self-Sufficiency
program destined to increase public housing families' opportunities for independence
and self-reliance. Opportunities usually include homeownership and educational
options. The goal is to demonstrate that the revitalization of public housing, if
approached creatively, can have a dramatic and positive impact well beyond the
boundaries of the projects.
Unit Mix
National trends indicate that the size and composition of public housing families vary
according to dynamic circumstances. Families are smaller and there is a stronger
demand by single individuals -- elderly, disabled or other -- for subsidized housing.
The goal of Authorities is to accommodate the majority of these changes in order to
maintain stability within developments and their surrounding communities. HOPE VI
strategies not only aim at providing unit plans that reflect "market standards" and
could therefore attract a "market" clientele, they also aim at including a mix of unit
types which closely responds to local needs.
There is also a consensus regarding the location of elderly or special needs housing.
Resident surveys, for instance, have indicated a strong preference for housing the
elderly in separate buildings within a family development or even in an area located
outside the development.2" Newman (1980) made the link between unit type and
population preference clear when demonstrating the principles of "communities of
interest".
New Urbanism
In the late 1980s, architects Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk (DPZ)
introduced a design vocabulary which regarded 19 th century town planning principles
as the best tools to counteract the wasteful sprawl of suburbanization. At the same
time, architect Peter Calthorpe studied the link between the decay of American cities
and the land-consumptive disaster of "non-planned" ex-urban peripheries. At the core
of urban design issues, they said, was the "fragmented metropolis" problem -- i.e. the
physical, social, economic and political segregation of certain parts of the city from the
urban whole. This problem was caused mostly by the proliferation of post-War
suburban subdivisions which were invariably depicted as bad places in which to live.
The solution, they posed, lay in the creation of "neo-traditionalist" communities that
seek to mix income groups, curb the car culture, re-introduce the street grid pattern
and encourage the use of public spaces. The idea was to study small towns and
evaluate why they "worked well", then to apply these validated principles of proportion,
scale and density to new communities. Within this framework, measures of success
included the presence of public spaces, tight residential grains, a street/block grid
network, sidewalks and a mixture of uses as well as housing types and tenure.
Creating more tightly settled environments with a strong center would naturally foster
social interactions so lacking in the fragmented metropolis. The archetype of neo-
traditionalism soon became DPZ's well-publicized town of Seaside, Florida, an 80-
acre seaside community no wider than a quarter mile and planned around a strong
center accessed from everywhere in five minutes by foot. The traditional vocabulary of
pitched roofs, porches, pergolas and picket fences which came to characterize
Seaside was not merely suggested but enforced by stylistic and typological design
codes. Seaside was criticized by some in the architectural community as a contrived
exercise in Disney-like nostalgia, a manufactured and controlled ersatz public realm
(Muschamp, 1996).
By 1991, a coterie of designers met in Yosemite National Park to formulate the first
principles for a new urbanism. Since then, a Congress of New Urbanism (CNU) has
been held every year and constitutes a movement adhered to by hundreds of
proponents from sectors of architecture, planning, real estate development and public
administration. At the 1996 CNU held in Charleston, the movement formalized its
manifesto in the form of a Charter which was defined as a democratically formulated
declaration of philosophy, principles and aspirations, rather than an operational
document. Many have drawn parallels between CNUs and CIAM, suggesting an
enduring tendency for like-minded designers to form movements and write manifestos
for wide release. In 1933, for instance, the CIAM yielded the Charte d'Athdnes, one of
the most influential documents to shape architecture and planning thinking in post-
War decades. Le Corbusier's vision of cit6s radieuses made of standardized high-
rises set in uncluttered urban parks influenced the design of public housing, as much
as the idea of segregating cities into functional districts linked by highways influenced
the development of cities. Sixty years later, the CNU charter promoted the antithesis
to the Charte d'Athdnes: the old urbanism ideas eradicated by Modernists were
26 The case of the Elm Haven development in New Haven, for example. New Haven Plan (1995): 4-5.
resuscitated as New Urbanism. The debate over an ideological Modernist-New
Urbanist continuum has been described as an opposition between a deeply
conservative "establishment steeped in avant-garde modernist rhetoric", and resisting
"young architects who, while they idealistically seek to change society through design
-- the original modernist aim -- accept the balanced order of classical architecture as a
style and as a progressive political idea".27
By 1996, a few examples of New Urbanist design had been built, almost all located at
the periphery of cities. Seaside had grown into such a success that property values
had significantly increased and gotten out of the reach of most dwellers. Other models
included the Kentlands development, a prosperous new community with a decorous
Colonial-style architecture in the Washington D.C. suburbs; and Harbor Town,
Tennessee, a development located just 5 minutes outside downtown Memphis which
some described as "gentrification-from-scratch". While many critics equated New
Urbanism with elitist havens of exclusivity a charge similar to Neo-traditionalists'
against the post-War suburbs - others highlighted the duality of the movement's
"elitist and populist, liberal and conservative" ideals. 29 Muschamp (1996) criticized the
New Urbanist movement's goal of creating new compact environments at the
periphery when many environmentalists are seeking solutions to reconfigure existing
suburbs and increase their density to house those who cannot afford to live in
gentrified urban centers.
Sensitive to such criticism, New Urbanists have in the last few years concentrated on
applying their principles to revitalizing distressed inner cities. During a Harvard
seminar in 1996, New Urbanists and housing policymakers met to evaluate inner city
applications to the redevelopment of public housing. A few weeks earlier, then HUD
Secretary Henry Cisneros30 had signed the CNU Charter at Charleston, formalizing
HUD's intention to crusade alongside New Urbanists in "[revitalizing and transforming]
distressed neighborhoods and bring a real sense of physical and social community to
places that now lack a sense of place and purpose".31 Since then, HUD has given
27 In Utne Reader (Cities), May 1994.
28 In Newsweek, January 1995.
29 In Charlotte Observer, February 1995.
30 British neo-traditionalist Rob Krier, the advisor to the Prince of Wales in matters architectural, was a guest-speaker at the
Charleston congress but refused to sign the Charter over the inclusion of a clause against mimicking historic forms
(Muschamp, 1996).
From Cisneros Address at the Charleston CNU, May 1996.
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priority to the implementation of New Urbanism principles in HOPE VI grant
applications. The CNU has been clever at cementing a close alliance not only with the
Clinton administration and its policymakers, but also "with virtually every sector that
affects the art and business of building"32 and , most recently, with the Mayors'
Institute on City Design.33
In tackling the revitalization of distressed public housing communities, the CNU has
conceded that physical solutions alone cannot solve social and economic problems,
neither could economic vitality, social stability and environmental health be sustained
without a coherent and supportive design framework. This idea that New Urbanism
imposes neither esthetic nor stylistic code, but a framework in which to develop locally
specific solutions for the redevelopment of public housing, is a central one. Designers
interviewed as part of this study have stated their positive views of New Urbanism.
They also signaled the independence of their particular approach to designing urban
housing, approaches which may have stemmed from different philosophical sources
but which nonetheless converge in a similar result: creating in-fill housing that
adequately weaves in an already traditional neighborhood.34
1.3.3 - Conclusions
Since its inception in 1993, HOPE VI has encompassed an impressive number of
issues. All agree that the $2.7 billion HOPE VI program is an unprecedented
revitalization program, rich in flexible, risk-taking policies, as well as creative issues,
some of which are highlighted below.
One of the most sensitive design issue of the revitalization venture is that of de-
densification and demolition. Some designers have pointed to a trend fast becoming a
"flaw" in public housing redevelopment policy: the by-pass of the one-for-one
replacement regulation in favor of a more relaxed demolition-for-reconstruction policy.
32 In New York Times, June 1996.
Harvard Seminar on HOPE VI, November 1997.
34 Planner Daniel Glenn, for instance, views New Urbanism as a theoretical umbrella which acts as a philosophical counterpart
to Modernism. As much as the modernist Movement claimed as its own the construction of social housing fifty years ago,
New Urbanism is today "an excuse to claim the [public housing] project as obsolete". He adds that adopting a design
philosophy founded on the re-creation of traditional neighborhoods will not solve the ills of public housing. One only has to
"look at (the morphologically sound neighborhood of] East L.A. (to understand that] neighborhood tradition is not the way".
nnrntrating the poorest of the poor into one isolated development is, of course, bad policy: but that is "not a 'physical'
reality. To blame it all on architecture is absurd". Interview, Summer 1997.
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The essence of the HOPE VI program -- to tackle the worst of the worst and re-shape
it so that it would be integrated into the surrounding context -- has been distorted into
a simplistic equation: rehabilitating the old is less effective than rebuilding the new.
Under the helm of HUD Secretary Cisneros and the influence of the Republican
Congress, HOPE VI has evolved into a demolition program with a goal of 100,000
destroyed public housing units.35
Demolition is not solely a policy concern but also an architectural issue. The typical
pre-WW Il public housing development was a sturdy, low-rise concrete and brick
construction built to last 100 years. The 2- and 3-story public housing structures being
currently built in some cities -- using wood structures and non-brick facings -- will offer
a much more reduced life span of "20 to 50 years".36 The now-pervasive policy of
demolition is currently ignoring all large-scale rehabilitation alternatives for buildings
that could never be replaced with structures of similar structural caliber. In many
cases, discarded streets and infrastructure still exist underneath the distressed
development and complete demolition is often an unnecessarily drastic method for re-
connecting to the adjacent urban grid.37
Overall, demolition is a good marketing strategy. An image of desolation is more
effectively transformed with "new" than with "old". Some designers see demolition as
a trend rather than policy, and compare it to the extreme measures inherited from the
blind urban renewal era. The press has strongly contributed to making demolition a
popular redevelopment strategy by associating public housing desolation with
powerful images of toppling towers at Pruitt-Igoe and Cabrini-Green.
* * *
This chapter, after exploring the origins of the isolationist "project" mentality, has
introduced the most salient issues as the basis of the HOPE VI integration discourse.
In the following chapters, fifteen examples of revitalization founded on re-connecting
project with neighborhood are introduced (Chapter 2), then analyzed and classified
(Chapter 3).
35 From an Interview conducted with Daniel Glenn, designer and project manager at Tise, Hurwitz and Diamond of Brookline,
Ma. (August 1997).
36 Ibid. Glenn was referring to the Indianapolis case.
Joan Goody (of the Goody, Clancy design firm of Boston) also -riticized this trend at the Harvard HOPE VI Conference
(November 1997) and cited the successful rehabilitation precedent of Boston's Harbor Point.
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CHAPTER 2: NATION WIDE INTEGRATION EFFORTS: FIFTEEN CASES
Chapter 2 presents and illustrates the sample of fifteen HOPE VI cases. The chapter is
structured to contain: 1) the selection process that led to constructing a sample; 2) the
categorization of pre-redevelopment conditions for sites and neighborhoods; 3) the
description of each redevelopment strategy; and 4) the summarization of issues
involved in the sampled redevelopment strategies, such as resident involvement,
public/private partnerships, income-mixing, site design guidelines, housing programs
and community programs. The result of this analysis yields a preliminary portrait of
nationwide efforts to redevelop public housing. The chapter's main sources of data are
the HOPE VI grant application documents (for each selected site), along with updated
information supplied by some of the designers.
2.1 - Hypothesis and Method
The main objective of Chapters 2 and 3 is to present evidence of current efforts to
integrate public housing developments into neighborhoods throughout the United
States. This dissertation seeks to verify whether common integration trends have
permeated the many re-design strategies and have introduced consensual notions of
project-neighborhood integration. The evidence gathered in the next two chapters is
founded upon an analysis of pre-redevelopment conditions and redevelopment
strategies, according to sets of physical and socio-economic variables. As a result of
this analysis, in Chapter 3, a classification of integration strategies is possible.
To achieve this categorization, a group of fifteen developments is assembled into a
representative sample of HOPE VI strategies. The grant applications filed by fifteen
housing authorities (between 1993 and 1997) contain information about the physical
revitalization plan along with elements of the social services program.1 To complement
these sources, some of the designers involved in the redevelopment process have
supplied updated details about the plan.
1 Most plans collected were written between 1993 and 1995. Exceptions include a few amended applications, like that of New
Orleans (revised plan: 1996), San Francisco (revised plan: 1997) and Chicago (1997).
Highlighting evidence of consensual notions about public housing integration rests on a
twofold analytical process: 1) in Chapter 2, a description of each neighborhood context,
along with a brief history of its evolution, leads to a typology of pre-development
conditions. Each redevelopment strategy is also described and illustrated in order to
emphasize which main issues are involved in HOPE VI revitalization. And 2) in Chapter
3, each redevelopment strategy is compared according to sets of morphological, social
and organizational variables.2 For each variable, categories are drawn and types
established. Underlining the integrative value of each variable permits, at the end of
Chapter 3, to establish "levels" of integration, and to provide a clearer understanding of
the methods currently prescribed to transform public housing into integrated mixed-
income communities.
2.2 - Presentation of the Sample
In order to characterize and illustrate integration efforts on the part of public housing
authorities, a sample of fifteen redevelopment projects has been assembled (Table 2.1).
Developments in the sample are scattered throughout the territory. They vary in size,
date of original construction, housing typologies and site configuration. While some
developments have already relocated tenants into new and/or rehabilitated structures --
in Atlanta and Baltimore, for instance - others had not initiated the construction phase
as of the end of 1997 -- in Boston, for instance. One example -- New York's Beach 4 1st
Street -- has been completely stopped in its tracks, mainly because of tenant opposition
to the re-design strategy.3 This ensemble of HOPE VI- funded developments is meant
not only to represent a geographical cross-section, but also a diverse inventory of re-
design strategies and social programming methods (Figure 2.1).
2 These variables and their descriptors are presented at the beginning of Chapter 3, in Table 3.1
3 Daniel Glenn, project manager and planner working at the Brookline, Ma, design firm of Tise, Hurwitz and Diamond, said the
New York redevelopment project was opposed by tenants because of architectural and site design issues (see Section 2.3).
Since this "cancellation" occurred well after the group of developments was selected, the case of New York remains in the
samnle
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T able 2.1 - Samplad Sixes anA_ ouni dT Awarde HOr vi rurids
The sample includes cities from roughly every corner of the nation: seven developments
in the northeast, two on the west Coast, three in the south and three in the mid-west.
Figure 2.1 - Geographical Dispersion of the Fifteen Cities
4 From the Internet homepage of The Housing Research Foundation (1997): "List of HOPE VI Awards".
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Developments Names HOPE VI ' Year of Type of Grant Status of Physical
Cities Grant Application Redevelopment
Amount (August 1997)
Techwood/Clark Howell
Atlanta, GA Homes $42,562,635. 1993/1995 Implementation/ Phase 1 Completed
(now called Centennial Amendment Relocation
Place)
Baltimore, MD Lafayette Courts $49,663,600. 1994 Implementation Under
construction/Relocation
Boston, MA Mission Main $50,000,000. 1993 Implementation Planning Phase/Demol.
Camden, NJ McGuire Gardens $42,177,229. 1994 Implementation Planning Phase
Charlotte, NC Earle Village $41,740,155. 1993/1995 Implementation Under
/Amendment construction/Relocation
Chicago, IL Cabrini Homes $50,000,000. 1994/1997 Implementation RFP for Consultants
Extension
Cleveland, OH King Kennedy Estates $50,000,000. 1993/(1997, Implementation Delaney Village
(with Outhwaite Homes) for North KK) (/Amendment) Completed
Detroit, MI Jeffries Homes $39,807,342.! 1994/1996 Implementation Demolition
_$10,000,000. /Demolition
Houston, TX Allen Parkway Homes $36,602,761. 1993 Implementation Demolition
Indianapolis, IN Concord Village / $500,000. 1995 Planning/ Under
Eaglecreek $29,999,010. Implementation Construction/Relocation
New Haven, CT Elm Haven $45,331,593. 1993 Implementation Stalled
New Orleans, LA Desire $44,255,908. 1994 Implementation Planning Phase
Completely Halted
New York, NY Beach 41" Street $500,000. 1993/1995 Planning! Funds Rerouted to other
Houses $47,700,952. Implementation project
Planning!
San Francisco, CA North Beach $400,000.! 1995/1996/ Demolition + Planning Phase
20,000,000. (1997. not yet Revitalization!
_______________ _________awarded) (Amendment) __________
Planning/
Seattle, WA Holly Park Apartments $500,000.! 1993/1995/ Implementation Demolition
$48,116,503. 1996 Amendment
$4425,90. 99 Imleenatin lanin Pas
2.2.1 - Physical Characteristics of the Sites Before Redevelopment
Among the fifteen developments, one-third were built before 1945 and are typical
models of pre-War public housing design guidelines. They are composed of low-rise,
red brick, flat roof structures that are often arranged into courtyard configurations. The
remaining two-thirds were built between 1950 and 1973. While five sites constitute clear
models of a post-War design philosophy harboring mid- and high-rise structures
abstractedly disposed on a superblock, the ten others are composed solely of low-rise
structures. Almost all of the existing buildings in this sample offer red brick fagades (San
Francisco and Seattle are the exceptions) and flat roofs (except in Seattle). There are
three instances - at Atlanta, Indianapolis and Cleveland -- where both types of roofs are
found. Throughout the sample, there are as many residential types offering shared and
private entries to residents (Table 2.2).
Cities Year Brick Concrete Cladding Flat Pitched Shared Private
Construction Roofs Roofs Entries Entries
Atlanta T(C) g 1936 (1940) Yes(Yes) No No Yes (No) No (Yes) Yes (No) No (Yes)
Baltimore 1955 Yes No No Yes No Yes No
Boston 1941 Yes No No Yes No Yes No
Camden 1955 Yes No No Yes No n.a. n.a.Pitched during
Rehab
Charlotte 1967 Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes
Chicago 1958' Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
Cleveland N(S)t 1971 (1970) Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Detroit 1950 Yes No No Yes No Yes No
Houston 1944 Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Indianapolis C(E)! 1968 (1969) Yes (Yes) No (No) Yes (Yes) No (Yes) Yes (No) No (No) Yes (Yes)
New Haven 1940 Yes No No Yes No No Yes
New Orleans 1954-1956 Yes No No n.a. Yes n.a. n.a.
New York 1973 Yes No No Yes No Yes No
San Francisco 1952 No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Seattle 1941 No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table 2.2 - Physical Conditions of Existing Structures
The sample contains developments of diverse size, ranging from the very small -- San
Francisco's North Beach covers five acres on two city blocks -- to the sprawling --
Seattle's Holly Park and New Orleans' Desire respectively cover 102 and 97 acres. The
number of housing structures also varies from four (the towers at New York's Beach 4 1st
Street) to 239 (the Seattle bungalows). The number of dwelling units per site is also
5 T=Techwood and C=Clark Howell.
6 n.a. refers to non available data.
Construction at Cabrini started in 1940 (Frances Cabrini Homes) and later phases included the Green Homes in 1962.
8 N=North Family and S=South Family development.
variable: from 2,170 units at Detroit's Jeffries Homes to 110 at Indianapolis' Eaglecreek
Village. Consequently, built densities range from about nine dwelling units per acre
(du/acre) at Seattle, to over fifty du/acre at Chicago and New York (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3 - Pre-Redevelopment Composition of Residential Stock
The type of site onto which these developments were originally constructed -- if it were
a cleared slum or vacant land - is another useful variable to compare pre-
redevelopment conditions. In this sample, the majority of developments dating from
before the 1949 Housing Act (three out of four) were built on "vacant land" sites. The
majority of those built after 1949 (six out of ten) were located on "slum clearance" sites
(Table 2.4).
Slum
Clearance Atlanta Boston None Detroit Baltimore None Charlotte Cleveland
Sites Chicago (Ext.) Indianapolis
Vacant New Haven
Land Sites None Seattle None New Orleans Camden None New York
Houston San Francisco
Table 2.4 - Types of Sites
Policy explains the correlation between "type of site location" -- whether it was a slum
clearance or vacant land type - and "year of construction". On the one hand, the Act of
9 C=Concord and E=Eaglecreek
10 Estimated from a map showing existing conditions rather than from a description. In the Abt Baseline Report (1996), 409
"Rowhouses" are tallied, which appears to be an error of interpretation. Generally, there are slight inconsistencies between the
Abt-compiled numbers and those found in the Hope VI plans which provided the table's data.
Estimated from a map showing existing conditions
Residential Res. Structure Types
Cities Structures Low-Rise Mid-Rise Towers Units Acreage Density
(Total) (1-3) (4-6) (7-Up) (as built) (dulacre)
Atlanta T (C) 20(58) 20(58) 0 0 604(630) 17 (36) 27(17)
Baltimore 23 17 0 6 807 21.5 37.5
Boston 39 39 0 0 822 19.6 41.9
Camden 48 48 0 0 367 18.5 19.8
Charlotte 45 0 45 0 0 409 35.8 11.4
Chicago 23 0 0 23 1921 36.4 52.8
Cleveland N (S) 12 (23) 10 (22) 0 (0) 2 (1) 1152 36 32.9
Detroit W (E) 69 15(37) 4(0) 13(0) 1918(252) 52 46
Houston 80 80 0 0 1000 37 27
Indianapolis C (E) 62(27) 62(27) 0 0 310(110) 16.2 (9.2) 19(11.9)
New Haven 36 36 0 0 487 27 24
New Orleans 262 262 0 0 1860 97 19
New York 4 0 0 4 712 13.3 52.4
San Francisco 13 13 0 0 229 4.69 48.8
Seattle 2399 239 0 0 898 102 8.8
1937 made the administration of public housing a decentralized venture, thereby giving
local authorities the power to decide where to locate public housing developments
(Friedman, 1968: 106). Vehement neighborhood-based opposition to low-income
housing -- mostly coming from the suburban fringe -- often forced authorities to locate
developments in inner cities, away from those neighborhoods better equipped with
support services. Thus the most "politically" expedient solution was to build public
housing in areas where no one lived or wanted to live (Bratt, 1986: 346-8). This brand of
expedience did not necessarily mean clearing slums. For example, the site for New
Haven's development (a vacant land type) was located adjacent to train tracks, and
Houston's Allen Parkway was exiled in the blighted, mostly Black Fourth Ward district.
The same logic of expedience applies to post-War development strategies: New
Orleans' Desire was sited on a former city dump (Columbia Point, in Boston, was built
next to one); and Camden's McGuire Gardens was built on an environmentally
hazardous flood plain.
On the other hand, the law of 1949, as seen in Chapter 1, made urban renewal and
displacement important counterpoints to the public housing program. It is therefore not
surprising to find that many slum clearance sites belong to the post-War period.
More interesting still is to establish a correlation between "construction period" and "site
configuration", an issue explored by Franck and Mostoller (1996). According to them,
three types of site configuration have defined three cycles of public housing
construction: stage 1, refers to the construction of semi-enclosed courtyards configured
by low-rise structures; stage 2, includes examples of rowhouse, walk-ups or elevator
building types dotting generous expanses of un-programmed open space; and stage 3,
refers to privatized outdoor spaces and enclosed courts for low-rise building types. In
applying this categorization to the sample, one finds that there are only three clear cut
examples of "stage 1 site design" -- Atlanta, Boston and Houston -- which count among
the oldest. The other two older developments are more ambiguous. While New Haven
presents the court and open space principles characteristic of both stages 1 and 2,
Seattle retains elements more typical of stage 2. The majority of developments are
examples of stage 2 site design and are characteristic of the post-War period of public
housing construction. In Cleveland, the stage 3 privatization elements appear as a
result of substantial modernization work during the 1980s.
2.2.2 - Physical Characteristics of the Surrounding Neighborhoods
The similarities found among different neighborhoods permit to categorize types of pre-
redevelopment conditions. Short of surveying existing characteristics by visiting each
neighborhood, the HOPE VI grant applications provide information that can be used to
brush typical portraits of edge conditions. The objective of this analysis is to verify
whether pre-redevelopment conditions found in projects' surrounding neighborhoods
can be categorized into types, and whether these types influence the choice of a
redevelopment strategy.
The HOPE VI program aims at re-weaving the isolated public housing development with
the neighborhood fabric that surrounds it. These edges often contain barriers that not
only negatively impact the site but also impede socio-spatial connections. The following
section underlines the influence of these barriers in implementing revitalization.
The comparing of pre-redevelopment conditions is based on a survey of land uses
found within the east, west, south and north edges of each site. Among the most
common uses surveyed were: retail, institutions (schools, universities, libraries and
museums), industry, health care and other categories of community-based facilities (like
senior centers), corporate offices, post offices, police stations or correctional facilities,
metro or bus stations, and other public housing developments. The often distressed
condition of the surrounding fabrics -- evidenced by vacant or boarded up buildings --
contribute to isolating the public housing development from the rest of the
neighborhood.
Another indicator of distress is provided by the presence of "barriers" or single-use
"borders" near or adjacent to the developments. A barrier -- either "natural" (water,
topography) or "man-made" (highways, rail lines, industrial parks) -- usually refers to a
detrimental element isolating project from the city as a whole. Barriers usually carry
negative social connotations. They behave like impenetrable separators that bisect
districts in a physically and socio-economically harmful manner. A border, according to
Jacobs (1961), rather constitutes the perimeter of a single massive or stretched-out use.
In both cases, adjacent residential areas are physically and economically blighted,
mainly because intensity of use is stifled. The negative impact of borders that contain
institutional uses constitutes a more problematic matter. As sources of employment and
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magnets for investment, single-use institutional borders are generally considered an
important part of the city's economic structure. Lynch (1968) found that borders (he
called them "edges") do not necessarily constitute barriers. If visual or motion
penetration is possible, the "border as barrier" can act as a seam or line of exchange
along two separated areas.
As a result of surveying pre-redevelopment land uses and isolating barriers, two sets of
common characteristics emerge to form typical contexts for revitalization. The major
characteristic of the first type of pre-redevelopment conditions is an impenetrable man-
made barrier that has enforced the isolation of the public housing site from the rest of
the neighborhood. Among typical barriers are roadways (Interstate, highway, major
avenue or local street), waterways, public parks and cemeteries, rail lines or rail transit,
industrial districts, "alien" residential districts (such as trailer parks and large-scale
public housing developments), parking garages and urban blocks that have been cut in
half. Eight of the studied developments are models belonging to this type: Atlanta,
Boston, Charlotte, Detroit, Houston, Indianapolis, New Haven and New Orleans. In each
of these cities, an "aggressive" barrier appears in the form of an adjacent interstate, a
highway, and/or a major avenue. These barriers either make it difficult for residents to
have access to services, or they bring negative environmental impacts to the site. In
Baltimore, Chicago and San Francisco, for instance, the developments are surrounded
by high-traffic roadways on all sides. In New Haven, New Orleans and Indianapolis'
Concord Village, railroads create isolating barriers similar to those found in Boston's
Mission Main. In each case, rail lines define an active (Indianapolis, New Orleans) or
inactive (New Haven) industrial corridor. At Seattle, the man-made barrier is a 200-feet
large transmission line right-of-way slicing the site along its middle. At six of the sites,
adjacent edges contain large-scale public housing developments (Baltimore, Boston,
Chicago, Detroit, New Haven, New Orleans) and a seventh is adjacent to a large-scale
trailer park (Indianapolis' Eaglecreek).
Some of the edges characterized by barriers were found to contain such a large
concentration of institutional uses that they act as isolating "districts". This is the case of
Atlanta where districts of corporate and institutional uses form homogeneous borders. In
New Haven and Baltimore, two large university campuses have an imposing physical
presence on the developments. This also is the case in Boston's Mission Main which is
t- e
almost completely surrounded by the contiguous Longwood Medical Area and
Wentworth Institute of Technology. Nevertheless, university and hospital campuses, as
explained above, are viewed as active clusters of employment and activity. In the
Mission Main case, however, Wentworth's buildings are turned away from the
development and the potential to create an active seam along Ward street is stifled. If,
after redevelopment, Wentworth could reserve portions of its campus nearest Mission
Main to enable permeable links (i.e. areas residents could share), that border would
form an active seam destined to encourage social interaction. Right now the institutional
edges of Mission Main constitute an economic draw, but act as detrimental physical
barriers.
In the second type of pre-redevelopment edge conditions, developments are part of an
urban fabric that morphologically meshes well with the rest of the neighborhood. The
street/block network is not interrupted by a highway or by districts of homogeneous
uses. Typically, the public housing communities physically "stick out" because of their
contrasting building types, site configuration and street pattern (or lack thereof). This is
the case for the two west Coast sites - San Francisco and Seattle -- as well as for
Charlotte, Cleveland, Camden and Chicago.
Chapter 3 further explores the correlation between the type of isolating edge conditions
and the integration solutions proposed.
2.2.3. - Social and Economic Characteristics of the Sites
All of the developments' populations (before redevelopment) offer expected similarities:
in ten out of fifteen communities, 90% of tenants are African-American; in ten out of
fifteen, over 60% of households are headed by single women; eight developments have
at least 50% of their population under eighteen years of age; and everywhere this
statistic is included (ten out of fifteen), over 75% of the population is unemployed (Table
2.5). Since all of these public housing developments are designated for families, the
proportion of elderly households is rather low, yet it varies from 3% (Indianapolis) to
44% (Baltimore). These latter numbers have an important influence on redevelopment
issues like income mixing and physical clustering according to life cycles.
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Cities Date of House Resi- Black White Hispanic Asian "Other" Women Under Elderly Un-
Census -holds dents (%T) (%T) (%T) (%T) (%T) Heads of 18 (%T) employed
(Total) (T) HH (% T) (%T) (%T)
Atlanta 1990 530 n.a. 95.5 4.2 0 0 0.3 90 n.a. 6.8 91
Baltimore 1990 n.a. 2237 100 0 0 0 0 90 60 44 n.a.
Boston 1993 680 1940 38 0 57 0 5 84 53 68
Camden 1993 n.a. 1128 50 6 44 0 0 90 80 6 93
Charlotte 1993 n.a. 1200 100 0 0 0 0 95 60 5 n.a.
Chicago n.a. n.a. 3695 94 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 63 66 n.a. 91
Cleveland 1990 n.a. 1242 97 0 0 0 3 26 n.a. 30 87
Detroit 1995 n.a. 1657 98 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 61 33 20 93
Houston 1995 21 56 68 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 77 43 n.a. n.a.
Indianapolis 1995 152 504 97 n.a. (0) n.a. (0) n.a. (0) n.a. (0) 74(90) 63 (63) 3 (0.6) n.a.
C(E) (90) (314) (100)
New Haven 1995 341 805 93.6 3 2 0 1.4 59 45 18 84
New 1990 n.a. 4000 99.9 0.1 0 0 0 81 60 2 68
Orleans
New York 1995 684 1932 73 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 56 50 6 n.a.
San 1996 229 n.a. 32 14 0 50 4 37 48 14 90
Francisco I I
Seattle n.a. n.a. 2197 33 11 3 44 9 41 52 6 74
Table 2.5 - Demographic Portrait of Sites Population Before Redevelopment
This summary of pre-redevelopment resident demographics serves to emphasize the
findings published by the NCSDPH stating that the resident population is very poor and
getting poorer (NCSDPH, 1992: 47-8). The Commission emphasized that the
concentration of poverty in islands of despair stemmed from institutional abandonment
of populations in most need of support. Many of the revitalization plans mention that
HOPE VI strategies are parts of larger, city-scale redevelopment and economic
development efforts such as Empowerment Zones, Homeownership Zones or other city,
state- or federally-sponsored neighborhood revitalization programs. Empowerment
Zones initiatives typically focus on restoring the economic base of disinvested
neighborhoods by attracting and targeting private investment. They also provide means
of assistance for home buyers dealing with local banks; they channel EPA funds toward
cleaning up and redeveloping "brownfields"; they assist the public school system in
supporting community learning and job training centers; and they engage in community
policing and anti-crime/drug efforts. In cities like Baltimore and Cleveland,
neighborhoods of the Empowerment Zone are encouraged to increase homeownership
opportunities, mainly through partnerships with local and national organizations -- such
as Habitat for Humanity or Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporations -- or with federal
programs like Homeownership Zones12 (Table 2.6).
12 Cleveland has received - in supplement to the HOPE VI Grant -some $23 million (grant and loan guarantees) from HUD in April
1997 to invest in the creation of 400 new and 65 rehabilitated homes in the neighborhood surrounding the King Kennedy
development. Similarly, Baltimore has received HUD funds to create a Homeownership Zone within its Empowerment Zone
which also contains public housing projects (HUD Press Release No. 97-43, 8 April 1997 - "Hud.Gov" web site).
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Cities Site Area Revitalization Area Complementary Revitalization Efforts
(Acres)
Same Atlanta Empowerment Zone;
Atlanta 54.4 (Techwood Olympic Legacy Initiative
Redevelopmt Area)
East Side Empowerment Zone;
Baltimore 22 Not Specified Homeownership Zone;
HUD's 'Bridges to Work' Program
Slight extension of Sewell St. Part of City's larger
Camden 18.5 Same revitalization strategy: Camden Initiative, a program of multi-
level of gvnmt participation tackling issues of public safety,
econ. development, housing and youth assistance
Charlotte 35.8 Not Specified Not Specified
Chicago Empowerment Zone, which includes west side
neighborhoods;
Chicago 36.4 59.5 acres Near North Redevelopment Initiative (TIF Boundary);
Includes Cabrini Ext. Complex (Division/Hudson N. &
Larrabee S.) along with six other sites surrounding it;
HUD's 'Bridges to Work' Program
8.5 sq. miles - Planning Empowerment Zone : Central Neighborhood is part of the
Region 11, including Planning Region 11 of Cleveland's "Civic Vision 2000";
Cleveland 36 Central, Hough, Fairfax Homeownership Zone in same area, immediately north of
& Kinsman King Kennedy;
neighborhoods, along
with University Circle
and Woodland Hills
+/- 500 acres
Detroit 52 (Jeffries (surrounding Detroit Empowerment Zone;
West & East) neighborhood area) Focus: HOPE Program, for youth job opportunities within EZ;
Neighborhood Study Area, though not clear what
Houston 37 304 acres supplementary funds funneled toward APV
Near Westside Improvement & Neighborhood Plan earmarks
Indianapolis 16 (C) & 9 (E) 278 acres funds to specific areas in need of revitalization
New Haven 27 Not Specified Not Specified
New Orleans 97 Not Specified Not Specified
Edgemere Renewal Area (ERA) Plan, awarded $57 millions
New York 13 200 acres by City to implement affordable housing
San Francisco 4,7 Not Specified Not Specified
Seattle 102 Same (Except land Not Specified
swaps)
Table 2.6 - Citywide Economic Development Programs
In sum, the developments' social and economic characteristics, because of their overall
similarity, contribute less to creating categories of pre-development conditions than do
physical characteristics. The following table (2.7) summarizes the relationships among
construction period, type of site location (slum or vacant), type of site configuration
(stage 1,2 or 3) and type of pre-redevelopment edge conditions (type 1 "barriers" or
type 2 "meshing"). While pre-War developments and their edges share similar physical
conditions, post-War sites constitute less clear cut example of the second period of
public housing construction.
Table 2.7 - Tves of Pre-Redevelopment Conditions Accordinq
Location, Site Configuration and Edge Conditions
to Existing Structures, Site
2.3 -Sampled Developments: Pre-Redevelopment Conditions and Revitalization
Strategies
Atlanta's Centennial Place: A Fitting Piece of the Olympic Legacy
Atlanta's Techwood Homes was the first public housing development to be built in the
United States.13 It belongs to the National Register of Historic Places. Built in 1936
under the PWA, Techwood is contiguous to the Clark Howell Homes development,
which was erected four years later. Together, the developments form the largest public
housing estate in Atlanta, offering 1702 units in 180 low rise buildings. Two 17-story
towers for public elderly housing - Roosevelt House (1973) and Palmer House (1966) --
frame the site's north and south edges. Over the years, the Techwood/Clark Howell
development has become modern day slums ultimately destined for demolition. Only
the newer high-rise structures have escaped this fate.
13 Techwood was actually dedicated by F. D. Roosevelt.
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Pre-War Developments Post-War Developments
(5 of 15) (10 of 15)
Cities Atlanta (Slum) Category I Category 2
Boston (Slum) Baltimore (Slum) Camden (Vacant)
Houston (Vacant) Chicago (Slum) Charlotte (Slum)
New Haven (Vacant) Cleveland (Slum) Indianapolis (Slum)
Seattle (Vacant) Detroit (Slum) New Orleans (Vacant)
New York (Vacant) San Francisco (Vacant)
Low-rise brick structures with flat Mixture of low, mid- and high-rise Low-rise structures with flat roofs
Typical Existing roofs and shared entry; or only high-rise buildings with flat
Structures on roofs and shared entry
Site Exception: Cladding, private
entries and pitched roofs at
Seattle
Vacant Land Predominantly Slum Clearance (S) Predominantly Vacant Land (V)
Location Types
Exception: Atlanta and Boston,
slum clearance sites.
Site Courts Open Space Open Space
Configuration (Stage 1) (Stage 2) (Stage 2)
Types Type I IException: Cleveland (Stage 3)
Typical Edge (or Man-Made Barriers Predominantly of the Man-Made Predominantly of the Mesh-Well
neighborhood) comprise highways, rail roads, Barrier Type. These include rail Type
Conditions districts of homogeneous uses roads, highways
(mainly institutional)
(Type 1: "Barriers") (Type 1: "Barriers") (Type 2: "Meshing")
Exceptions: Chicago & Cleveland Exceptions: New Orleans &
Indianapolis
The development originally comprised two types of buildings: the 2-story townhouse
and the 3- to 4-story walk-up. While the low-rise typology mirrored a scale found in
residential edges, it also harbored modernist aesthetic principles in the form of flat-
roofed volumes and unadorned red brick fagades. After nearly sixty years, site and
structures offered signs of severe distress. By 1992, the development was almost
completely vacant. Around that time, feasibility studies showed that modernization
would constitute an economically unsound exercise, mainly because the siting of
buildings made it highly difficult to plan for defensible space. Even the elegantly
porticoed public library branch, originally been founded by the Carnegie Foundation and
located along the western edge, has become vacant. Reports also highlighted that
inadequate design rendered the prospect of income-mix strategies an impossibility.
The early 1990s feasibility studies made it easy for HUD to approve, in 1992, the
Atlanta Housing Authority's (AHA) decision to sell historically significant public housing
structures to the State of Georgia, which expressed a pressing need for space for the
forthcoming 1996 Olympic Games. So when the AHA applied for a 1993 HOPE VI grant
to rehabilitate Techwood and a portion of Clark Howell, the impending Olympics had
already prompted the sale of 11414 units and five acres of Techwood land for the
building of the Olympic Village. This trade-off allowed the construction of 2,000
apartments for 4,000 athletes which would become, after the event, a dormitory for
Georgia State University students.15  Located directly opposite the corporate
headquarters of the Olympics' biggest sponsor, Coca-Cola, and also near a prestigious
university, Georgia Tech, the Techwood site suddenly appeared as a much desirable
and convenient site to build an Olympic Village 6 . This encroachment of institutional
uses on the already surrounded and isolated site was accepted as a noble sacrifice for
the good of a historic event.
14 Forty-five of these 114 units were eventually re-built, but sixty-nine public housing units were ultimately lost to the high-profile
15 Olympics.In a twist of "political irony', says redevelopment architect Jon Carlsten, the dormitory would not belong to neighboring Georgia
Tech, which directly faces the public housing site, but to that other university located some two miles away from the site.
The 1996 summer Olympic Games focused the world's attention on Atlanta. The city is home to prestigious corporations such as
Delta Airlines and the Cable News Network (CNN). Between 1992 and 1996, 30,000 jobs were created. The "Olympic Legacy"
initiative has also generated many investments and civic projects for Atlanta: a new Centennial Olympic Stadium, athletic
facilities now used by nearby universities, Olympic housing now destined to revive inner-city neighborhoods and recreation
space in the Centennial Olympic Park now appropriated by the downtown area. The redevelopment of Techwood/Clark Howell is
considered part of this initiative.
While occurring in conjunction with exceptional circumstances like the Olympic Games,
the redevelopment of Techwood/Clark Howell -- or Centennial Place as it is now known
-- nonetheless addressed the pressing problems of severe distress and isolation.
Isolation, in this case, stemmed from the presence of harsh barriers which surrounded
the public housing site and cut it off from the rest of Atlanta: single institutional and
corporate uses along two edges and an interstate highway along another.
The 1994 revised version of the redevelopment plan (i.e. the 1994 HOPE VI Plus grant
application) called for: de-concentration and density reduction through demolition and
re-design of the site; the creation of a mixed-income community for long-term viability;
the implementation of comprehensive economic development; and the creation of
community and supportive services programs. The redevelopment plan makes
provisions for the construction of 900 new units in three phases. Among them, 360 (or
40%) were reserved for very low-income households. The public housing stock is
physically undifferentiated from the market rate units, which constitute another 40% of
the total. The remaining 20% of units are offered to those with an income up to 60% of
local median. Even though they were mostly vacant at the beginning of the HOPE VI
process, some 800 units of public housing are in the end lost to the redevelopment
strategy (McKee, 1997: 100). The redevelopment plan stipulates that three of the
historically significant structures are kept and renovated: the Carnegie Library (to be
resuscitated into its original function), the Cupola building and the community center.
The Cupola is rehabbed into an apartment building and serves as a model for the new
structures' exterior detailing and scale (McKee, 1997: 100).
Although surrounded by an impenetrable barrier to the east ( the 1-75 highway) and by
two institutional and corporate borders to the north and west (Georgia Tech and Coca
Cola) (Fig. 2.2), the new site plan for Centennial Place favors the re-creation of a pre-
public housing street network. A cul-de-sac pattern is introduced along the eastern edge
as a means to turn the housing away from 1-75 and reduce its negative impact (Fig. 2.3
a), 2.4, 2.5).17 The new 3-story, pitch-roofed housing structures are composed of either
1- and 2-bedroom flats, or 2- and 3 bedroom townhouses over 2-bedroom flats. The use
of red brick, cladding and fish-scale shingles for exterior walls and pediments is meant
17 All of the illustrated "Proposed Plans" and "Diagrams of the Proposed Plans" includes in this section are reproduced to roughly
the same scale, except for the very large developments like New Orleans, Chicago and Seattle.
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to introduce variety in scale and texture on the site, as do projecting exterior stairwells.
Ground floor entrances (shared and private) are marked by brick arches. They often
support porches and create vertical entry signals along fagades (Fig. 2.3 b)). The overall
result of this rather complex volume manipulation is an effective replication of upscale
market-rate housing, a clear demarcation from the housing Centennial Place seeks to
replace.
Designer Views
According to architect Jon Carlsten.18 the redevelopment of Centennial Place has
indeed been an exercise in distancing the old "project" image from the reality of a new
mixed-income community. Even the name change has significantly contributed to this
symbolic transfer.
The redesign of Centennial Place is nevertheless strongly influenced by its existing hard
edges. To the east, the Interstate remains a barrier no amount of good design could
make disappear. The only solution is to physically turn away from it: the new cul-de-
sacs are effective buffers against the barrier. To the west, one of Atlanta's most
powerful property owners, Coca-Cola, directly faces the housing community. The
heavily fenced-in corporate compound, says Carlsten, would be no more penetrable if
millionaires, instead of public housing residents, lived across from their facilities. The
north edge is homogeneously lined with another single-use border, the Georgia Tech
buildings. Even the south edge, with its modest commercial node and deteriorating
conditions, offers limited potential for directly re-connecting the site to an adjacent
mixed-use context. Nevertheless, Carlsten sees these barriers on all sides of
Centennial Place as potential "assets" for marketing the redeveloped site and attracting
new residents. He points to the "positive enclave atmosphere" and reassure parents of
college students along with working families who are looking for safety within a
"residential island".
Carlsten is enthusiastic about the New Urbanism movement's incentive for creating
streets and defining clear private and public open spaces. He salutes the movement's
incursion in the low-income housing sector without simply transposing successful
18 Jon Carlsten is senior partner at the Atlanta firm of Carlsten, Pucciano. He was interviewed on July 1' 1997.
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suburban design principles. Jim Brooks19, head of HOPE VI operations at the AHA and
urban planner, offers a more measured opinion of New Urbanism saying that "a lot of it
is just community planning". This method is used at Centennial Place to emphasize the
role of residents, deal with the local YMCA for services, implement a new magnet
school, cultivate citywide support as well as partnerships with Coca Cola and Georgia
Tech, and stimulate historical rehabilitation.
Centennial's participatory planning and design process has been successful. Carlsten
contrasts this positive experience with another HOPE VI project, mentioning residents'
reticence to part with their cluster mentality, and think in terms of New Urbanism (i.e. re-
connecting to the surrounding edges). Understandably, public housing residents have
traditionally acted as "guinea pigs" for others to "experiment with people of not much
economic power". Designers should not be surprised to come across reticent residents
who "[no longer] want to be experimented upon". The level of "paranoia" and suspicion
on the part of poor residents "who expect to be screwed" is ever increasing and should
be adequately dealt with during of the planning process. The social engineering and
design tenets of the 1960s and 1970s which imposed a "new world order" -- not unlike,
he concedes, "the New Urbanism mindset" -- are now openly resisted by residents.
Baltimore's Lafayette: From 'Project' to 'Hope Circle'
In Baltimore, the construction of public housing started as early as the mid-1930s.20
Lafayette Courts, however, was built in 1955 and was the first of Baltimore's high-rise
family public housing development. Lafayette paved the way to implementing three
more "projects" in the next eight years, all smaller but located in close proximity.
Lafayette Courts was built in the predominantly African-American and renter-occupied
East Baltimore area, a community which had historically remained an industrial zone
and was targeted for urban renewal in the 1950s. In fact, public housing construction
followed the urban renewal impetus whereby whole African-American neighborhoods --
such as those in East Baltimore -- were razed to make space for government,
institutional and business uses. Prior to clearance, 582 Black families lived on the site
that would become the 816-units Lafayette superblock development (Baltimore
19 Interview with James Brooks, AHA, 17 December 1996.
20 Five of Baltimore's eight pre- and post-\N 11 low-rise developments were in fact designated as "Negro housing": "This housing
was built to 'maintain' the increasing African-American population in Baltimore within certain neighborhoods".
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Baseline, 1995: 4). Hence after the eradication of "Negro" neighborhood housing,
shortages had to be remedied by constructing high density "Negro" projects. These
environments not only addressed shortages but also maintained housing segregation
practices already enforced within Baltimore (Baltimore Baseline, 1995: 4).
Before redevelopment, Lafayette consisted of six 11-story high-rises (645 efficiency
units21) and seventeen low-rise buildings (162 units). In 1990, there were 2,277
residents on site, all African-American (Baseline, 1995: Exec. Summary). Lafayette is
located close to several major thoroughfares, among which the l-8322, which are used to
get from one side of the city to the other, or to get in and out of Baltimore to suburban
neighborhoods. To the east of the development is a large institutional campus
composed of the Johns Hopkins University and Hospital, as well as the Church Home
Hospital. On three of Lafayette's sides are no less than six other low- and high-rise
public housing developments23, all built after 1955. The presence of these neighboring
"projects" further isolates the typologically alien environment from the rest of the
neighborhood (Figs. 2.6, 2.7).
By the late 1980s, Lafayette Courts offered all of the typical signs of distress: antiquated
mechanical systems, postponed maintenance, a high vacancy rate, high crime rates
due to drug trafficking, absence of defensible space, high unemployment and poverty
rates and lack of neighborhood resources. In 1989, Baltimore's Mayor commissioned a
Task Force on Family High Rise Modernization which concluded that high-rise
environments were no place for families. In 1993, the Housing Authority of Baltimore
City (HABC) was granted $50 million of HOPE VI funds to redevelop Lafayette Courts.
The redevelopment strategy aimed to demolish all existing structures and re-build -- at a
much lower density -- family townhouses, a community center and a low-rise elderly
complex. Community services programs, such as childcare, job training and educational
opportunities, were designed to enable residents to become self-sufficient. Demolition
was completed in 1995 after tenants were relocated in other developments or given
Section 8 vouchers. Construction of the first phases was completed throughout 1996
and 1997, and re-occupation concurrently conducted.
21 An efficiency unit offers less than one bedroom, not unlike a studio.
22 Built in the late 1950s, the location of 1-83 coincides with the trace of the Jones Falls bed, hence its name: the Jones Fallsway
expressway.
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The redevelopment of Baltimore's Lafayette Courts is based on three main sets of
actions that focus on reducing the site's original density, on strategically locating target
populations onto specific parts of the new site and on encouraging community-based
support and services. The redeveloped Lafayette Courts, now known as Pleasant View
Gardens, contains a total of 338 on-site units of newly constructed rowhouses for a
mixed-income population. The new unit mix specifies twenty-seven fee simple/for sale
units to first be offered to the development's residents, twelve units designated for
young mothers, a 110-unit apartment elderly building and 189 public housing units.
These latter apartments are expected to be sold to the residents and/or converted into
condominiums.24 While families are concentrated in an enclave of the new Courts that is
closest to the new daycare and recreational facilities, senior citizens are grouped "in an
enclave appropriate for elderly living". Young single mothers are housed in a "special
housing community... with programmatic links to the elderly enclave" (Lafayette Profile,
1997: 1).
The most striking of the Lafayette's new plan is the import of rowhouses, which are
meant as key elements of a strategy to replicate typical, tightly-grained Baltimore
residential fabrics. Thus the flat-roofed Lafayette rowhouses are only slightly setback
from the street to permit the implementation of 3- to 4-step stoops. Their smooth brick
fagades have no recesses. This formal and stylistic simplicity serves to create walls
along streets and around public spaces. The re-designed site is fractured into two parts
by north/south Asquith street. The east block features the elderly apartment building, a
renovated community building and new rowhouses (twelve rentals and six for sale).
The west block is bordered, to the south, by single-story recreation and day care
centers. All for-sale rowhouses (twenty-one units) line Asquith street, which is treated as
the main axis for the community. Perpendicular to Asquith and facing the community
building is a two-lane avenue leading to the center of the site, which is marked by an
octagonal piazza. "New Hope Circle" is surrounded by townhouses and lies at the focal
point of a system of internal streets that connect to the perimeter avenues. Each of the
four residential blocks shares semi-private space. Along Colvin and Low streets, the
new townhouses are resolutely turned towards the center of the development, thereby
They are Somerset, Douglass, Broadway, Perkins Homes and Flag House Court.
24 After talking with Gus Bullock of the HABC, it is not clear how many of the 189 public housing units - referred to as "rental units"
in the Project Profile (July 1997) - will be targeted as homeownership opportunities for very low-income tenant or offered as
condos on the market.
offering their backs to the public way. In fact, the site is surrounded by a high perimeter
fence (Figs. 2.8, 2.9, 2.10).
The new Lafayette Courts were completed during 1997 and tenants relocation occurred
concurrently.
Designer Views
According to architect Tom Gilmore25 of Washington DC's CHK architects and planners,
the main design issue at stake during initial planning phases had to do with streets. At
an early meeting with residents, when the firm had to expose its views regarding the re-
design of the site, he recalls the presentation of three boards: one showed the current
figure-ground plan and emphasized the morphological incongruity of megablocks dotted
with high-rises; another showed the pre-public housing fabric of tightly-grained
rowhouses; and the last introduced CHK's proposition which re-introduced a street
pattern on the site, albeit a much different one from what preceded slum clearance.
Closely tied to the intent of re-introducing a street/block pattern was the idea of a "town
center" (the Hope Circle), a civic node destined to be the anchor of urban life within the
redevelopment. This strong focal public space to which all new streets lead has
permitted to create "neighborhood portals" that clearly announce points of entry to the
site. The town center, according to Gilmore, is CHK's "commitment to New Urbanism".
The Hope Circle enhances residents' opportunity to identify with a symbolic space.
Overall, says Gilmore, the re-design of Lafayette is rendered specially effective by the
highly controlled vistas shaped by narrow, rowhouse-lined streets. Even pedestrian
access to the site affords inviting sight lines into the new community and town center.
Another key element of CHK's integration strategy is the import of the Baltimore
rowhouse typology on the site. The need to extend "visitability" -- the possibility for
handicapped visitors to access units - was problematic. Since one characteristic of the
rowhouse is the presence of a vertical buffer (or stoop, typically twenty inches high)
between sidewalk and first floor, universal access via ramps presented a challenge. In
accordance with residents and intent on preserving the simplicity of street fagades, the
architects suggested that ramps be solely accessible from the back of units.
25 Tom Gilmore was interviewed in January 1998.
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Gilmore could not explain the dichotomy between the intent of HOPE VI's policymakers
to "seamlessly weave development with neighborhood" ,and the implementation of a
perimeter fence surrounding a site turned toward itself and a central space. He pointed
instead to the presence of streets as the most important and overriding element of the
plan to physically and socially integrate Lafayette Courts to its surrounding
neighborhood.
Boston' Mission Main: A Tumultuous Implementation Process
Mission Main was built in 1940 as a family development of thirty-nine 3-story structures
for 1,023 units. Subsequent transformations brought that number down to 822 units.
Mission Main is one of the largest and oldest of Boston's "projects". Fifty years after
construction, however, Mission Main stands out in its Roxbury surroundings not only as
an extremely deteriorated environment, but also as a site where pernicious drug-related
crime festers. Especially stark is the contrast between the run-down development and
its neighboring institutions: the Longwood Medical Center (largest of its kind in New
England), five colleges, and, nearby, The Museum of Fine Arts.
The Boston Housing Authority (BHA) is among the oldest and largest authorities in the
United States. Like many other PHAs, its sixty-year evolution was marked by now
familiar policy and societal shifts like the elimination of ceilings rents and the
reorganization of waiting lists in favor of the homeless and unemployed (Boston
Baseline, 1995: 1). In 1975, residents sued the BHA for failing to keep up its
developments within sanitary standards. In 1980, when the Authority failed to implement
satisfactory changes, a Court ordered the BHA be put under receivership. A decade
later, the role of receiver evolved into that of an administrator appointed by the Mayor.
Nevertheless, the BHA's has been recognized for its successful methods of improving
low-income tenants' life. The renovation of the Commonwealth development in the early
1980s, for instance, has provided a model for effective physical rehabilitation and
management overhaul. Today, the development is a privately-managed site where each
family is provided with a private entry and back yard, along with well-programmed
communal spaces. Around the same time, the much distressed and ill-designed
Columbia Point was transformed into a mixed-income community, jointly managed by
tenants and private developer. At Mission Main, however, deteriorated buildings and
site, along with crisis-oriented management and severe problems with crime, confirmed
the site's reputation as isolated housing of last resort.
As detailed in Chapter 4, Mission Main is located in a diversified, low-density residential
environment. The surrounding privately-owned housing stock is thus wildly different in
appearance than the development. Mission Main is located near a large concentration
of institutions: medical, educational, cultural and religious. Major community resources
for residents comprise the Whittier Street Health Clinic, the Tobin Elementary School, a
branch of the public library and the Mission Hill Neighborhood Housing Services
(NHNHS). Major thoroughfares around the site (Tremont St., Huntington Avenue and
Columbus Ave.) provide residents with an efficient public transportation network.
Tremont Street is the most important commercial axis to provide residents with basic
services: grocery store, pharmacy, laundromats, gas station, bars and fast-food
restaurants. The eventual construction of a multi-service complex on the Ledge Site
confirms that much of the neighborhood's economic development potential hinges on
the Brigham Circle, a few blocks away from Mission Main.
The 1993 HOPE VI plan for Mission Main focused heavily on a new way for the BHA to
conduct public housing business. The proposal also focused on a complete physical
overhaul: re-creation of a street network, reduction of density (822 units transformed
into 538), individualization of structures; stylistic transformations, and hierarchical
arrangement of open space. Not much in the way of economic development was
outlined in that proposal, except for the fostering of partnerships with the nearby
institutions for job creation. The social programming part of the plan was clearer and
focused on the location of a new community building in the center of the site. But the
first proposal was soon stalled because of a budget shortfall. Between 1995 and 1997,
two more plans would evolve: they proposed to completely demolish then rebuild
Mission Main. The idea, in tune with HUD's revised "HOPE VI Plus" vision, was to
consider Mission Main's edges major elements of redevelopment. During 1996 and
1997, much work was done to trade off pieces of the site for off-site parcels, reconfigure
its limits, re-create a street/block network and re-consider the location of the community
building. Thinking about the development potential of the land, rather than the buildings
themselves, seemed to provide clear and compelling opportunities for a physical plan
that integrated the area into the fabric of the neighborhood (Boston Baseline, 1995: 30).
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In early 1996, the redevelopment process seemed on a fast track. A plan authored by a
consortium of architectural firms proposed new housing typologies, a reconfigured
Smith Street, an edge of mid-rises along the adjacent high-rise private housing, a
permeable street network and a decentralized community center sited along the Smith
edge. Again, due to overriding costs and the protestations of tenants over land swap
issues, the plan was stalled. In late 1997, after HUD had threatened to take HOPE VI
funds away, a third plan was proposed, this time by a lone architectural firm. The plan,
not much changed from its predecessor, included more details about the site's
configuration and housing typologies. After the Mayor of Boston decided, in Spring
1998, that the land swap deal would be dropped, HUD finally released the HOPE VI
funds, six years into the process.26
Camden's McGuire: Rehabilitation and Re-Design
The McGuire Gardens public housing development is considered a microcosm of
Camden, a city which has been, in the last thirty years, on a steady decline. As one of
Camden's most distressed public housing developments, the McGuire site is physically
isolated from the rest of the city, notably by a lack of access to public transportation and
the absence of job opportunities in the vicinity. Generally, McGuire Gardens is
perceived as "a terrifying place to live. Crime is rampant. It is unlikely that anyone in the
development was not actually touched by some form of officially reported crime in 1992"
(Camden Plan, 1993: 11-4). These descriptions refer to vandalized units used as crack
houses and frequent power sabotages by vandals who can easily reach vulnerable
outboxes at the back of buildings. A management system mostly absorbed by day-to-
day repairs has accelerated the spiral descent of physical maintenance on site.
There are 367 public housing units - 100 of which are vacant in 1993 -- for 1128
residents (Camden Plan, 1993: 11-9,12). Built in 1955 on nineteen acres, the
development's architecture is typical of the post-War period: forty-eight 2-story buildings
of six or eight units, with shared entryways and configured to form open-ended
courtyards. The structures are abstractedly disposed onto a superblock of generous
swaths of un-programmed open space. The brick volumes are flat-faced, some with
deteriorated canopies above entrance doors. During modernization phases, the original
26 The designer's views along with more details about the implementation process are examined and illustrated in Chapter 5.
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flat roofs were replaced by pitched ones, and two former residential units were
converted into a community center. Ever since construction, the flat site (located in a
flood plain) has suffered from serious drainage and sewerage problems. As a result,
parking areas have almost continually remained flooded, streets are deteriorating and
buildings' structure is rotting and collapsing. The site's distressed aspect is reinforced by
pockets of vacant areas turned into de facto playgrounds. There is lead-based paint in
every unit, and none of them are accessible by handicapped residents or visitors.
The McGuire Gardens site is located in East Camden within the Marlton neighborhood.
It is wedged between two distressed industrial and commercial zones and two heavy
traffic thoroughfares, the Marlton Pike and The Admiral Wilson Boulevard. McGuire is
adjacent to two residential areas (to the southeast and west edges), both with
differentiated housing types in fair to poor condition. The western edge, across
Twentieth street, is a large seventy-five acres area of vacant land referred to as the
French Tract27 (Fig. 2.11, 2.12).
Camden's 1993 redevelopment plan promises a "better life" and a secure environment
for residents. A network of social services assists families living in distress and helps
them prepare for work. The social component of the plan includes childcare,
transportation, a library, and a medical and dental clinic.
The redevelopment strategy , mainly proposes the rehabilitation of what used to be a
pleasant environment only twenty years earlier. One distinctive aspect of the physical
plan suggests that "transitional housing units", owned and operated by the Authority,
would house families interested in "moving up and out of public housing into private
housing". These units are designed as "rewards": they are larger, have generous
porches, rear yards and individual driveways. Located prominently at the end of each
housing block, they face both the street and the inner courtyard. The intention is to
earmark these units more desirable units for "promising" families, which in turn become
models for all to see or the "gatekeepers to the entire block, [instilling] a sense of pride
The French Tract edge was to become the site of a large SAAO (Success Against All Odds) Campus of socio-economic support
services. It were to be developed after the implementation of the housing component of the plan, but has since been put on
hold. for budget reasons The SAAO multi-purpose campus comprised a communications center, education, health care and
recreation facilities, management offices, daycare, a kitchen and bakery, a food coop and a laundromat.
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and achievement in all residents of the development" (Camden Plan, 1993: 111-32). This
"housing as reward" system was eventually eliminated in the revised version.
The plan mainly hinges on the rehabilitation of a portion of the existing structures and
the selective demolition of 172 units. Seventy new rental units are built along Bank
Street to restructure the connection to the southern edge. These units are also
earmarked for homeownership opportunities. Some of the preserved I-shaped bars are
cut in size or sectioned to reduce the scale of the built grain, eradicate the inherited
institutional atmosphere and promote permeability. New streets are added to the site
with the aim of weaving back the isolated development into the surrounding residential
fabric. An increased sense of identity is created by defining semi-private recreation
areas and private space amenities (Fig. 2.13, 2.14).
Designers' View2"
The original redevelopment plan for McGuire Gardens had two main features: the
physical rehabilitation of the site's 368 units and the construction of an 80,000 square
feet multi-purpose community center (the SAAO Campus) located off-site. Each of
these two phases were delegated to two architectural firms which, in 1993, proceeded
according to an aggressive schedule. A few months into the process, HUD pulled the
project's plug stating that the CHA's redevelopment philosophy was fundamentally
erroneous. First, the new community center was too big and no reasonable budget
could provide for the support programs harbored in the huge facility. Second, the
housing rehabilitation goal went against the renewed spirit of the HOPE VI Plus
program which was no longer restrained by a "one for one" replacement policy.
Meanwhile, the CHA was entering a period of political unrest and the consultant firm of
Abt Associates confirmed these troubles reporting that McGuire Gardens was "not
HOPE VI-friendly and was not packaged right".
After a design charrette to which residents were not invited, a new plan was prepared. It
offered a scaled-down concept of demolition and the implementation, along with: 1) an
on-site 10,000 square feet community center; 2) a system of streets according to which
every unit has frontage; and 3) a "front-to-front/back-to-back" type of configuration to
28 Architect David Sheuermann, of the R.J. Sheward, Architect Philadelphia was interviewed in Summer 1997.
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Fig. 2.13 - Proposed Plan for McGuire Gardens. Showing Extension of Sewell St. toward the
Marlton Ave. (Benjamin, Architect)
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Fig. 2.14 - Diagram of the Proposed Plan
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replace the original courtyard concept. Off-site housing units are acquired through the
leverage of HOPE VI funds.
The revised design scheme for McGuire is, according to the design team, much more
sensitive to re-weaving of the urban fabric. Urban links are concentrated between the
Marlton neighborhood and the development, which is resolutely turned away from the
Frech Tract's industrial edge. So the "back of the site" is treated as a "zipper edge", i.e.
the back of buildings are designed to form a jagged edge that will act as a buffer
between residential and industrial uses. Integration also translates into the
implementation of a new 800-student school on the public housing site that would serve
the whole Marlton neighborhood. The housing program is not based on the introduction
of a mixed- income population. According to market studies conducted by outside
consultants, McGuire was not considered a viable market for single homeownership.
The McGuire designers are enthusiastic about the New Urbanism guidelines
permeating the public housing re-design discourse. New Urbanism is considered, in the
case of low-income housing design, an inspiring source of clues which seem to work
successfully in lower density environments. New Urbanism remains but one of a gamut
of design principles which also comprise Defensible Space, community planning,
walking distance concepts and rules of thumb for assessing "good" urban form. All
these principles, taken as a system of guidelines, provide the foundations for making
successful public housing communities.
Charlotte's Earle Village: A Town with its Center
Charlotte's Earle Village -- so named to honor a longtime member of the Authority --
was constructed in 1967 on thirty-six acres of land neighboring the Central Business
District (CBD). A sharply differentiated environment inhabited by a distressed population
renders Earle Village physically and socio-economically isolated from the rest of the
city. The population is described in terms of "permanency", since many residents have
lived at Earle Village for some fifteen years or are second and third generation public
housing residents (Charlotte Baseline, 1996: 7,8). The site itself is renowned as a haven
for drug-related crime. People on the Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA) waiting list tend
to refuse to live at Earle Village and as a result, those who do are often the most
desperate.
Earle Village is located within the First Ward neighborhood, one of Charlotte's four
central wards that has historically remained a culturally diverse community. The First
Ward was, during the late 1880s and early 1900s, a thriving business district where
lived farmers, merchants and unskilled laborers. The Ward also provided a supportive
setting for Black residents by incorporating the first Black public library in the State, a
YMCA and a retail center widely known as "Black main street" (Charlotte Baseline,
1996: 11). The Depression-induced declining rate of employment caused many African-
Americans to neglect their houses. The once financially stable First Ward suffered
social and physical decline. A decade later, those who could profit from the FHA
mortgage policy fled to Charlotte's outskirts, leaving behind a First Ward inhabited by
poor Black residents. With the onset of the 1960s urban renewal, the declining but
ideally located First Ward was a prime candidate for clearance and redevelopment. The
direct result was the razing of the Ward to build government facilities, and the
displacement of populations toward areas deprived of suitable housing options. In 1967,
the Authority was legally required to build Earle Village as replacement housing. In
subsequent decades, Earle Village became increasingly dwarfed in the shadow of the
prosperous neighboring CBD, and bypassed by growth or economic opportunities. A
trench made of numerous parking lots and vacant parcels further impeded on the
development's potential to partake in downtown development possibilities. Today, a
local retail base of grocery stores, restaurants or cleaners remains conspicuously
absent, further highlighting the isolation effect between development and downtown.
Nevertheless, the edges of the site contain diverse uses such as an elementary school,
three churches, an Afro-American Center, four small low-income multi-family
complexes, ten single family homes and a few convenience stores (Charlotte Baseline,
1996: 12). Earle Village stands as the only residential area of the First Ward (Fig. 2.15).
The development's 409 two-story rowhouses and garden apartment buildings compose
a physical environment in sharp contrast with the modern downtown area. While the flat
brick boxes are considered structurally sound to house 1,200 residents, the main cause
of physical distress mainly stems from deferred maintenance. Earle Village covers a
four by five block area with an eleven dulacre density. Three major thoroughfares
dissect the site. They connect the downtown area to the nearby interstate and bring
heavy traffic within the development.
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Fig. 2.15 - Pre-Redevelopment Conditions at Earle Village, Showing Brookshire Freeway to the
East (Charlotte Plan)
In 1992 and 1993, Earle Village residents were invited by the CHA, the City and the
Planning Commission to discuss plans for the revitalization of the development and the
surrounding First Ward. The basis of the 1993 HOPE VI grant application focused less
on the distressed conditions of the area as it did on the potential for adding needed
retail and housing assets to the downtown district. The CHA was awarded $41 million in
HOPE VI funds, a grant to be used for renovation, new construction and the
improvement of management practices, as well as for the implementation of supportive
services.29 Resident consultation and participation was encouraged throughout the
implementation process.
The three main social components of the plan include: a homeownership program, a
Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) program and an "elderly" program. While the first two
programs are designed to help move families out of public housing by providing them
with skills to acquire economic and social independence, the latter focuses on issues of
health care, accessibility and transportation for the elderly. The social services plan for
the FSS households functions as a contract between residents and Authority. While
children must attend school, adults are required to follow job training sessions, do ten
hours per month of community service, take homeownership workshops, and leave
assisted housing within the next five years. Residents who, at the beginning of the
planning process, refused to partake in the agreement were given Section 8 certificates
to relocate. To those who wished to stay, the CHA proposed programs like the Charlotte
Self-employment Project, the Afro-American Cultural Center after-school arts programs,
the Safe Neighborhood Awareness program and the Community Health Center cancer
screening program.
The physical plan remedies the sprawled configuration of the development by
introducing a "town center" at the intersection of Seventh and Davidson Streets (Figs.
2.16, 2.17). This town center in fact designates a mixed-used four-block area with
daycare and community facilities. These structures are strategically located for easy
access by all residents. A covered, crescent-shaped walkway (or galleria) enhances the
centrality of the communal area. There are 239 rehabilitated and new units on the
redeveloped Earle Village site (which used to contain 409 units): 102 are rehabilitated
29 The CHA's $35 million award was subsequently amended to $41 million to reflect the complexity of the new master plan
(Baseline, 1996: 13).
Fig. 2.16 - Proposed Plan for Earle Village (Charlotte Plan)
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and earmarked for FSS households; twenty-nine are new FSS townhouses; forty other
new townhouses are reserved for homeownership; and sixty-eight units in a new 3-story
elevator apartment building are set aside for the elderly
Management at the new Earle Village is privatized. Three management teams cater to
the needs of separate groups: the FSS Program, the Homeowners' Association and the
Elderly Housing management teams.
Successful public/private revitalization partnerships in Charlotte's Second Ward have
inspired the CHA to make Earle Village a catalyst of neighborhood-wide revitalization.
The positive effects of the HOPE VI plan will attract private investment to the First Ward,
mainly through the creation of these economic programs: a non-profit, non-HUD-
regulated Economic Development Corporation, and the implementation of an Economic
Development Center serving as a business incubator space. CHA-owned vacant land at
the edge of the site will be used to lure investment and introduce mixed-use
development in the First Ward.
Chicago's Cabrini Extension: Revitalization at the Neighborhood Scale
Chicago's Cabrini-Green is one of the most infamous public housing developments in
the nation, mainly because of the intense media-coverage of violent crime against
resident children. The 1997 Chicago Housing Authority's (CHA) HOPE VI plan for the
Cabrini Extension integrates the public housing community into the Near North Side
neighborhood, which is part of the Near North Redevelopment Initiative (NNRI). 30
Incorporated within city limits in 1837, the NNRI planning area is located in one of
Chicago's oldest communities. During the 1 9 th century, the area benefited from the
presence, on the other side of the Chicago River, of industries like the McCormick
Reaper. To the west of Wells Street, hundreds of industry workers were housed in small
wood-frame cottages clustered in an area that was already described as a slum
(Chicago Plan, 1997: 5.2.4). While the western part of the Near North Side
neighborhood contained industries and deteriorating workers housing, its eastern part
30 The NNRI concentrates on the revitalizing an area bounded by the Chicago River to the west, Chicago Avenue to the south,
Wells Street to the east and North Avenue to the north, and which includes the Cabrini-Green development.
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evolved into a fashionable residential and commercial area which extended to Michigan
Avenue and the Gold Coast. Apart from the 1928 construction of the Marshall Field
Garden Apartments, the major effort to revitalize the neighborhood occurred in the early
1940s when the first public housing development, the Frances Cabrini Homes, was
built. To the 586-unit low-rise garden apartment residential complex were annexed, in
1958, the 1,921-unit Cabrini Homes and, in 1962, the 1,096-unit Green Homes.
During the 1990s, the incidence of violent crime at Cabrini-Green -- which had already
become an issue as soon as the 1970s and 1980s -- reached a paroxysm of media
attention. In October 1992, a six year old boy walking to school with his mother was
fatally shot by a sniper hidden ten floors above in one of the towers. In January 1997, a
nine year old girl was found sexually assaulted, poisoned, beaten and covered in gang
symbols on a seventh floor landing.
It is widely accepted that site design at the Cabrini Extension is a typical example of in-
defensible space. The site itself is delineated by Orleans Street to the east, Larrabee
Street to the west, Division street to the north and Chicago Avenue to the south. The
towers-in-the-park configuration, the absence of a traditional through-street pattern (Fig.
2.18), the unsafe corridors, stairwells and open-air galleries and the ambiguous
demarcation between public and private zones are all characteristic symptoms of an
institutional-looking environment designed for everyone and nobody in particular. The
eight high-rise buildings at the Cabrini Extension range in height from seven to nineteen
stories and were planned without enclosed lobbies. By 1997, year the CHA received its
HOPE VI grant to revitalize Cabrini, two of these structures were vacant. A significant
portion of the site is also vacant, overgrown and littered. There is no street network on
the Cabrini-Green site, only vast and unsafe no-man's-lands between desolate
structures.
The HOPE VI plan for the Cabrini Extension, covering 340 acres, constitutes the largest
revitalization area of the sample. With a redevelopment budget of some half a billion
dollars, it is probably the largest integration endeavor in the U.S. The largest land owner
in the NNRI area is the CHA. Other substantial portions are owned by private or
charitable entities like the YMCA, and by government bodies like the City and the Park
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Fig. 2.18 - Land Use Map showing the Pre-Redevelopmeft Conditions in the Near Northi -Redevelopment Area with location of Cabrini-Green Extension (Chicaqo Pan)
District. A number of off-site parcels will be acquired by the CHA to supplement the
Cabrini-Green Extension acreage.
The NNRI implements between 2,000 and 3,000 new housing units, mixing row housing
and duplexes with mid-rise structures. The 700 units reserved for public housing are
scattered throughout the revitalized community. In fact, the mixed-income strategy for
the redeveloped Near North Side neighborhood designates 30% of new units for public
housing families; 20% for working low-income households; and the remaining 50% are
sold at market value. A total of 1,324 units (and all of the towers) are demolished to
make place for the new mixed-income community which is built by a private developer
through a competitive Request for Proposal (RFP) process. The plan, which remains in
a preliminary planning phase, includes a town center with a retail and services core, two
new schools, one elementary1 and the other high school, a new police station cum
community center, a new library and new neighborhood parks (Figs. 2.19, 2.20).
Cleveland' King Kennedy: Three Phases of Re-Design
During the 1970s, Cleveland went through a difficult phase: fiscal default, an industrial
fire along the Cuyahoga River, and the loss of thousands of manufacturing jobs. A
decade later, business and community organizations like Cleveland Tomorrow and the
Gund Foundation spurred multi-billion investment funds in the downtown area. Shortly
thereafter, government and community-based leaders shifted this civic revitalization
task to surrounding neighborhoods. The public/private partnership strategy created the
Cleveland Empowerment Zone within which federal funds are helping expand job and
housing opportunities. As part of these citywide efforts, the Cuyahoga Metropolitan
Housing Authority (CMHA) has received HOPE VI funds to redevelop four public
housing developments: King Kennedy, Outhwaite Homes, Carver Park and Riverview.
These funds are supplemented by the creation of a Homeownership Zone.
The main target for neighborhood and public housing revitalization is the Central
Neighborhood, an eight square mile area located between Cleveland's downtown and
31 The CHA-owned lot where the 1117-19 North Cleveland tower now stands will be acquired by the Board of Education for the
construction of a new elementary school, in return for an equivalent piece of their land.
80
- V TI- -I
7-A ~ 7'14 ,M- -
c ---
*N S TiA - --
/ 7~ -T -
I*
- - - - - - --... - -r - ---.. -
-.- / /
rr
c-aw - \
- \. , /
, 
-j
lot
.i-T
t'A
Fig. 2.19 - Proposed Master Plan for the Near North Neighborhood, Showing Location of Town
Center just North of the Cabrini-Green Development (Chicago Plan)
Fig. 2.20 - Renderings of the Redeveloped Cabrini and Adoining Neighborhood: Town
Center(Above) New Rowhouses (Middle) and New Mid-Rises (Bottom) (Chicago
Revised Plan)
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University Circle. Back in the Depression era, Central was one of Cleveland's most
distressed neighborhoods. It welcomed the city's first public housing developments. In
subsequent decades, Central's public housing stock continued to steadily deteriorate
along with the adjacent neighborhood. The King Kennedy Estates were built in the
Central neighborhood in two phases: the South section in 1970 and the North section in
1971. The development consists of one 8-story and two connected 6-story structures for
the elderly, also called the North and South high-rises. It also contains twenty-two 3-
story gable-roofed buildings and ten 3-story "gallery" structures for walk-up family units,
also known as the North and South family developments. Deterioration at King Kennedy
stemmed from the unmanageability of the thirty-six barren acres of development, lack of
security, management deficiencies, crime and other socially stigmatizing ills (Fig. 2.21).
In 1990, the King Kennedy public housing development was known nationwide as
"Dodge City". It offered a haven for gangs, crack use and prostitution. The site was then
composed of two parts made distinct by the drab and monotonous character of the
housing structures: the "Yellows" to the north -- also referred to as the "Motel 6" -- and
the "Browns" to the south. Both sections were equally desolate low- and high-rise
environments.
In 1993, the CMHA exposed its "Central Vision" whereby HOPE VI funds helped
"achieve economic integration of Cleveland's Central neighborhood through
transitioning it from a very low-income poverty community to an economically viable and
self-sufficient mixed-income community by leveraging the power of public/private
partnerships". The secured HOPE VI Plus grant would enable hundreds of families "to
recognize the American Dream of homeownership" (Cleveland Plan, 1993: 1). The
Central Vision3 3 plan also contained provisions to create quality retail in the
neighborhood, increase residents' safety and security, develop a local work force and
create a partnership between the Authority and Cleveland's public schools to provide
attendance incentives.
As a result, five hotels, five office towers, two shopping centers and two sports facilities were built, along with downtown housing
in the Warehouse District and the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, which anchors the North Coast Harbor
development.
"Central Vision" was the title of CMHA's first HOPE VI grant application and was later updated into an "Expanded Central
Vision" to comply with HOPE VI Plus goals.
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Fig. 2.21 - Pre-Redevelopment Conditions in the Larger Neighborhood Area of the King
Kennedy Estates (In Central Neighborhood) (Cleveland Plan)
By 1996, two thirds of King Kennedy (the south portion) were transformed with the use
of Comprehensive Modernization (CompMod/MROP) funds -- which created
Renaissance Village -- and by HOPE VI grants -- which created Delaney Village and the
South Tower's Social Services Mall. The two Villages, developed in two phases but
meant as a homogeneous compound, are heralded as models of defensible space
design principles. Each rehabilitated unit has its own private entranceway amidst
"controllable" landscaped surroundings. The South high-rise, now transformed into the
Carl B. Stokes "One-Stop" Social Services mall, is also designated as a successful
example of re-use of non-viable public housing. The North high-rise has been
remodeled for elderly residents in 1995 (Figs. 2.22, 2.23).
In 1997, as the North family units remained unchanged, residents felt mounting tensions
between the South and North neighbors. The latter group, still inadequately housed, felt
doubly stigmatized: first, because the "good" King Kennedy residents who passed the
screening tests were allowed to move down south; and second, because South
residents bragged openly about their "status" address at the rehabilitated Villages. The
1997 HOPE VI grant application (the third phase of rehabilitation at King Kennedy)
concentrates on the North Family development, replacing the courtyard-configured low
rises with single-family townhouses.
Designer Views
Architect Michael Benjamin 3 ' has worked on five different HOPE VI projects for three
housing authorities. In the case of King Kennedy, he is especially critical of the fact that
physical integration of the re-designed community to the surrounding fabric was virtually
impossible, "because there is no fabric to connect with" in the Central neighborhood.
The North high-rises will soon be demolished, as this building type has been almost
universally deemed an intolerably inadequate dwelling environment for poor families.
But when redevelopment started at King Kennedy in 1991, demolition was not an
option, even though designers had suggested it as part of rehabilitating the site into
"mini-neighborhoods". The re-introduction of one new road going through the site and
connecting with the edges was opposed by a small but influential group of tenants. The
Interview with Michael Benjamin, architect practicing in Cleveland, Oh, was interviewed on July 10 1h 1997.
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message was loud and clear: residents did not want links to the adjacent community,
"even though their estate stood out like a megalithic anomaly".
Not being able to introduce a network of streets in accordance with New Urbanism
principles does not alter Benjamin's opinion of the movement. Of course, he says,
encouraging residents to participate in planning and introducing mixed-income
communities are sound ideas. "But what it really boils down to is some version of
gentrification". Reducing the number of public housing units does not adequately deal
with the fact that tenants "do not want to move out or get Section 8 certificates".
Creating mixed-income communities and forcing some residents out, says Benjamin, is
contrary to the kind of "loyalty" HOPE VI seeks to spur. In Benjamin's view, the
residents' attachment to their development refers to New Urbanism's commitment to
community building principles but remains hard to recreate.
According to Benjamin, the current HOPE VI initiatives and philosophy are basically
right. In wanting to re-distribute incomes within a community, "HUD is veiling itself into
motherhood. What could be wrong with that?" For one thing, continues Benjamin, these
good intentions are being carried out with the same "site-specific" methods of
implementation: authorities are awarded a large lump of money to quickly redevelop a
site. "What's mostly missing is a sense of time". Deceptively long range HOPE VI goals
really boil down to a familiar exercise in doing that much redevelopment with that much
amount of HUD funds.
When visiting a Chicago "project" after one tower had been demolished35 , Benjamin
reflected on his ambivalence vis-d-vis the demolition of the much maligned -- mainly by
the media -- high-rises. As an architect formed during the 1960s when schools generally
adhered to the modernist ethos, Benjamin feels a twinge when thinking that he could
very well have designed such a building, for another site and program perhaps, but with
the same stylistic and functional results. He questions the "party atmosphere" and
fanfare that inevitably accompanies high-rise implosion ceremonies, like some sort of
ritualized "Pruitt-Igoe Revisited" event. One Chicago resident he met during his visit was
35 He was referring to a Chicago development where one 10 year-old had been dropped from a high rise by another child. The high
rise in question was demolished in June 1997.
right, he remembers, in saying that "you can drop and kill a boy from the third story
window of a new townhouse just the same".
Detroit's Jeffries West: Implementing Urban Villages
The Detroit Housing Department (DHD) owns and operates twenty-three public housing
developments: twelve serve elderly populations, four are reserved for families and the
remaining house combinations of both groups. Jeffries Homes is the largest housing
development in Detroit. The 2,170-unit development was built in phases in the early
1950s to include sixty-nine multi-family residential structures of six different architectural
types, from the 2-story townhouse to the 14-story high-rise. The development's large
scale and high density36 dominate the surrounding neighborhoods, which are mainly
composed of 1- and 2-family homes, as well as garden apartments. The Jeffries site is
divided into two main sections (Jeffries East and West) by the Lodge Freeway (Fig.
2.24). It has, over the years, harbored all the symptoms of a severely distressed public
housing: high vacancy rates, lack of maintenance, vandalism, deterioration and high
drug-related crime rates. Jeffries West is characterized by a superblock configuration
dotted by thirteen high-rise structures (1,918 units); Jeffries East, more recently
modernized, consists of thirty-seven rowhouses (252 units).
Jeffries West is itself divided into three distinct superblocks, each about the size of four
to six neighborhood blocks. In contrast, the adjacent neighborhood is composed of
traditional four-acre blocks laid out according to an orthogonal grid. The typical
residential block usually is divided by a service alley. The site's edges contain an
elementary school, a school for the deaf, deteriorating residential blocks, a church, a
convenience store and numerous vacant lots. The lack of differentiated public and
private open spaces, along with alien building types, densities, institutional character
and site configuration, make Jeffries West a segregated environment.
The revitalization plan for Jeffries Homes proposes the demolition and re-building of
low-income housing on- and off-site. It also includes a comprehensive supportive
services program and economic development initiatives. HOPE VI strategies are
36 Jeffries Homes stands out not only because it is big, but also because of its comparatively high density: sixty units per acre at
Jeffries East and thirty-one units per acre at Jeffries West, contrasting with five to twelve units per acre36 in the surrounding
neighborhood.
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Fig. 2.24- Pre-Redevelopment Conditions at Jeffries West. Showing Location of 1-10 to the east
and Martin Luther King Boulevard to the South (Detroit Plan)
F
coupled with Empowerment Zone activities and the Detroit Works Partnership to
encompass the broader neighborhood.
Density is reduced by demolishing 1438 units (twenty-four buildings) and make space
for 826 new ones. The revitalized development is "designed to blend into the existing
fabric of adjacent residential communities, in an effort to erase the boundaries between
public housing and the large community." (Detroit Plan, 1995: 1-5). The plan calls for
the creation of three distinct villages or neighborhoods: a Seniors Village (424 units), a
Special Needs Village (104 units) and a Family Village (298 units). Each village is
separately managed so that policies cater to the specific needs of each group. The
Seniors Village comprises four renovated high-rises and a community center to form a
separate entity from the rest of the site. Surrounded by a high fence, it offers a sense of
security to the elderly. The Family Village, at the north end and center of the site,
consists of thirty-two renovated townhouses and 266 new duplexes and rowhouses for
families with children. Each family unit has a private entrance on the street, a fenced
backyard, resident parking at the back and a protected, in-block play area for children. A
new community center/administration Building is located across the street from an
existing elementary school. The Special Needs Village, finally, is wedged between the
elderly and family villages. It includes a 104-unit garden apartment building for groups in
need of special attention: the previously homeless, recovering alcoholics, the
developmentally challenged, pregnant teens and persons with AIDS. A separate team
manages the special needs village and its separate supportive services (Figs. 2.25,
2.26, 2.27).
A new street system connects Jeffries to the existing street pattern in the surrounding
neighborhood. A main north-south spine (the Jeffries Boulevard) runs through the
center of the development to link all three villages into one community. A new
Neighborhood Resource Center, located in the edge, is run in partnership with local
agencies to offer support services.
Designer's View
Daniel Glenn specifies that the creation of "Urban Villages" at the Jeffries West
development was mostly a request by the elderly who were much concerned for their
safety. They insisted that their cluster, the Seniors Village, be enclosed by a fence.
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Gayle Epp, involved in the early planning stage, mentioned her reticence vis-d-vis
keeping high-rises on the site, but pointed to the "political importance" of including the
elderly in a redevelopment scheme. In her view, the Seniors Village towers are anti-
integrative elements of the revitalization plan.
The creation of an enclosed village for the elderly at one end of the site prompted the
creation of a boulevard that links the Seniors cluster to the site's "entry", located at the
opposite extremity. The elongated form of the central open space -- which acts as a
skeletton with the seniors village as its head -- reflects the different group's acute sense
of territoriality.
Houston' Allen Parkway Village: Preservation and Fencing
Allen Parkway Village (APV) -- originally named San Felipe Courts (Houston Plan,
1995: 2-17) -- is located in the northern fringe of the Freedmen's Town/Fourth Ward
neighborhood. The site is bounded by Allen Parkway to the north, West Dallas Avenue
to the south, Heiner street and Interstate 45 to the east and San Felipe park to the west.
Allen Parkway has now been recognized as the San Felipe Courts Historic District,
which is listed on the Register of Historic Places.
The thirty-seven-acre site, acquired by eminent domain by the USHA, was dedicated to
the construction of public housing during World War II. When it was turned over to the
Authority, the Allen parkway site was known as a blighted area of dilapidated buildings
and as a City garbage dump. While the first phase of construction was conducted by the
USHA, completion of the project was done under the Division of Defense Housing of the
Federal Works Agency and completed in 1944 (Houston Plan: 2-17). At the time, Allen
Parkway represented the largest USHA-sponsored housing development in the South.
Both the Allen Parkway development and its surrounding environment are severely
deteriorated, as evidenced by unemployment, distressed or vacated buildings and
disinvestment. In fact, this neighborhood is one of Houston's lowest income areas. The
Freedmen's Town neighborhood is so named in commemoration of the Emancipation
laws of 1865, when freed slaves immigrated to Houston and founded one of the city's
four wards. The Houston land subdivision system, implemented in the 1800s, was
governed by ward "bosses" and aldermen. Its ethnic homogeneity was notorious. By the
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late 1880s, most of the land in the Fourth Ward was occupied by Black settlers and
subsequently subdivided into house lots. By the 2 0 th century, Italian and Jewish
merchants, who were not welcome in other wards, joined the area's Black businessmen.
One of Houston's first Black neighborhoods, Freedmen's Town is a historically important
community. In fact, the Fourth Ward contains the oldest African-American Church in
Texas. In the 1950s, 95% of Houston's African-American citizens who owned
businesses lived in the Fourth Ward. Even though the Freedmen's Town Historic District
was placed on the National Register of Historic Places, the neighborhood is today
primarily owned by speculators and absentee landlords. Even though 81 % of the
population is Black, the majority of property owners is made of White families,
government entities and a few other companies. Revitalization efforts for Allen Parkway
and the surrounding neighborhood concentrate on the revival of the African-American
heritage embedded in the surrounding neighborhood.
The physical structure of the Freedmen's neighborhood is influenced by the West Dallas
Avenue which links more wealthy neighborhoods to the nearby downtown area. There is
no "town center" or structured retail core in the vicinity of the Allen Parkway
development. The public housing community is further isolated from the rest of the city
by the very configuration of its site: it has fenced boundaries, few access points and
limited pedestrian links to the adjacent environments. The development also acts as a
barrier between Fourth Ward residents and the Buffalo Bayou, a major public amenity.
The Freedmen's Town streetscape is a typical Houston grid network of streets and
blocks. Neighborhood uses range from residential (single family attached and detached,
duplexes and apartments), to commercial (small markets, retail stores and restaurants)
and institutional (churches and two cemeteries). The neighborhood adjacent to the
development offers none of the basic amenities such as high school, post office, library
or playground. Neighborhood houses are generally of wood frame construction and in
poor condition (Fig. 2.28).
Originally, Allen Parkway offered 1,000 units in eighty-two flat-roofed buildings: sixty-
eight 2-story housing blocks, twelve 3-three-story housing blocks and two 2-story
administration buildings. The twenty-seven dwellings per acre on-site density contrasts
with that of the neighborhood. The administration building and the community center are
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Fig. 2.28- Pre-Redevelopment Conditions at Allen Parkway Village (APV). Showing Land Uses
in Surrounding Fourth Ward District, as well as 1-15 to the East and the Allen
Parkway to the North (Houston Plan)
located at the corner of Allen Parkway and Valentine street to form a gate to the
development. The residential buildings are planned like garden apartments although
they are separated by ill-defined open space and located far from parking areas. In fact,
some Allen Parkway residents have to traverse various courtyards to reach their parked
cars. Modernization occurred in 1978 when some units were transformed into a daycare
center.
The development was cited as a prime example of modern architectural design and
detailing. Access to the project was limited to White residents until the mid-1 960s, even
though part of the predominantly Black Freedmen's Town was razed to build the
development. In fact, during the construction for the village in the early 1940s, 928
bodies had to be exhumed from what had been a mass grave for freed slaves and
indigent Whites. The grave was located near one of Freedmen's Town two "pest
houses" (or pestilence hospitals) where sick people lived out their final days some time
around the Civil War (Makeig, 1996: 6(3)).
The Allen Parkway, an elevated and noisy segment of the 1-45, borders one edge of the
development. Other edges comprise a service alley, chain link fencing, the back of a
commercial building and a parking area. West Dallas Avenue itself serves as a barrier
between city and project. The abandonment of the site's original north-south streets
(except for Valentine street) has transformed Allen Parkway into a 2,450 feet long
superblock. The housing structures are arranged into long rows along the remaining
internal east-west streets and cul-de-sacs. Fronts and backs of units are practically
undistinguishable since fronts do not necessarily face a street.
The HOPE VI funds are invested in a major revitalization effort coupled with the creation
of a "campus of learners" environment. Elements of this comprehensive revitalization
and long-term sustainability effort comprise physical improvement for the site, new
replacement housing, revised management strategies, supportive and community
services and incentives for resident participation.
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The planning process has been a controversial one.37 As soon as the Authority received
HOPE VI funding, Lenwood Johnson - the head of Allen Parkway's tenant group --
opposed any scheme involving demolition (Robinson, 1995: 11(8)). The nineteen
remaining households on the vacated site soon boycotted all HOPE VI meetings, halting
the planning process. An agreement was finally reached between city officials and the
historic preservation council to keep 286 units for rehabilitation. Johnson remained
opposed: "We are certain that a substantial amount of demolition will completely
eliminate the Allen Parkway Village community campus plan"(Robinson, 1995: 12(19)).
Two months after a consensus for demolition was reached, a local insurance company
bought the nearby (and abandoned) Jeff Davis Hospital for undisclosed "investment
purposes", suspected to include the construction of luxury apartments (Stinebaker,
1996: 2(13)).
In March 1996, the relocation of the remaining APV residents was initiated while
Johnson remained staunchly opposed to imminent demolition. He declared that
"residents [would] block bulldozers at the entrance of the housing complex" (Villafranca,
1996: 5(5)). Meanwhile, HUD decided to handle communications with Johnson and
promised $300,000. to the remaining residents, funds that were ostensibly invested in
creating an on-site planning office (Makeig, 1996: 6 (3)). In June 1996, a U.S. District
Judge finally ordered the remaining residents to vacate the site (No Author, 1996:
6(13)). Archaeological searches were subsequently conducted to make sure no
historically-significant artefacts were threatened by redevelopment.
The HOPE VI plan nevertheless introduces revitalization guidelines to: 1) never sell any
part of the development, except in cases of access to homeownership programs; 2)
have a mixed-income population reside on the redeveloped site; 3) harbor a community
campus concept to include existing and new buildings; 4) harbor a housing program
with one-thirdof the total units for low- and very low-income families, one-third for the
elderly and the remaining third kept as affordable units; 5) replace all public housing
units on a one-for-one basis either with new, acquired or rehabilitated units off site; 6)
37 In May 1993, the Houston Housing Authority (HHA) agreed to concentrate HOPE VI revitalization efforts upon the southwest
corner of the site. The remainder of the Village would be sold at market value and the proceeds reinvested in buying off-site
replacement units. Opposition from a state representative however prompted HUD's secretary Cisneros to announce that no
part of the public housing development would be sold off and that Allen Parkway would be redeveloped into a low-income,
mixed-use development of a smaller scale.
develop a "sustainable living center"; and 7) include economic development
components like a telecommunications network program (Figs. 2.29, 2.30, 2.31).
Designer's View
Planner Daniel Glenn highlights two major issues responsible for a difficult planning
process at APV: 1) the strained relations among residents and redevelopment team;
and 2) a trend consisting in the consolidation of property to form "gated" communities.
He notes that this enclave mentality is in fact deeply rooted in the very origins of a
development built exclusively for Whites while adjacent to a Black neighborhood. This
attitude toward racial segregation, encoded into the site's differentiated appearance and
configuration, has pervaded the residents' mindset for decades. Glenn nevertheless
argues that the enclave mentality he encountered in Houston stems less from the
residents' desire to remain separate, than from developers intent on replicating models
found elsewhere in the suburbs. Gated communities are perceived by developers to
enforce visible protective mechanisms around their investment. As a result, says
Glenn, this trend has negatively impacted the HOPE VI scheme. Through streets
connecting to the neighborhood are absent, and the implementation of shops along a
shared retail boundary along the Fourth Ward was rejected as an integrative measure.
Indianapolis' Small-Grained Concord and Eaglecreek
Concord Village and Eaglecreek Village were built in 1968 and 1969 as public housing
developments for Indianapolis' very low-income families. Both developments are located
in the Near Westside neighborhood, across the river from the Purdue University at
Indianapolis campus. In spite of the University's presence, Near Westside remains one
of Indianapolis' most distressed neighborhoods (Indi. Plan, 1995: 2-5). It includes the
three smaller neighborhoods of Haughville, Strington and Hawthorn which are all
targeted by the City for comprehensive planning efforts.38 The two Villages' surrounding
fabrics contain a substandard housing stock, a low-income population and a struggling
retail core. As in many other urban neighborhoods, Near Westside is confronted by
drug-related crime and violence. As a result, residents of both developments feel unsafe
and vulnerable. In the early 1990s, at least 60% of applicants for an available public
38 The "Near Westside Housing Improvement and Neighborhood Plan" instigated in the early 1980s by the City, neighborhood
residents, the CDC, local business and service providers has now been adopted (1994) by the Metropolitan Development
Commission. The goal of the plan is mainly the rehabilitation of residential structures (Indi. Plan, 1995:.2-7).
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Fig. 2.31 -Renderings of Rehabilitated Garden Apartments (Above)
and New Townhouses (Below) (Houston Plan)
housing unit have refused to live at Concord or Eaglecreek, based on evidende of
criminal activity in the area (Indi. Plan, 1995: 2-50).
Even though a large proportion of buildings are vacant, the Near Westside harbors a
wide range of uses such as housing, light industrial, recreation, institutional and retail.
Two major public open spaces are located near the public housing sites: the Haughville
and Max Bahr parks, the latter being difficult to access because of heavy traffic. Density
figures for the developments show that they are some 50% more dense than their
surrounding environment. There are eighty churches dotting the Near Westside
residential fabric. The Holy Trinity Catholic Church, one of the larger congregation of
300 families, has provided community-based services to the population since the
beginning of the century. The transportation system for the neighborhood is inadequate
and proves an access barrier to jobs and services for many of the developments'
residents.
Concord Village is bordered on three sides by a residential fabric of 1- and 2-story
family homes that are either owner-occupied or rented. Within the remaining edge,
railroad tracks form a barrier between site and neighborhood. The orientation of the
gabled apartment buildings is also reversed, i.e. the resident use the rear door (adjacent
to the parking lot) as the main entrance. In fact, so sharp is the typological contrast
between project and neighborhood, that the site "sends a clear 'public housing'
message to the Near Westside Community" (Indi. Plan, 1995: 2-14). In sum, the overall
atmosphere at Concord Village is one of physical distress, monotony and vulnerability.
The site's configuration offers no through streets but rather dead-end alleys to the rear
parking lots, which have become de facto recreational spaces. There is no clear
differentiation between public (front yards, play areas, walkways ) and private (back
yards) space. As a result, generating a sense of security by creating defendable spaces
is impossible (Fig. 2.32).
Edges of Eaglecreek Village are composed of more varied uses than its Concord
counterpart. To the north side is a residential fabric similar to that surrounding Concord;
to the east, across Tibbs Avenue, is the former Central State Hospital, a site now under
consideration for residential development; to the south, across Cossell Road, lie a
cemetery and a trailer park, both fenced and uninviting; and Little Eagle Creek forms a
Fig. 2.32- Pre-Redevelopment Conditions for Both Ea-glecreek and Concord Village, Showing
the Rail Line Barrier (Indianapolis Plan)
natural boundary to the west. There are rare and far between convenience stores near
the development and public transportation to the next services is difficult to reach. The
site generates an impression of "isolation, monotony and foreboding" (Indi. Plan, 1995:
2-28). Surfaces in-between buildings are hard and desolate, and open spaces are
limited and ill-defined. Even though cars can access the site through three uncontrolled
entries, the internal network of circulation invariably leads to dead-end parking lots (Fig.
2.32).
The HOPE VI plan calls for total demolition of the existing 200 units at the Concord
Village site and 110 units at Eaglecreek. The plan suggests the reconstruction of 132
and 73 units, respectively. The 105 remaining units are replaced using two methods: 1)
thirty-five new off-site units are built on scattered plots, with incentives toward
homeownership; and 2) Section 8 certificates replace the other seventy units. Helped by
the leveraging of HOPE VI funds through the use of tax credits, the revitalization
scheme obeys a one-to-one replacement philosophy. Demolition allows to re-weave the
adjacent developments into the broader neighborhood fabric as one large urban
element that mirrors surrounding street/block patterns. The plan calls for the extension
of neighborhood streets toward the sites and for the import of architectural types that
offer private entryways as well as well-defined front and back yards. The new mixed-
income communities are managed by a coalition of Authority, non-profit agencies (and
/or private partners) and residents (Figs. 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 2.36).
A plan for supportive services calls for a seven-point strategy to: 1- improve the
transportation system to maximize access to jobs; 2- encourage programs that are
located in the neighborhood Youth Center; 3- provide support and job training services
for families by creating a partnership with the local university; 4- strengthen existing
local crime prevention programs; 5- increase neighborhood-based child care services;
6- emphasize "one-step" community outreach services; and 7- improve options for
seniors, such as transportation. A permanent, community-controlled endowment fund to
promote to sustain long-term resident services is created to leverage supplemental
funding.
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Fig. 2.36 - Diagram of the Proposed Plan
Fig. 2.37 - a) Rendering of Typical Concord/ Eaglecreek Street (ndi. Plan)
FRONT ELEVATION 2/1 BR FRONT ELEVATIONI 3BR TYPE I FRONT ELEVATION 1/1 BR
FRONT ELEVATION 3/1 BR FRONT ELEVATION 3BR TYPE 2 FRONT EL-EVATION 2/2 BR
Fig. 2.37 - b) Typical Elevations for New Townhouse Units (Indi. Plan)
The scattered off-site replacement units3 9 are key elements of the Family Self-
Sufficiency program. They represent opportunities for public housing families to become
homeowners, and they contribute to blur the "project" image by highlighting its positive
influence in the neighborhood's revitalization (Fig. 2.37).
Designer's View
Daniel Glenn portrays the Indianapolis HOPE VI planning process as one of the
"smoothest" among those he's overlooked. The new structures are implemented almost
exactly as was originally proposed in the plans. This relative efficiency, he says, is due
to a successful participatory process whereby residents faithfully attended planning
meetings. He also mentions the quality of the relationship between residents and
redevelopment team. Residents appreciated dealing with a representative of the team
that has remained present from early discussions into implementation. They felt that the
redevelopment team, and especially the omnipresent design professional, had their
interest at heart.
New Haven's Elm Haven: Re-Weaving the Fabric
The Housing Authority of New Haven (HANH) owns and operates thirty-one public
housing developments, fifteen of which serve family households. Elm Haven, located in
the Dixwell neighborhood, is the oldest and the largest of New Haven public housing
developments. The Dixwell neighborhood forms the historic center of New Haven's
African-American community, and is located close to the business center of the city.
The train tracks that parallel Winchester Avenue constitute a physical and psychological
barrier between the deteriorated Dixwell area and its affluent neighbor, Yale University.
Large blocks of vacant property border the tracks (along Ashmun Street), further
distancing Elm Haven from the "Yale side" of town. A network of one-way streets
disconnected from surrounding fabrics -- mainly because of the presence of the rail
tracks -- further enhances the Dixwell neighborhood's sense of isolation (New Haven
Plan, 1995: 3-9) (Fig. 2.38).
From the turn of the century to 1939, Dixwell changed from an area of mixed single- and
two-family houses, into an area of serious blight. The area was also home to a few
39 The Near Westside neighborhood profits from strong community-based partnerships, many of which nurture goals of residential
rehabilitation.
Fig. 2.38 - Pre-Redevelopment Conditions at Elm Haven, Showing the Strip of Vacant Land to
the North (New Haven Plan)
important New Haven factories -- among which the Winchester Repeating Arms --
makers of the rifle that "won the West" (New Haven Plan, 1995: 3-9). During this period,
a growing population of Black factory workers immigrated into the neighborhood and
lived where they could, i.e. in rapidly dilapidating and vacated housing, or even in cars
and makeshift abodes near the plants. The HANH formally identified Dixwell as a slum
area. The Authority then made plans to replace "deplorable" living conditions with new
low-rent units mainly destined for the returning War veterans. Thus the first public
housing built in New Haven was in fact "temporary 'military housing' [built] for War
veterans until they could move into a more permanent setting" (New Haven Plan, 1995:
3-9).
To build the development in 1940, the poor Black population of Dixwell was displaced
and replaced by a mix of African-American (66%) and Caucasian (33%) on-site
residents. To house both groups on the same site was, in times of sanctioned racial
segregation, a most innovative strategy, even though households of each group were
assigned separate buildings. This novel racial mixing strategy was initiated by the
owners of the Winchester Repeating Arms, "the largest factory in the area and a large
employer of Black workers. The factory lobbied to make the additional housing available
for Black families because it planned to bring 'additional large numbers' to the plant for
the War effort"(New Haven Plan, 1995: 3-10). In 1949, in response to the Taft-Ellender-
Wagner Housing Act and under pressure from the City's segregating policies, a high-
rise extension to the Elm Haven development was nevertheless built for the exclusive
use of Blacks.4
Elm Haven is a 650-unit low-rise housing development two or three times more dense
than the surrounding neighborhood: twenty-four dwellings per acre on site, compared to
eight du/acre in the adjacent Dixwell neighborhood (New Haven Plan: 3-11).41 The
contrast in densities -- which opposes multi-family structures to single family houses --
40 The tower was demolished in 1989 and was at the heart of a class-action suit brought by New Haven public housing residents
against HUD, the City and the HANH. The plaintiffs, when faced with the relocation of the tower tenants in another area of
minority concentration, claimed that public housing site selection was for decades based on discriminatory practices and had
encouraged racial segregation. The suit was settled mainly through the allocation of Section 8 certificates to be used outside
minority-concentrated areas in the New Haven suburbs. The seemingly innovative racial mixing initiatives of the 1940s had
created enclaves of segregation that required the strong voice of residents to be dismantled.
41 From: Fig. 5: Elm Haven Neighborhood Density Comparisons . The plan is contradicting: the neighborhood proportion of single
family dwellings is said to be 12%, versus the number of units in multi-family structures at 86% (p. 3-11). The land use plan
clearly shows, however, that the predominant housing type found in the neighborhood is the detached single family house (Fig.
3: Elm Haven neighborhood Context/ Land Use).
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makes Elm Haven's separateness from its surroundings highly visible. The public
housing site is bordered by four streets -- Ashmun, Webster, Dixwell and Admiral -- and
is composed of two large parcels: one for the thirty-six low-rise brick buildings and the
other for the now demolished high-rise. Deteriorated one-way drives divide the low-rise
parcel in half. A disaffected railroad line to the east has historically constituted a barrier
between Elm Haven and the industrial zone. The fine-grained residential fabric of the
north and south edges is in fair to deteriorated condition. Finally, the western edge is
lined by the Dixwell Avenue commercial axis.
The Elm Haven site layout is visibly out of context with the surrounding 1 9 th century
street/block patterns. Bar-shaped, flat-roofed apartment buildings disposed in parallel
groupings rarely face the street so that unit entryways ambiguously relate to the internal
and external road network. Even though backs of buildings generally face other backs,
off-street entrances to common hallways and stairwells are difficult to differentiate.
There is a clear demarcation between the institutional appearance of the Elm Haven
buildings and the neighborhood houses facing them. In fact, "the deteriorated
appearance ... sends a clear message that the owners and residents of public housing
projects do not care about the 'public face' they show to the neighborhood" (New Haven
Plan, 1995: 3-22).
The neighborhood's social fabric is enriched by a number of grass-root and community-
based organizations mainly interested in providing children health care, teen counseling
and drug prevention programs. While Yale University forms one of Elm Haven's physical
edges, it also plays an important role in shaping the social landscape of the
neighborhood. For instance, Yale sponsors some 220 community-wide
university/community partnerships in different areas of activity. For the Elm Haven
population in particular, such partnerships take the form of a business plan for a
resident-owned laundromat and of legal assistance during the HOPE VI redevelopment
phase.
The revised version for Elm Haven' redevelopment plan attempts to eliminate the
isolation of the Dixwell's most distressed residents.42 The creation of a "campus of
42 The plan's eight redevelopment goals were identified: Physically, economically and socially integrate the community to its
surrounding neighborhood to end isolation; Reinforce stability by improving the housing stock, creating affordability and95
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Fig. 2.39 - Proposed Plan for Elm Haven, Showing the Extended Limits of the New Committee(Along Canal Street) (New Haven Plan)
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Fig. 2.41 - Rendering of Typical Street Elevation (New Haven Plan)
learners" and the introduction of a mixed-income population on the site are two
cornerstones of the redevelopment strategy. The campus of learners combines public
and private resources to offer a selection of educational opportunities and family
support services. This developmental "laboratory" is anchored by an adjacent school to
form a campus core easily accessible for all tenants. This initiative is supplemented by a
"social contract" struck between landlord and tenants. It spells out, in the lease, that
residents are responsible in taking action toward economic self-sufficiency.
The redevelopment plan for Elm Haven calls for the demolition of all existing public
housing (462 units) and the building of new homes (565 units), streets and community
amenities. The physical concept -- which supports income-mixing tactics and introduces
a street network -- weaves Elm Haven back into the rest of the neighborhood. New
housing typologies and architectural styles are imported to mirror conditions found in the
broader Dixwell community. An administrative building and a community center are
located at the site's edge, along Dixwell Avenue, to create a "gate" into the redeveloped
community (Figs. 2.39, 2.40, 2.41).
New Orleans' Desire: Composing with Harsh Barriers
In 1996, the Desire public housing development could only be described as
"disastrous." Built in 1954 to add 1,800 public housing units to New Orleans' stock,
Desire "was destined for failure from the day it was built" (New Orleans Plan 2:1). By
1996, six years after HUD had deemed Desire non-viable, only 500 families occupied a
site so deteriorated that demolition was the only financially feasible solution.
Desire has from its inception been severely impacted by the presence of an adjacent
industrial area. The city of New Orleans has in the last decade heavily invested in the
Almonaster-Michoud Industrial District. As a result, neighborhood growth is directed
away from Desire. The public housing community, apart from being isolated within an
enhancing the economic revitalization; Plan for the rehabilitation of existing substandard housing and the creation of
homeownership opportunities; Introduce income mixing to encourage working households to remain in the community and serve
as role models; Develop a comprehensive approach (policing, lease enforcement, physical improvements, drug prevention) to
eliminate drug dealing; Create strong links with the adjacent Wexler School and make it the focus of the "Campus for Learners";
Develop the Linear Park and adjacent city parcels as an element of redevelopment; Encourage the partnership between the
tenants and a private developer (New Haven Plan: 1-1).
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Pre-Redevelopment Conditions in the Desire Neighborhood, Showing the Water's
edge to the North. 1-10 to the West and the Florida Highway to the East (New OrleansPlan)
Fig. 2.42 -
undesirable part of New Orleans, suffers from the stigma of living on what was reputedly
an old garbage dump site.4
Prior to 1927, the large area located north of the Florida Canal (the Desire area) was
virtually vacant. Also known as the Gentilly Industrial District, this district was first
subdivided in 1949 to permit large-scale residential development such as the Desire
development, built in the mid-1950s. Along the east edge, typical New Orleans shotgun
houses heavily ornamented with pattern-book jigsaw embellishments contrasted sharply
with the public housing site (New Orleans Plan: 6-6). By the 1970s, on- and off-site
vacancy rates soared when Interstate 10 was built and catalyzed steady encroachment
of industrial and commercial uses into the residential areas (Fig. 2.42).
Apart from a Comprehensive Modernization ("CompMod") grant allocated in 1992 and
used to rehabilitate a part of the site (125 units) that is adjacent to the Florida Canal
Avenue, Desire has remained untouched and severely deteriorated.
In 1996, a private program management firm" was hired by the New Orleans Housing
Authority (NOHA) to prepare a revised version for the Desire's HOPE VI revitalization
plan. The revised HOPE VI plan recognizes that "the Desire site is a critical part of a
viable New Orleans neighborhood and that the future survival of that neighborhood, as
well as of Desire itself, depends on the implementation of a bold and imaginative
revitalization effort." (New Orleans Plan, 1996: 1-2). The four main redevelopment goals
are unchanged: 1) create safe, decent and diversified housing opportunities, including
homeownership; 2) dissolve existing neighborhood barriers to reverse an acute sense
of isolation; 3) provide programs for job training along with economic development
opportunities; 4) maximize the use of HOPE VI funds through the leveraging of other
public/private funding needed to complete the project.
The new and improved plan concentrates on a neighborhood scale of intervention,
notably by extending housing opportunities outside the development, by inviting profit
43 Contemporary independent tests performed on the soil's composition however proved that the site's foundation was not polluted
and that the dump was an urban myth.
According to HUD, NAHO was unfit to manage the HOPE VI program on its own. It insisted that outside consultants assist in
developing a new master plan, a comprehensive support services program and a complete revitalization strategy for the broader
neighborhood.
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Fig. 2.43 - Master Plan Diagram for Desire: Building Configurations do not Appear (New Orleans
Plan)
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and non-profit developers to invest on the site, by implementing a new "connecting"
street network, and by creating an on-site commercial core, also called economic
incubator. The 1996 revised version does not offer a detailed re-design plan. A master
plan presents general intents for the site's reconfiguration: the creation of a street/block
pattern to connect development to the south edge, the presence of a mixed-use
"boulevard" extending from the site's "entry" through to the centralized community
center, and the structuring of smaller residential blocks into small "neighborhoods"
turned away from the industrial barrier. Diagrams allude to the implementation of
townhouses arranged around courtyards as the main residential models (Figs. 2.43,
2.44).
The community and support services programs introduce a model of "neighborhood by
choice", based on principles of long-term sustainability and self-sufficiency. This latter
component is also founded on the idea that any support service for residents (such as
Youth Empowerment, Resident Development and Golden Age programs) will have a
community service counterpart.
Manager's View
John Burgess", manager of the HOPE VI venture, specified that the creation of "mini-
neighborhoods" is not an attempt to replicate patterns found elsewhere in New Orleans.
The idea, he says, is rather to "break up a huge site" into manageable entities that can
be better integrated into the broader social and physical fabrics. Burgess also specifies
that the creation of a traditional street/block pattern is consistent with the goal to avoid
suburbs-like cul-de-sacs which are "inappropriate for the Desire site". He considers the
New Urbanism agenda to provide important clues in forging a better integrated image
for public housing environments.
New York's Beach 41st Street Houses: Re-designing High Density
The Beach 4 1st Street Houses public housing development is located in the Edgemere
neighborhood, one of the thirteen communities of the Queens Rockaway Peninsula's (or
Rockaways).The development is surrounded by a long-declining, moderate income
community called the Edgemere neighborhood which consists mainly of small 1- and 2-
John Burgess, manager of the project, was interviewed on July 1s' 1997.
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family detached and semi-detached houses interspersed with vacant lots. The
Edgemere neighborhood was developed at the turn of the century as a seasonal
summer community. Trendier resorts for city dwellers already existed west of the
Rockaways in the more accessible Coney Island and Brighton Beach areas. Instead of
following the residential pattern of Brooklyn, the Rockaway developers opted for the
implementation of modest homes and bungalows similarly found on Staten Island's
south shore. The wood-framed clapboard constructions characterized a small-scale
community of modest means
After the War, the area went into disrepair mainly because of spatial obsolescence in
the face of life-style changes and of better opportunities found elsewhere. While either
ends of the Peninsula transformed themselves into thriving upper- and mixed-income
areas, the middle part -- containing the Edgemere neighborhood -- fared worse. In the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the blighted area was cleared to build several public housing
developments. Among these was the Beach 41st Street Houses, a development
designed along the "tower-in-the-park" principle of high-rises sited on a loosely planned
superblock of windswept open spaces. When it was built, the scale of the development
sharply contrasted with that of the fine-grained waterfront fabric. The development's
high density (fifty-two dwellings per acre) highlighted its separateness from the
neighborhood (three to nine du/acre). The socio-economic context also shifted when an
influx of permanent residents made Edgemere a year-round neighborhood (New York
Plan, 1995: 1-10) 4. As a result, east-west roadways were widened and a subway line
was elevated to improve local traffic. Nevertheless, the lack of transversal connectors
rendered links between the Peninsula and the other boroughs very difficult.
The Beach 4 1st Street Houses development was completed in 1973 and is fully
managed by the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA).The development consists
of four 13-story apartment buildings (712 units in 118 feet high towers) on thirteen acres
of waterfront property. There is a total of six separate vertical circulation cores among
the four high-rises. The only other on-site facility is a community center which is
connected to one of the residential structures. The development, even though located in
the middle of the Rockaway Peninsula, has always been physically and socio-
46 During construction in the 1970s, the Edgewere population increased by 32%. Along with two other developments (Ocean
Village and Seaview Towers), there was now a total of 2,265 new units for more than 8,000 new residents.
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Fig. 2.45 - Pre-Redevelopment Conditions in the Edgemere Neighborhodd of the Beach 41st St.
Development, Showinq-Basin's Edge to the North and Ocean to the South (New York
Plan)
economically isolated. Since transportation is scarce but essential to get to the nearest
services, the young and the elderly are both constrained and bound to a site where
drugs and crime are prevalent. Physical isolation thus limits residents' ability to earn a
decent income and attain economic self-sufficiency47 (Fig. 2.45).
Unlike many typical HOPE VI candidates, the New York development does not suffer
from severe deterioration and under-occupancy. Distress rather stems from the impact
of the deteriorated neighborhood on the site (New York Plan, 1995: iii). The absence of
support services, community amenities or a healthy retail base, and the presence of
numerous vacant lots are the most visible factors of neighborhood distress. The
proliferation of city- and privately-owned vacant lots is a result of the steady demolition,
since the mid-1950s, of dilapidated 1920s bungalows and summer cottages. In 1994,
the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development devised an
Urban Renewal Area (URA) plan to replace Edgemere's vacant lots with houses and
shops, along with a new park and educational facilities. The off-site elderly housing and
the health clinic later envisioned by the HOPE VI Plan would be supplemented by the
URA plan.
New York's HOPE VI redevelopment philosophy remedies distress with a
comprehensive program to increase safety and security in decent housing structures,
and to create opportunities for acquiring job skills and self-sufficiency. The plan for New
York aims to "physically integrate the site and the neighborhood" by 1) reducing the
height of the existing towers and reduce density; 2) developing a service building and
center across Beach Channel drive; 3) building new on-site townhouses that mirror off-
site typologies; 4) adding new on-site community facilities at the edge to encourage
social links among tenants and neighborhood residents48; and 5) providing more
outdoor recreation facilities; 6) developing pedestrian links toward the neighborhood. All
these intents are consistent with the larger goal of creating a defensible space.
47 Socio-economic indicators confirm that tenants of the Beach 41" Street Houses (and their neighbors) contend with far more
severe disadvantages than the rest of Queens' residents. For instance, the area has experienced a faster growth rate of AIDS
cases and deaths than any other Queens area. There are 50% more teen pregnancy in this area than anywhere else in the City.
More than one-fifth of the Rockaways population has not finished high school. The unemployment rate (36%) is the highest of all
districts in Queens. Incidences of violent crime at Beach 4 1s' Street are twice the City average, and there are only thirty
businesses in the Edgewere area.
48 This new facility provides space for recreational and educational purposes. The existing community center is renovated to
include a central management office, a credit union office and a day care center. The central laundry facility (with access off 4 0 1h
Beach steet) is also renovated to improve visibility ad safety. Within the site, space is provided to house business incubators as
well as a community room. 100
Fig. 2.46 - Proposed Plan for the Beach 41 Street Development (New York Plan)
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As a result, the 13-story towers are significantly reconfigured through selective
demolition. Eight stories are "topped off" four towers and roofs are pitched to enhance
scale and density reductions. Maisonnettes with ground-level entry and private back
yard replace the open-air loggias at the towers' ground floors. The remaining
reconfigured towers offer floor-through units accessible from individual staircases. In
sum, 152 of the 712 existing units are demolished and replaced by thirty-five new on-
site townhouses and 125 new off-site senior apartments. Of the twenty-four re-
configured units, ten to twenty are earmarked for homeownership. Section 8 certificates
constitute supplemental relocation opportunities (New York Plan, 1995: 11-32) (Figs.
2.46, 2.47).
The site is re-designed according to a hierarchical vehicular (north/south) and
pedestrian (east/west) circulation pattern, The plan also proposes to organize parking
into small clusters, to provide private backyards for maisonnettes and townhouses and
to add well-defined play areas for children. While a fence surrounds two of the site's
edges, entry roads are not gated. Nevertheless, recreational spaces along the Bay
remain fenced and gated.
San Francisco' North Beach: Mixed-Use Redevelopment
San Francisco's North Beach development, designed in the 1940s but built in 1952, is a
229-unit development of thirteen structures located in the heart of San Francisco. The
site is located on two blocks (five acres) of prime San Francisco realty, in the center of a
very popular neighborhood. Many locals and tourists pass through or near the public
housing development when using the cable car that leads down to nearby Fishermen's
Wharf or up to Nob Hill. Major hotels face the development and the site is encircled by
a ring of retail, offices and residential uses (Fig. 2.48).
The development's bleak fagades contrast with the character of the neighborhood.
There are no doorways on the fagade lining Taylor Street, the site's most visible edge
where many San Franciscans queue to board cable cars. The units were originally
poorly planned: entry doors directly opened onto the kitchen instead of the living room.
While long, motel-like common corridors and stairwells have become safety hazards,
the buildings mainly suffer the problems of age. The overall configuration
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accommodates an open site plan with breezeways going through each structure's wing.
This permits residents and trespassers to run from one non-private and unsafe
courtyard to the next. Most units lack the basic characteristics that are typical of the
neighborhood's housing stock: continuous fagades to form a street wall and private front
doors, stoops and stairways. Only a few units along Bay Street offer some of these
elements, These units are the most sought after among residents. The lack of
maintenance exacerbates inadequate protection against unstable soil and seismic
occurrences. The on-site community room is of inadequate size to accommodate
tenants and is not equally accessible to all tenants. In sum, design inadequacies like
dark open courtyards and enclosed common stairways have over the years caused
chronic safety problems and enforced an institutional image alien to one of San
Francisco's most desirable areas.
While North Beach sits squarely on a very desirable site and is encased in a historic
neighborhood, it nevertheless suffers from acute physical isolation. The type of
buildings found on site is different from anything found in the neighborhood. The edges'
densely built and highly diversified housing stock offer typical San Francisco colorful,
wooden frame rowhouses. As it was originally conceived, the North Beach housing
development is one-third less dense then the surrounding neighborhood, making the
site a bland vortex of ill-designed open space prone to deterioration and vandalism.
In the early 1980s, a developer approached the San Francisco Housing Authority
(SFHA) to buy the very distressed housing property and build a new hotel and shops in
its place. In exchange, the developer would build 229 replacement units elsewhere in
the city to house the displaced tenants. This proposal was irrevocably refused for two
reasons: 1) land acquisition and construction costs for replacement housing elsewhere
in San Francisco would prove prohibitive; and 2) the North Beach residents, who had
organized at the onset of the debate, were vociferously opposed to any sort of deal that
would result in population displacement. Their voice was echoed around town by that of
Telegraph Hill and Chinatown residents. In fact, neighborhoods surrounding the North
Beach community pulled together, with financial and physical assistance from local
merchants and other concerned neighbors, to repaint the development. This debate
over the fate of North Beach resulted in SFHA resolutions for the future of the
development. First, the site would never be for sale, at any cost; second, North Beach
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would always offer 229 public housing units; and finally, the residents would always
remain closely involved in the decision-making process.
In 1992, the North Beach residents took the initiative in organizing design workshops to
study rehabilitation alternatives. The design principles devised at these workshops were
enunciated in eight points: 1) no displacement; 2) unit entrances oriented onto public
streets; 3) no shared corridors or elevators; 4) open space clearly identified as either
public or private; 5) retail uses implemented on Taylor street to enhance safety and
economic development; 6) project design to emulate the surrounding neighborhood; 7)
secured parking areas; and 8) one large community room and smaller community
facilities at the project's entrance.
Inspired by these guidelines, a redevelopment team prepared two alternatives as part of
the HOPE VI grant application: a renovation scheme, based on the conservation as well
as on the re-configuration of the buildings' form; and a new construction alternative,
based on the creation of new floor-through units. A financing study determined that the
reconstruction option would be a more viable option to be financed with project-based
Section 8 certificates, complementary HUD and City funds, and low income housing tax
credits.
In accordance with the HOPE VI philosophy, North Beach would become a mixed-
income community but the number of subsidized units, as agreed in earlier discussions
with residents, would remain unchanged at 229. Market rate units are added as "extras"
amidst an already established community. The very low-income units, new or
rehabilitated, offer the same bedroom-type mix as originally found on site. The only
change introduced on site has to do with the location of the public housing units: they
are clustered or interspersed within the limits of the site. Apart from the goal of mixing
incomes, the redevelopment plan also makes provisions for a mixed-use environment
where housing co-exists with retail, public open space, community services and parking
uses (Figs. 2.49, 2.50, 2.51).
Seattle's Holly Park: Cauterizing a Bisected Neighborhood
Holly Park was built in 1941 under the Lanham Act as part of a program to house
Seattle defense workers, who were mostly employees of the Boeing company (Large,
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1997: 5(6)). The development remained such until 1955 when it became a public
housing community.
Holly Park was built on 102 acres of what is commonly described as grassy rolling
topography. The most distinguishing physical feature of the development is the 200 feet
right-of-way for a high voltage transmission line owned by the City Light Department of
the City of Seattle. The eighteen-acre swath of land, which abuts private back yards,
also bisects the site into two unrelated halves. Over the years, the long strip has
become a littered, unsafe wasteland, indiscriminately crossed by residents and visitors.
Since the City Light Department does not permit any built infringement onto their land,
the high-voltage line remains an unavoidable barrier that is there to stay (Seattle Plan,
1994: 2-4, 4-11)49 (Fig. 2.52).
The sinuous and steeply graded street network is composed of a series of winding
roads and cul-de-sacs that connect to the rest of the city at only eight entry points. Even
though the cul-de-sac patterns are commonly viewed by suburbanites as "good"
neighborhood design, residents perceive them as alien. They separate Holly Park from
the broader community and imposes a stigmatizing difference.
Density, at Holly Park, is measured at nine dwelling units per acre, a number which is
higher than what is found in the surrounding neighborhood of single-family homes (six
du/acre). The result is the creation of "a more dense concentration of low-income
families as a self contained 'island' amidst a lower density of higher income families"
(Seattle Plan, 1994: 2-2).
There are fourteen variants derived from duplex (228 structures) and four-plex (eleven
structures) types. All gable-roofed buildings are 1- and 2-story wood frames clad with
lead-based painted wood siding. They have been described as barracks painted dirty,
grayish shades of yellow, blue and green. Most unit types contain two or three
bedrooms and are not reflecting the needs of contemporary families (Seattle Plan,
49 The City Light Department is however open to charging a fee for any use (other than building permanent structures) that may
appear on their property.
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1994: 2-12).50 The only non-residential buildings are used to hold community activities,
provide childcare and house management offices. All are outdated and inadequate.
Prior to obtaining HOPE VI revitalization funds for Holly Park, the City of Seattle had
devised a comprehensive plan for the growth and management of its urban
neighborhoods. Based on an urban village philosophy, a "Residential Urban Village"
plan was devised by the City. The Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) considers the HOPE
VI venture an opportunity to demonstrate the potential of integrating Holy Park as a
mixed-income "village" part of a seamlessly woven larger Urban Village strategy.
The revitalization plan calls for the demolition and replacement of the existing 898 public
housing units with 1,200 units of new, mixed-income housing. As part of the original,
pre-HOPE VI Plus plan, extra subsidized units are implemented off-site to meet the
regulatory requirements of one-for-one replacement. The plan's replacement housing
strategy aims to: increase Seattle's stock of affordable housing and to meet the
increasing needs of low-income families; create a stable mixed-income neighborhood in
southeast Seattle to stimulate economic opportunities and support services; and
reinforce the city's long-range growth management goal by weaving into the broader
Urban Villages plan (Seattle Plan, 1994: 1-3).
Among the new 1,200 units of housing to be built, 800 units are subsidized: 400 for very
low-income and 400 for low-income households. The remaining 400 units are reserved
as market rate housing (Seattle Plan, 1994: 1-6). At least 493 units, as required by the
City, are built on scattered off-site lots with the help of public/private partnerships.
Townhouses constitute the prevalent unit typology, in keeping with the low density, fine-
grained scale of the surrounding areas. To encourage neighborhood stability,
homeownership opportunities are offered to Holly Park residents with the help of rent
ceiling mechanisms and Family Self-Sufficiency programs. Units are planned to meet
market standards and be large enough to accommodate contemporary families' profiles.
They are indistinguishable in terms of design, location and access to services. "Your
neighbor won't know what your financial status is unless you tell them", adds a long-
time resident (Large, 1997: 5(6)).
50 SHA data shows that Holly Park residents have a cultural tradition of living within extended families, a practice that is however
not allowed at the development.
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Apart from a new street network designed to better connect to the surrounding grid, the
urban village center offers a cluster of amenities: a neighborhood resource center, a
satellite public library, as well as and extended parks and recreation facilities. The
center will be located at the busy intersection of South Othello and M. L. King, within the
edge of Holly Park, to catalyze the retail base and introduce a new transportation hub
(Fig. 2.53, 2.54).
The steeply graded topography of Holly Park hinders the re-design of buildings and
streets. In an attempt to circumvent the problem, two land swap options are proposed:
first, part of the adjacent and underutilized 37th Avenue South Park is traded for an
equivalent amount of open space on the public housing site; second, the Union Gospel
Mission trade their basketball courts fronting the South Othello artery in return for
equivalent SHA-owned land adjacent to their youth facility. This latter swap would
provide land that is more easily transformable into open space, more connectable the
existing street network and more appropriate for commercial uses.
2.4 - Preliminary Inventory of Redevelopment Strategies
The following section summarizes the previous descriptions by highlighting the major
issues which constitute the core of the HOPE VI revitalization debate: the planning and
implementation processes; the income-mixing and homeownership strategies; the
nature of neighborhood interventions; site master planning; and the implementation of
support and community services. An analysis of each issue yields a general portrait of
public housing redevelopment. This portrait is further detailed in the following chapter.
2.4.1 - Planning and Implementation Processes
. Resident Involvement
Redevelopment teams -- made of authority representatives, design and planning
professionals, as well as developers - consistently encourage residents to participate in
the planning process. A typical HOPE VI planning process begins with a meeting of the
resident council and authority officials to discuss revitalization goals and methods for
involving the different actors. Workshops are then organized to discuss issues such as
urban design, support services, financing, management and economic development.
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Participants in these authority-organized workshops usually comprise tenants (or
members of their representative body), neighborhood leaders and consultants. When
the goals of revitalization are satisfactorily articulated, the authority selects a multi-
disciplinary development team composed of professionals in the domains of
architecture and engineering, management and social planning. The selection is done
through a "Request For Proposal" (RFP) format.
The next step usually consists in conducting surveys of the development's existing
conditions, whether environmental or demographic. Manifestations of distress and
design inadequacy are highlighted, as well as indicators of social isolation within the
population. As part of the demographic survey, residents are typically asked to answer a
questionnaire written either by the authority or one of the appointed consultants. Results
are interpreted by the redevelopment team responsible for coming up with the best
integration solution. Results are also used to establish the number of units to be
earmarked for very-low income households within the income-mix strategy. In practice,
this number roughly corresponds to the amount of people who on the questionnaire
indicated that they intended to remain on the site after redevelopment, instead of using
Section 8 certificates to relocate.51 The number of public housing units to remain on the
redeveloped site thus often corresponds to a "political minimum".
After the first phase of the consultation process, the redevelopment team prepares a
HOPE VI Grant Application (or plan) which closely follows HUD prescriptions presented
in the yearly "Notification Of Funding Availability" (NOFA) documents. Each plan details
the pre-redevelopment conditions of distress, the actual physical guidelines for
revitalization, the supportive and community services programs, the works schedule, the
participatory process and the management strategy for the development's long term
sustainability. A typical proposal also contains many letters of support issued by
community-based organizations willing to be partners in the revitalization venture.
The resident participation process is a sensitive issue debated among design
professionals. While some describe themselves as staunch tenant advocates, others
51 Method notably used by Gayle Epp, of Epp Associates in Boston, for their clients.
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question the sometimes overpowering voice given to public housing residents. The
latter argument states that public housing residents are, by definition, temporary tenants
of a permanent environment with a stake no less but no more important than their
neighbors outside the development. The key issue is stability: are public housing
tenants more or less stable than others, based on the fact that they remain on site for
long periods of time? Planners like Gayle Epp -- who heads the Boston-based firm of
Epp Associates -- have studied data extracted from resident surveys, finding that if
offered the opportunity, public housing residents prefer to leave the development and
live elsewhere.53 To which extent, then, do redevelopment strategies have to be
"tailored" to meet the requirements of a population -- or its often vociferous
representative body -- which may not remain on the site after redevelopment? Planner
Daniel Glenn sees this sort of question as manipulative and somewhat taken out of the
revitalization context. He points out that public housing populations are stable by virtue
of their remaining on the site for as long as two or three generations. He compares
planners ignoring this brand of stability to those of the urban renewal era who arrogantly
decreed that "professionals knew better" and subsequently went on to eradicate
Boston's West End and Scollay Square. Adopting the role of resident advocate, says
Glenn, often creates tensions with head consultants (Tise and Epp, for instance) who
are responsible for "getting the projects" and getting them done.54
Overall, the participatory planning experience is considered overwhelmingly positive. In
a few cases -- Boston, Detroit, Houston and New York -- the process went off track
because of strained relationships among local authorities, government officials and
residents. In these cities, the development had been mostly vacant for some time. In
Detroit, for instance, the resident consultation and participation process was "stopped
dead by the Executive Director of the Authority who ordered: 'Just design"'.55 In the case
of Houston, the design team faced a Mayor intent on selling the site to speculators, and
52 Characterization derived from a conversation with HOPE VI project manager and urban designer Daniel Glenn, from the firm of
Tise, Hurwitz and Diamond of Brookline, Ma, which has done consulting work in Detroit, Houston, Indianapolis, New Haven and
New York. Glenn was contrasting his views with those of planner Gayle Epp, who has collaborated with THD on the same
projects. Glenn was interviewd on August 8" 1997.
Epp specified that her data collecting (notably for redevelopments in Detroit, Houston, Indianapolis, New Haven, New York and
Seattle) indicated that the ratio of those who want to leave the site to be redeveloped is roughly 2/3 of the population: half of
them wanting to move to another site, and the other half wanting to avail themselves of Section 8 replacement options. Harvard
Seminar on HOPE VI, Nov. 1997.
54 Glenn acknowledges that while his salary remains the same whichever position he defends, his employer's financial stability
varies according to his or her capacity to get results for the authority.
Glenn Interview, Summer 1997.
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little or no resident population to oppose him. Remnants of Houston's policy of racial
segregation56 also permeated the tense relationship between planners and the City. The
Mayor's office in the end imposed a six-foot fence around the Allen Parkway
development, arguing that the only way to attract a mixed-income population into the
predominantly Black and deteriorated neighborhood would be to install a gate at the
site's single entry. The City has also opposed the planning team's suggestion that a new
street network connecting to the Fourth Ward neighborhood be introduced on the
superblock site. In the end, a developer reportedly suggested the designers go ahead
and create connecting streets in spite of the fence, which could come down "when the
'Leave it to Beaver' folks come back [to the neighborhood]".57 In New York and Boston,
residents' opposition to the re-design scheme along with their strained relationship with
the Authority, contributed to stalling and, in New York's case, canceling the HOPE VI
venture.
The role of urban designers in the participatory process is a complex and sensitive one.
In Glenn's experience, "actors in this process prefer abstraction". Residents are usually
not fully aware or equipped to understand all of the issues presented to them by
designers. Professionals, he says, sometimes do not take sufficient time or adequate
means to explain the details of their schemes, which they almost always present solely
in the form of drawings. Professionals are also prone to blame residents for "not seeing
the big picture". Glenn mentions a tenant meeting during which he introduced, as an
accompanying image, a photograph of a tree-lined street. At the sight of the image,
residents flatly told him to forget about the other niceties, all they were concerned about
was how that street would look like on their development. During a particularly complex
design consultation process in New York58, THD built a 3-dimensional model of the
whole site as it would look when redeveloped. Glenn recalls that the presentation of the
model sparked the residents' very first understanding of their new environment, which
eventually led to vociferous contentions and an eventual cancellation of the whole
redevelopment effort. Oakland architect Pyatok uses models during the earliest phases
56 Houston's Allen Parkway development was built for White occupants, even though the site was located at the heart of a Black
neighborhood. Allen Parkway's adjacent park was even named for a confederate officer of the Civil War (Glenn interview).
Glenn confirmed, in October 1997 (interview), that no publicly-accessed network of streets is planned for the Houston site.
At Harvard (Nov. 1997), Gayle Epp however suggested that Allen Parkway could eventually be connected to its south edge by
58 way of a street network.New York's plan was based on a complex rehabilitation scheme in which the residential towers are topped-off and internally
reconfigured to house ground-floor townhouses. See description in previous section.
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of the participatory planning process. Such didactic tools are useful to spark residents'
interest in how their home relates to the site and how the site relates to the surrounding
neighborhood.
Participatory planning is often the bane of designers. They have to be mediators
between their client -- the authority -- and vociferous residents who are sometimes
perceived "as tribes with only a few strong voices"60, i.e. small groups that may not
always faithfully represent the views of the whole community. Professionals -- if their
role is to "educate" or counsel their client about the complexities of environmental
relationships -- "cannot blame their 'students' for not understanding issues".6 '
Designers have mentioned the somewhat inevitable "suspiciousness" of public housing
residents, also described by some as "paranoia". Since many public housing residents
have been living on the site for generations and have "[dealt] with the 'system' over long
periods of time", they have grown accustomed to distrusting programs and services that
have come and gone (Charlotte Baseline, 1996: 8). For many residents, the scale of
HOPE VI programs brings back bitter-tasting memories of urban renewal and
unceremonious displacement, prompting a Charlotte resident to voice worry: "This is
prime land. You're just running a game on us to get us to agree and you'll move the rich
people into the community" (Charlotte Baseline, 1996: 23). The all-important HOPE VI
participatory process has therefore not only presented a challenge to designers, but
also to housing authorities across the nation intent on breaking a deeply rooted
sentiment of distrust among its residents. The HOPE VI emphasis on a strong
participatory process is another example of policymaking intent on breaking away from
the project mentality to instigate a relationship of trust among authority and residents of
the site and neighborhood. The case of Boston's Mission Main, reviewed in Chapter 5,
is a prime example of resident distrust, powerful to the point of impeding the course of
the implementation process.
59 Pyatok, at Harvard's Seminar, showed slides of charrette process for low-income urban housing project (Nov. 1997).
60 Glenn interview, Summer 1997.
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. Public/Private Partnerships
The growing emphasis of HOPE VI public/private partnerships stems from a recognition
that modernized developments will remain isolated islands surrounded by vacant lots
and boarded up shops if the surrounding neighborhood is not equally invested in and
revitalized. The creation of integrated mixed-income communities requires the
intervention of a great number of players at all levels of city planning, from housing and
infrastructure, to transportation and economic restructuring. Revitalization conducted at
the neighborhood scale is a costly venture which could in many cases not solely be
funded by HOPE VI grants alone. Since HOPE VI grants covered the revitalization cost
of a maximum of 500 units, the need for complementary sources of funding for large
projects is all the more important. The creation of public/private partnerships ensures
that the scope of the planning effort benefits from a network of financial and advisory
partners in all sectors of community life.
HUD considers HOPE VI funds to be public "seed money" that may be leveraged in
other sectors to supplement the broader revitalization budget. Leveraging may be
achieved through a number of financial methods such as Low Income Housing Tax
Credit proceeds, grants from the City or State already investing in the area, tax exempt
bonds or community soft loans. Partnerships also take the form of an advisory process
fueled by local elected officials, neighborhood leaders, school representatives, local
business people, non-profit organizations, churches or law firms who are willing to
supply expertise and provide services as part of the revitalization effort.
In order to forge profitable public/private partnerships, HOPE VI plans must prove viable
and realistic in the eyes of investors. Authorities throughout the country have the heavy
burden of proving their ability to attract sufficient private investment to create viable
mixed-income, mixed-use residential and commercial development. Many cities boast
successful experiences of large-scale revitalization as well as a number of potential for-
and non-profit development partners. The plans consulted were all rich in intent. Long-
term impact measures, as sketched in Chapter 6, will be needed to monitor the actual
success of the partnership.
61 Glenn Interview, Summer 1997. Views shared by Michael Benjamin, designer for Cleveland's King Kennedy, and Jon Carlsten,
designer for Centennial Place in Atlanta.
111
2.4.2 - Income-Mixing and Homeownership Strategy
Income-mixing is described as a tool that encourages employed households to serve as
models for other public housing residents seeking work. A combination of market
research and resident surveys seemingly dictates the proportions according to which
the public housing stock will be partly replaced (or supplemented) by a mix of low-
income and market rate units. The proportions are determined by the number of
residents willing to leave the development and/or become on-site homeowners; or they
are based on city-wide real estate demand and market indicators. Methods employed to
exactly determine these ratios are however not fully explained, in any of the plans
surveyed.
The income-mixing strategy, in most cases, is supported by a development-specific rent
ceiling policy to entice established "working families" to stay longer within the
redeveloped community.
The common principles of a cross-national income-mixing strategy are listed below:
- The long-term viability of the community is ensured by the co-existence of diverse
income groups;
- On-site homeownership is introduced (everywhere except in New York and San
Francisco) for both public housing residents and newcomers as opportunities for
attaining long-term socio-economic self-sufficiency;
- Units of mixed-income housing are un-differentiated and planned according to
market standards for all types of tenure. The only way to achieve this goal is to
demolish all or part of the existing dilapidated structures and re-build anew;
- The clustering of same-needs households (such as the elderly and populations with
special needs) onto one portion of the site forges "communities of interest" (this is
especially the case in Boston, Charlotte, Cleveland, Detroit, Houston, New Haven).
2.4.3 - Neighborhood Interventions
The breadth of the HOPE VI program is invariably related to broader neighborhood- or
city-wide revitalization plans, like Cleveland's Civic Vision 2000, Chicago's Near North
Redevelopment Initiative, Detroit's Empowerment Zone or Atlanta's Olympic Legacy
Plan. HOPE VI ventures are typically considered elements of these plans. In this
context, a few of the sampled strategies include the strengthening of an adjacent retail
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core to serve both as a local service area and an employment base. Some designers
however consider the retail component of revitalization "the missing link" of the HOPE
VI program. In spite of extensive re-design efforts, no HOPE VI dollars are explicitly set
aside for the implementation of new retail (on- or off-site) except in cases where small
business incubators are created. Portions of the funds raised through leveraging
strategies are expected to be pumped into the neighborhood retail base, along with
money coming from municipal programs. Not many details are however furnished in the
HOPE VI grant applications.
In sum, designers involved in HOPE VI have no real control when it comes to
revitalizing commercial edges and blur the site's limits with a mixed-use border. In San
Francisco, the plan proposes that a mixed-use street be a part of the integration
strategy. The success of planning or revitalizing mixed-use environments is however
difficult to predict. In New Haven, when planners offered to restructure the Dixwell
Avenue commercial district by implementing new retail along the site's border, local
businesses representatives saw the gesture as competition against the already
established shops. In Houston, the restructuring of a bordering mixed-use strip is made
virtually impossible because the block's residual width is insufficient to implement stores
according to Houston's standard patterns. 2
Physically linking project to neighborhood typically entails three strategies: 1) re-
creating a street network on the site that mirrors the neighborhood's; 2) re-structuring
the site's residential fabric (street, blocks, parcels, units) to replicate the grain of
adjacent residential fabrics; and 3) implementing replacement housing in scattered
areas near the site to blur the site's perimeter. The locus of intervention are the
development edges which are typically eroded zones separated from the rest of the
community by man-made barriers such as interstates, rail corridors or overgrown vacant
land.
62 The southern border of the development goes through the middle of a strip of blocks. These are shared, according to the
revitalization plan, by both public housing and retail. A typical Houston retail strip will offer parking spaces in front of the stores
and set back from the street alignment. There is not enough land to accomplish such a pattern near the development, hence the
abandoning of the retail component of the overall revitalization plan. See description in previous section.
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2.4.4 - Site Master Plans
At least 80% of the HOPE VI grants are earmarked for the physical revitalization of
developments. The proposed master plans figure prominently in the proposals. The gist
of their guidelines is examined here.
. Site Design Guidelines
Demolition and Rehabilitation
The preferred method of revitalization is the demolition of existing structures in favor of
a clean slate for re-construction. One major argument in favor of demolition is the
reduction of the built density. Most of the redevelopment areas are differentiated from
their surroundings by comparatively higher densities. Eleven out of fifteen developments
are completely razed and re-built (Table 2-9). In only one case -- New York -- the
selective demolition high-rise buildings replaces a razing strategy. In the other four
cases, rehabilitation is made part of the HOPE VI revitalization strategy. In some cases,
like Cleveland, rehabilitation is an extension of pre-HOPE VI modernization.
Demolition Only Rehabilitation Only Demolition and Rehabilitation
Atlanta - Except the Cupola Building New York Camden Rehabilitated Prior to
Baltimore HOPE VI (CompMod)
Boston Charlotte HOPE VI Revitalization
Chicago -- the Cabrini Ext. Cleveland HOPE VI (Delaney) and
Indianapolis Prior (Renaissance)
New Haven - Except the Johnson Tower, Detroit HOPE VI
off- but adjacent to site Houston HOPE VI
New Orleans
San Francisco
Seattle
Table 2.8 - Demolition vs. Rehabilitation Strategies
Street / Block Patterns
The majority of developments have plans to re-create a traditional street/block pattern.
In many cases, the re-connection of street networks is made easier by the presence of
cut-off streets at the site's edges. But more than mere connectors, streets are meant as
buffers between units and neighborhood, i.e. the loci of social interaction between
neighbors and neighborhoods. From the descriptions above, three types of re-
connection strategies emerge: 1) the weaving of the street/block pattern so that the site
meshes with the surrounding context (Indianapolis, New Haven, New Orleans, Seattle);
2) the introduction of a winding street to seemingly discourage traffic to go through the
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newly re-connected site (Atlanta, Camden, Cleveland); and 3) the creation of a strong
central space from which streets radiate (Baltimore).
Existing Condition
Type A: Restructuration Type B: Traffic Deviation Type C: Radiating
Complete re-connection is often impeded by the presence of barriers such as highways.
In such cases, the design of the street/block pattern contributes to turn housing units
away from the often negative impacts of the barriers. Design strategies used to stave off
the negative impact of barriers include cul-de-sacs (Atlanta) or the creation of a local by-
pass loop (Houston, Detroit).
The redeveloped communities' residential blocks are typically regular (i.e. rectangular)
entities which mirror patterns found in surrounding edges. The main intention is twofold:
to break down and eradicate the superblock configuration typical of many of the original
sites; and to provide a morphological system whereby front doors have street addresses
and private backyards are safely located in-block, behind units. The re-creation of a
street/block grid also permits to introduce a hierarchical system of public and semi-
public open spaces.
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Ste (Existing)Cut-Off
Connectors
Existing Condition Shielding Strategy
Parking
In most cases, parking is segregated into areas located inside the blocks at the semi-
private core of residential blocks. Therefore street parking is typically made the domain
of "visitors".
EE:i
Existing Condition Proposed
Private, Semi-Private/Public and Public Open Spaces
Most redevelopment plans have elected to introduce a hierarchical system of open
space which typically follows these guidelines":
- Private and fenced back yards are located inside the block (behind units) and are
accessible by residents alone;
- Semi-private and private front yards either lead to a shared or private front entryway;
- Semi-private common areas of passive and active recreation, most often an in-block
tot lot, are shared by those residents living on the same block;
- Semi-public "sub-neighborhood" parks, programmed as active or passive open
spaces, are located within the site's boundaries for the use of residents;
63 Much of this hierarchical system of defining private, semi-private/public and public open space directly follows principles of the
Defensible Space theory.
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- Public parks are typically located at the development's edges for the use of the
larger community; they form green links between site and neighborhood;
. Residential Unit Design Guidelines
To create a less dense residential environment is a prevalent HOPE VI revitalization
goal. This is achieved, first, by demolishing high density multi-family structures (high- ,
mid- and even low-rise apartment buildings); and second, by re-constructing low-rise
types of lower density. The choice of architectural types is dictated by issues of density,
but also by an intent to import types which have traditionally shaped the neighborhood's
image and identity. Other strategies, like those of Chicago and New York, rely on the
presence of culturally-sanctioned high density architectural types.
The built landscape of the new mixed-income communities is typically characterized by
the combination of one or more of the following elements of residential re-structuring:
- Each unit among rows of low-rise townhouses (2 and 3 stories) has an address on
the street; it faces a similar townhouse across the way;
- Each detached and semi-detached townhouse (2 and 3 stories) has a private entry
directly accessible from the street;
- Townhouses located above or below a row of flats (3 stories) have private entries;
- Stacked flats or duplexes (3 stories) are accessed by common entryways;
- Mid-rise garden apartment buildings (4-6 stories) share entry halls;
In a few cases, these new types co-exist with rehabilitated structures that nonetheless
conform to higher standards of design and configuration. This is the case of Cleveland's
Renaissance and Delaney Villages as well as the North Family High-rise, of Camden
(low-rise multi-family structures), of Charlotte (multi-family into townhouses), of Detroit
(the Seniors Village towers), of Houston (the Seniors Village garden apartments), and of
New York (modernized apartment towers).
. Community Facilities Design Guidelines
Community facilities are designed as rallying points for the community. While they
house support services for residents, they are also meeting places and council seats.
Ever since the 1960s when social engineering took a more prominent role in addressing
the needs of public housing tenants, community spaces have become integral parts of
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the residential environment. In many cases, buildings have grown obsolete and
inadequate.
As part of HOPE VI revitalization, community facilities are typically generous structures
with tightly programmed spaces that include a combination of classrooms, meeting
rooms, offices for service providers, residents or management, maintenance depots,
resident-owned businesses (such as a laundromat or a food coop) and indoor and
outdoor recreation spaces. Community services may be grouped into more than one
facility to form a campus or to decentralize specific activities. For instance, specialized
services for the elderly and special needs population are located within separate
housing structures (this is the case in Baltimore, Detroit, New Haven and New York).
Recreation spaces can also be clustered into a separate building (as in Baltimore), like
maintenance facilities are separated from the main core of community services (as in
Atlanta, Houston, New Haven and New York). In many cases, new community facilities
are built while in others they are rehabilitated and/or extended. Located most often at
the edge of the site, they constitute visible and psychological links with the surrounding
neighborhood. Recreation grounds usually are implemented next to the building to form
a buffer with residential uses and a center of outdoors community life.
2.4.5 - Community and Supportive Services Programs
In spite of the fact that a maximum of only 20% of the HOPE VI grant is allocated for a
support system of social and community services (as well as site-based economic
development) all plans reviewed include detailed programs. These will be reviewed in
further detail in the next chapter.
* * *
This chapter has pursued three goals: 1) to introduce and classify the broad
characteristics of the sites' pre-redevelopment conditions; 2) to present case-per-case
summaries of neighborhood conditions and revitalization strategies; and 3) to extract
the redevelopment issues common to all the sampled plans so that a cross-national
portrait of HOPE VI revitalization can emerge. This latter section is meant as an
introduction to Chapter 3's in-depth analysis of the integrative value encoded in various
types of revitalization strategies.
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CHAPTER 3: TYPOLOGY OF INTEGRATION EFFORTS
After reviewing each plan's strategy for physical and socio-economic integration (in
Chapter 2), generalities have emerged. Chapter 3 aims to detail and illustrate these
general principles of revitalization by using physical, social and organizational variables
of analysis. The comparison of large scale integrative efforts is conducted through the
lens of physical variables and descriptors like the creation of new "neighborhood links".
Similarly, the impact of socially integrative tactics is examined through the lens of
variables like the "location of Community Centers" (Table 3.1). Each set of comparison
variables yields categories (or types) of integration measures which rally the largest
amount of examples (or developments). Results permit to qualitatively measure the
degree of integration involved in the sample of HOPE VI revitalization plans.
Variables Descriptors Variables Descriptors
Connecting Streets Parks and Paths Income Mix Homeownership Working
Neighborhood Edge Retail Network Strategy Family Public Families
Links Town Center Replacement Hsg Housing Senior
Community Buildings Site Entry Specialized
Off-Site
Restored Street/Block Cul-de-Sac Participatory Meetings Charrette
Street Network Circle Loop Methods Photography Site Tours
Boulevard HOPE VI Office Survey
Regular/Irregular Supportive and Supportive Programs
Block Pattern Zipper Community Volunteerism Programs
Halved Services Economic DevIpmt Programs
Circle Linear Location of New/Renovated Center
Public & Semi- Sub-Neighborhood Boulevard Community Edge Off-Site
Public Open Community Ctr Extsn Playground Buildings
Space
Private & Semi- Backyards Front Yards
Private Open Inter-Block Pedestrian Paths Parking Variables Descriptors
Space
Single-Detached Townhouse Authority Model 1
Housing Units Rowhouse /Attached Above/Under Private Entity Model 2
Low-/Mid-Rise Aptmt Flats Partnership Model 3
Stacked Flats/Duplex High rise Resident Corp. Model 4
Relationships Back-to-Back/Street Private/Shared
Among Units and Front-to-Front/Back Door
Site Housing-to-Other
Table 3.1 -Sets of Analytical Variables and Descriptors
The physical and socio-economic revitalization of HOPE VI sites hinges on the
restructuring (or, in some cases, the elimination) of the neighborhood-project interface.
This interface refers to the interactive experiences that take place at the edge of the
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project and within the neighborhood. Much of the chapter constitutes a comparative
analysis of design methods which transform this interface into a locus for
morphologically and socio-economically re-connecting project with neighborhood. The
study of the restructured interface shows a dichotomy of intents on the part of designers
and residents. The boundaries of the redeveloped site have become sensitive geo-
political zones where design measures (like the use of perimeter fencing) send a clear
"keeping them out' message to those not residing within the development. Some argue,
however, that the message may also allude to a territorial attitude which goes against
the more general HOPE VI intent to blur the project's limits.
3.1 - Physical Variables of Comparison
To understand the breadth of physical integration efforts, a method is proposed for
reading the restructured physical fabric and understand the way morphological
elements relate to one another. This reading method is implemented in four steps which
in fact constitute four scales of observation, from the most-encompassing -- the scale of
a relationship between project and neighborhood -- to the smallest -- the relationship
between unit and site. At the first level of observation, morphological relationships
between development and neighborhood (or edge) are examined; the second
observation step occurs at the scale of the street network; the third at the scale of open
space -- private and semi-private; and, finally, at the scale of the relationship between
the housing unit and the site. The information gleaned at each reading level
corresponds to the following chapter sections: Neighborhood Links, Street Network,
Open Space and Housing.
Each descriptor organizes information pertaining to form, dimension and relationship between that descriptor and its
environment. For example, the descriptor "linear" for the "Public/Semi-Public Open Space" variable describes the form of New
Haven's edge park, its dimensions and the way it relates to the site and the neighborhood (See Section 3-6). 120
3.1.1 - Neighborhood Links
At the scale of site-neighborhood relationships, eight types -- introduced in Table 3.2,
below -- of integrating strategies may be present in the redevelopment scheme to
highlight neighborhood links:
Nearly all ot the cases studied (except New York
and Houston) use streets as the most important
element linking project and neighborhood. Streets
are either reinstated according to a grid that used to
exist; or they are new continuations of the edge
fabric .
Two trends of subdivision: development as
Sub-Neighborhoods neighborhood unit (9 cases) and development as
ensemble of sub-units (6 cases).
Complex linking strategy dependent upon external
Replacement Housing financial mechanisms and partnerships. Only 2
cases (New Haven and New York) include an off-
site replacement housing strategy into master plan.
Two strategies: at the edge of or within the site.
Community Buildings Former situation spurs social interaction with
neighbors, while second may foster sense of
territoriality.
Two strategies: greening at the neighborhood scale
Networks of Shared Open Space and creation of greenways at the local (site) scale.
Two strategies: consolidating an existing edge retail
Edge Retail corridor (majority of cases) and importing retail uses
on site (San Francisco & Chicago)
Central civic space to facilitate contacts and
Town Center heighten sense of place. Though in 1 case
(Baltimore), development turned inwards,
seemingly impeding integration
Majority of communities use different strategies to
Site Entry announce distinctness of character
Fence as protective mechanism, which may not
Fencing automatically mean isolation.
Table 3.2 - Descrintors Used to Analvze Intearation Strateaies at the Neiahborhood-
Site Scale
Sixty years of public housing site design has produced "projects" isolated from urban
contexts, mainly by changing or eradicating existing street patterns, or by re-routing
traffic around the site. The overall effect was the creation of large monolithic sites
isolated in form, use and population profiles. Isolation thus feeds on the very notion of
"project" which has become institutionalized as a "different" environment, a difference
compounded by characteristics like alien site configuration, building types or austere
aesthetics.
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Connecting Streets
The neighborhood links variable is used to analyze legible efforts to physically connect
(or in some cases disconnect) the redeveloped site to any part of the surrounding edge.
To qualify these links, the following descriptors are used:
Connecting Streets
This descriptor qualifies instances when newly implemented streets act as connectors
between the environment contained within the development's legal boundary and its
surrounding edges. Since the typical development offers a disconnected (or absent)
pattern, new streets are implemented or recreated to re-weave residential fabrics on-
and off-site. There are two types of connecting patterns: 1) streets are reinstated
according to a morphological grammar previously present in the fabric but was
eradicated to accommodate public housing; and 2) streets are created in order to
extend a surrounding pattern and break an superblock configuration.
The tally confirms that introducing a weaving network of streets constitutes a popular
integration method. In fact, almost all of the redevelopment plans (thirteen among
fifteen) 2 include provisions to either create at least one new street on the site to break
superblock configurations and reach outside the legal boundaries, or to extend an
existing network which was consciously blocked in order to preserve the distinct
character of the development. The exceptions to this "rule" are New York and Houston.
In New York, two factors are responsible for an absence of connecting streets: 1) the
location of the site which is confined by the Bay and by the only east/west connector on
a thin strip of land; 2) the configuration of neighborhood and site limits the creation of a
permeable street network, simply because there is no network with which to establish a
connection. In Houston, where the site is also confined on two sides by thoroughfares,
the implementation of a connecting street network to the south edge was rejected by
local government officials.
Among typical "creation" or "restoration" integration methods are design variants, which
are further detailed in the next section. The number of actual links created between
development and edges is indicative of the degree of permeability connecting streets
bring to the revitalized site. The diagrams below show the number of connecting
2 The example of San Francisco is included in the tally, even if no new streets were created to weave the already network-
integrated project with neighborhood edges.
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streets3 that were actually created (>-), as well as any instances where links were
deleted ( X ) (Table 3.3). Surprisingly, there were quite a few streets and links that were
lost to the integration effort, mainly in cases where a strong barrier demanded that the
site be "turned away" from it (in New Orleans and Houston, for instance).
A street is "connecting" if it introduces a new point of penetration on the redeveloped site.
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Links (X)
As illustrated in this analysis, the creation of a street network as means to physically
integrate redevelopments to neighborhoods is not unanimously "desired" by all HOPE
VI-funded sites. While all designers agree that the creation of a meshing street/block
pattern is a powerful integrative measure, residents remain more skeptical. In the
Boston case, for instance, residents were reticent to have streets present within the
development's boundaries. Foremost on their minds were issues of security. The only
street traversing the site and left intact by slum clearance -- Smith street -- has
traditionally been perceived not as a public locus of social interaction and control, but as
an uncontrollable space dedicated to drive-through drug trafficking. Many plans have
noted that streets are viewed as zones where children are particularly vulnerable to
traffic.
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In sum, this descriptor shows that while there are many advantages to the creation of
streets within the boundaries of public housing (advantages mainly advanced by
designers), many residents remain wary of streets that may invite intrusions. The
integrative value of streets is thus interpreted differently by designers and by residents.
More research is needed to assess whether the disappearance of uncontrolled but
generous no-man's-lands is adequately compensated by tightly programmed networks
of streets and open spaces. The eradication of undefined open spaces in-between
buildings in favor of streets, tot lots and private backyards may have also prompted the
elimination of flexible areas shared and appropriated by adults.
Sub-neighborhoods
Breaking up large developments in order to implement sub-neighborhoods announces
an integration strategy based on the creation of smaller territorial units. The idea is to
bring back communal amenities - such as tot lots or recreation areas -- to a scale
consistent with that of the block and units, rather than the site as a whole. The other
founding principle site breaking-up has much to do with Defensible Space principles like
territoriality, i.e. increasing safety by designing clusters that are appropriated and
controlled by those who live within that cluster. Sub-neighborhoods are also alleged to
encourage the personalization of residential spaces and thus foster a positive self-
image.
Forging a legible link between a smaller unit (the project) and another (the larger urban
neighborhood) is a central theme to New Urbanism. This link is sometimes emphasized
by the distinctness of architectural vocabularies, by gating or by sharing a retail
boundary. As exposed in Perry's theory, neighborhood units are understood as
cohesive residential cells of limited size and population, anchored in the center by an
institution or community facility, and surrounded by shops. According to Perry's model,
the unit's street pattern is differentiated from the surrounding fabric's to slow down
traffic. Within the HOPE VI framework, a neighborhood unit refers to a physical entity
bound by (in many cases) commercial arteries or man-made barriers.
Throughout the sample, two types of territorial subdivision are introduced: the
development as a neighborhood unit which is itself part of a larger urban neighborhood
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but harbors a distinct character; and the development as an ensemble of closely related
sub-units (Table 3.4).
Applicable in: Applicable in:
Atlanta Baltimore
Boston (seen above: Mission Main as a Charlotte
neighborhood unit) Cleveland (seen above: the King Kennedy Villages or
Camden sub-units)
Chicago Detroit
Houston New York
Indianapolis New Orleans
New Haven
San Francisco
Seattle
Table 3.4 - Diagrams Showing Strategies for Site Subdivision and Organization: as Neighborhood
units or Ensemble of sub-Units
In Boston, for instance, the new Mission Main and its distinctive architectural character
form a neighborhood unit amidst the larger neighborhood of Mission Hill. The Mission
Main unit is in fact a compact residential environment adjacent to two corridors of
services and transit (Huntington Ave. and Tremont Street). It is part of a larger pattern of
neighborhood units aggregation which includes the Parker Hill area, the Highlands and
the Longwood area. Distinctness by design thus complies with a larger system of
residential clustering which is typical of that part of Roxbury (it is in fact anchored in the
historical evolution of that part of Boston - see Chapter 4). In Detroit, the Jeffries
development is subdivided into three distinct sub-neighborhoods called Villages. Each
of these villages is designed to welcome a population group: families, elderly and those
with special needs. In this case, the idea of sub-neighborhood is closely tied to the
creation of Communities of Interest where like-minded people share space and
experiences. Examples belonging to this type of neighborhood linking strategy also use
income mixing as a logic of subdivision.
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Off-Site Replacement Housing
Replacement housing constitutes another integrating strategy insofar as providing units
outside the development's edge blurs the sharply defined boundary between project
and neighborhood. Replacement housing as connecting device refers to the
implementation of supplemental housing units off-site as part of a broader revitalization
effort that includes both development and neighborhood. There are only two clear cut
examples -- New Haven and New York (Fig. 3.1) -- where providing extra neighborhood
units is illustrated as part of the HOPE VI plan. In both these examples, off-site
replacement housing units are used to bridge the gap between a previously isolated
residential cluster and a neighborhood edge which has suffered from this isolation.
Fig. 3.1 - Axonometric View Showinq Location and Type of Off-Site Housing in the Edge of the
Beach 41s' Re-development (New-York Plan, Section 11)
The rest of the developments include either demand-side replacement provisions and/or
rely on the leveraging of the HOPE VI funds to spur the construction of additional units.
Construction of these units is usually done in concert with non-profit neighborhood-
based providers of low-income housing or with nationally recognized organizations such
as Habitat for Humanity.
Replacement housing, as an integrative strategy, depends on a complex set of
implementation variables that range from the participation of "outside" actors (i.e. those
other than Authority, planners/professionals and residents), funding manipulations and
implementation phasing.
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Community Buildings
There are new or rehabilitated community facilities at each of the sampled
developments. However, the siting of community buildings on site remains a
problematic and sensitive issue. The HOPE VI philosophy encourages breaking all
physical barriers between site and edges. The Community Center thus offers an
opportunity to bring neighborhood residents on the site and share facilities or programs
in a way that erases entrenched psychological boundaries. The tenants, however, have
in the past been left to feel isolated and forgotten by mainstream society. They are very
"territorial" when it comes to the proximity of community services and their identifying to
a symbol resident solidarity. For example, the siting of a single decentralized community
center for Concord Village, Eaglecreek and their neighbors was rejected by the tenants
who were in favor of a clearly identifiable community facility for each of the
developments.
The majority of developments ( ten out of fifteen) have their community facilities located
on-site but along one of the site's edges (Table 3.5).
Location Strategy A Location Strategy B
Community Center (C.C.) at the Edge Near Community Center (C.C.) Within the Site
Multi-Use Axis
C CJ
Multi e AxI
Strategy applicable in: Strategy Applicable in:
Houston Charlotte Houston
New York Chicago Detroit
New Haven (see fig. 3.3) New Orleans
San Francisco Atlanta
Indianapolis Seattle Camden
Cleveland BostonH
Table 3.5 - Community Center Location Diagrams - Strategy A (Edge) and B (Centralized)
Among exceptions to this general rule are those developments where centralized
facilities are rehabilitated and kept in place. This is the case of Atlanta's Cupola building,
which is one of the historically significant buildings kept relatively intact; of Houston's
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facilities, which are located toward the Bayou edge at the opposite end of the
neighboring Freedmen's Town residential edge; and of Camden, where centralized
facilities are rehabilitated to remain centralized. New Orleans' Desire is the only place
where a new community center is sited as a central feature culminating a tree-lined
boulevard (Fig. 3.2).
New Orleans Master Plan Showing Fig. 3.3 - New Haven Master Plan Showing Location
Location of Centralized of Centralized Community Center Along
Community Facilities (New
Orleans Plan)
Dixwell Edge (New Haven Plan)
Again, the integrative value of the community center's location -- at the edge or within
the site - is interpreted differently through the eyes of designers and residents. The
former view communal centers as opportunities to physically reinforce a service edge in
order to cement the social bond between the two communities. Residents however view
centralized communal spaces in terms of identity to an environment and solidarity
among themselves.
Parks and Paths Networks
These two descriptors characterize methods by which a network of parks (or
greenways) and a network of landscaped pedestrian paths are used as connective
urban elements.
There are two types of integrating "greening" strategies: the first one refers to the use of
parks and paths as elements of a city- or neighborhood-wide system; and the second
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refers to localized, small-scale efforts to link project with parks and landscaped streets
at the edge of the site (Table 3.6).
There are four examples of the first type -- Houston, New Haven, New York and Seattle
-- where a system of green open spaces is a key element of the revitalization plan and
is meant to extend (some cases more resolutely than others) outside of the site's
boundaries. In each case, a "linear" park forms a green spine of open spaces for the
benefit of the community at large, and onto which the development are attached. In
Houston, the elongated Bayou Park is echoed, across the interstate and on the site, by
a green buffer along the north boundary. In New York, the waterfront is considered part
of a larger network of natural settings. In New Haven, a railroad corridor of vacant land
has been transformed into a bordering linear park which links development to the city. In
Seattle, another man-made barrier that left an indelible imprint in the middle of the site
is reinvented. A boulevard with a large median diminishes the immediate impact of the
transmission towers while exploiting the linking potential of this elongated space. It
should be noted that the implementation of such linear greenways coincides with the
presence of a strong man-made or natural barrier: an interstate in Houston, the water in
New York, an old railroad line in New Haven and a transmission line right-of-way in
Seattle. Thus the integrative impetus of such amenities lies not only in their
environmental and social value, but also in the transformation of a harsh obstacle into a
strong civic asset.
In Chicago, preliminary intentions hint at a large-scale network of inter-connected
neighborhood parks -- new and existing -- by way of planted pedestrian paths and
sidewalks. The Camden plan also shows the intention of linking the site to a major
connector by emphasizing planted sidewalks along the newly extended Sewell street.
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Greenways at the City or Neighborhood Scale Greenways at the Site Scale
City- or |
Nei hborhood-Wide
Gt r ningys m ste g
it
site
C.C.
Table 3.6 - Strategies for Implementinq Parks and Paths Networks: At the Macro (Nei-ghborhood)
and Micro (Development) Scale
Other developments have opted for a linking system of green spaces that is more local
and punctual in scale (type 2). In these instances, a street greening strategy extends to
small local parks located at the edge of the site (off- and on-site).
Edge Retail
Most HOPE VI plans include intents to reinforce and restructure the typically
deteriorated and vacated commercial core nearest to the redevelopment. What is
usually implied -- rather than actually programmed -- is that the presence of a
redeveloped mixed-income community in proximity to this once healthy retail hub will
create a trickle effect to the benefit of potential investors. A retail and business hub is
invariably viewed by urban designers as a strong connecting element between site and
neighborhood. Reality however highlights the ambiguity of the retail component of
HOPE VI plans.
This descriptor tallies instances when the revitalization plan actually translates these
intentions into legible site design guidelines. In about half of the reviewed cases, the
relationship between site and adjacent retail zone has been programmatically integrated
into the plan (Camden, Charlotte, Chicago, New Haven, New Orleans, New York and
San Francisco). The most economically integrative examples, Chicago and San
Francisco, propose the implementation of mixed-used (housing above shops) along
major connectors. All of the other examples have relied on the developing potential of
an existing commercial spine along at least one edge of the site (Table 3.7). In the case
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of Houston, designers' suggestion to restructure the south edge by allowing mixed-uses
on the other half of the perimeter block along the retail strip was rejected by residents
and officials in favor of a six-foot fence.
Strategy A Strategy B
Consolidating an Existing Edge Retail Corridor Bring Retail on Site to Create Multi-Use District
_L IL-I
Re5 i rrido I
Strategy Applicable in: Strategy Applicable In:
Atlanta Houston Detroit San Francisco
Baltimore New Haven Chicago
Camden New York Charlotte (not clear)
Cleveland Seattle New Orleans (not clear) Indianapolis (not clear)
Table 3.7 - Relationship Between Site and Local Retail Base: Strategy A (Edge Corridor) and B
(Multi-Use District)
The integrative value of reinforcing or restructuring a retail or mixed-use site edge
complies with the New Urbanism notion of urban diversity and permeability.
Town Center
This descriptor illustrates instances where developments are re-designed to focus on a
strong central space of condensed activity. These spaces are in fact reproducing -- in
both form and function -- the traditional town center (a staple of New Urbanism) from
which radiates the street network. Within this framework, the idea of integration is
ambiguous since centrality somewhat opposes the HOPE VI philosophy of weaving
spatial and social realms without distinction. Nevertheless the integrative value of
centrality is allegedly found in the possibility of offering residents a civic space in which
to meet, interact and forge a collective identity.
There are only three examples of site re-design based on the strategic location of a
central public space: Baltimore, Charlotte and Chicago (Table 3.7). While the two former
cases introduce geometric forms to emphasize centrality, the latter exploits a critical
location where an important diagonal (Clybourn Ave.) meets an orthogonal connector.
In all cases, the town center is completely surrounded by built structures.
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Types of "Town Centers" Character
Chicago:
... f- Large multi-use area -- located at
morphologically "sensitive" area where
2 development axes converge --
defined as Town Center.
- Belfry symbolically marks center of
neighborhood where community
facilities are clustered.
- Dense built fabric of housing over retail
base near center
Table 3.8 --Diagrams Showing Types of "Town Centers"
The creation of town centers closely relates to Perry's Neighborhood Unit idea in which
clearly bounded residential cells are anchored by a civic amenity. In the Baltimore case,
the Hope Circle is homogeneously residential. While it offers the "best address" around,
the Circle harbors no communal uses that contribute to intense interaction.
Site Entry
A majority of plans (twelve out of fifteen) have proposed to clearly identify ways of
penetrating within the site's boundary. Even though the HOPE VI program clearly posits
the goal of eradicating any physical differentiation between development and
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Baltimore:
- Circle street gives shape to central
common -- the Hope Circle -- sited in
middle of site;
- Main gate at mouth of boulevard, in
axis of Elderly Complex;
- Local streets radiate from center;
- Surrounding common is non-
continuous built wall.
Charlotte:
- Central common defined not by street
circle as in Baltimore but by
architecture i.e. built walls and
gallerias surrounding space;
- No differentiated single access gate;
- Space perceptible from all sides;
- Common sliced by streets: each
quadrant acting as front room to
different uses.
Character f " o n Centers"
neighborhood fabrics, most redevelopments use design to announce -- if not their
distinct character -- their perimeter.
Methods of emphasizing a site entry comprise: installing an actual gate, electronically-
controlled at a single check point or ornamental (Houston; Detroit's Seniors Village; and
Cleveland's Delaney/Renaissance Villages); creating a processional boulevard which
clearly indicates the development's main axis (Detroit, Baltimore, New Orleans, New
York and San Francisco); introducing hard-surfaced plazas at strategic points of entry
(Camden and New Haven); using striking architecture for highlighting strategic street
corners (Boston, Atlanta and Charlotte); and proposing a built signal to mark a strategic
gathering or civic space. In only two cases (Indianapolis and Seattle) is there no
contrived attempt to announce a demarcation between the redeveloped environment's
character and that of the rest of the fabric (Table 3.9).
Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C Strategy D
Site Entry Gate "Processional" Architectural Signal
Boulevard Differentiation
Signal
AEdge
Strategy applicable in: Strategy applicable in: Strategy applicable in: Strategy applicable in:
Cleveland (Renaissance Village) Baltimore Atlanta Chicago
Houston Detroit Charlotte
San Francisco New Orleans Boston
New York
San Francisco
Table 3.9 - Site Entry Diagrams: Strategies A (Gate), Bs (oulevard) %, (ifferentiatiohj
and D (Signal).
Fencing
In addition to clearly marking the re-designed site's entry, a few studied cases
(Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit's Seniors Village, Houston and New York) have made
provisions to surround the community (or restrict access to semi-public spaces) with a
high fence.4 In two cases (Atlanta and San Francisco) a fence surrounds an urban
4 In Cleveland and Detroit's cases, the fence surrounds one or superblock(s), which are kept intact from existing site
configuration.
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block to restrict access to semi-private spaces or parking within that block. In four cases
(Boston, Indianapolis, New Haven and Seattle), no fence are indicated on the plans. In
Boston, however, access to inner-block parking and tot lots is made to clearly appear
private. The remaining four cases were unclear about fencing (Table 3.10).
Fencing is arguably the most effective means to ensure security within a development
which has typically been plagued by incidences of crime or other kinds or urban
violence. The issue of fencing is also tied to the complex notion of public housing
image. The logic of enforcing a perimeter with a fence has a lot to do with principles of
Defensible Space. In some cases, fencing occurs along the whole perimeter of the
redeveloped site, or it occurs on a block-per-block basis. In other cases, the architecture
defines street corners or restricts non-resident access to the semi-private or private in-
block space. Any fencing method brings symbolic meanings of security enhancing or
territoriality, but also of privacy enforcing and individualism. Vale (1994) highlighted that
the type of fencing strategy adopted for a redeveloped site is function of the population
profile. While a homogeneous population might want a perimeter fence to announce a
consolidated take on security, a more heterogeneous group might want to emphasize
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the privacy of the household unit.5 In most cases, this correlation between population
make-up and intents on fencing cannot be derived, simply because re-occupancy
strategies have favored the integration of groups that have not necessarily resided on
the development.
Within the HOPE VI redevelopment framework, fencing does not relate to the
implementation of privatized "gated communities" whereby citizens want to create
physical barriers to access, as well as privatize community space and civic
responsibility. Blakely and Snyder (1997) have identified two types of gated
communities: the "lifestyle" and "prestige" communities. They also acknowledged the
emergence of a third type -- the "security zone" community -- which proves that gates
and fences are no longer the sole prerogative of rich suburbanites but also of vulnerable
low-income communities.
Public housing as security zone community translates residents' need to regain control
of their territory and protect themselves against crime. By erecting a perimeter fence,
"the important point is not whether they need to cut off access to their streets, but that
they feel they musf' (Blakely & Snyder, 1997: 99). Fences, in this case, are viewed as
an exigency rather than an amenity. They are also viewed as a socially integrative tool
for protection, cohesion and solidarity.
Newman has asserted that fences and gates divide large public areas into smaller
territories so that residents can more easily defend and identify them as theirs, thereby
increasing senses of belonging and responsibility. Others have questioned fencing off
low-income communities saying that it discourages residents from interacting with the
surrounding neighborhood to get to jobs and communal resources. Enclosing a housing
development in a fortress-like setting or enclave of fear further stigmatizes the
residents. When confronted with the issue of fencing and how this strategy may go
against HOPE VI ideals for re-weaving efforts, designers have typically stated that the
need of residents to protect themselves against real threats cannot be denigrated or
ignored. Even if the solution is a drastic and perhaps questionable one in terms of
5 Vale (1994) studied the cases of three Boston redevelopments done in the 1980s. At the West Broadway site, for instance, a
population predominantly made of Irish women opted for fencing to enclose shared courtyards, while the more heterogeneous
Franklin Field population opted for backyard fencing.
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physical integration, fencing may be viewed as a matter of social integration by way of
positive collective initiative toward the improvement of the neighborhood. In fact, it is
reasonable to hypothesize that erecting a fence or gate at the perimeter of a public
housing development may strengthen the area into considering itself a cohesive place
and community. It is also reasonable to posit that this community must also extend
beyond its confines toward the neighborhood of which it is but one part.
Results from this analysis show that fencing, while a highly controlled protection
strategy, makes for sites that are nonetheless somewhat porous, i.e. local streets
remain accessible and still belong to the public domain. Most cases with high perimeter
fences avoid the implementation of a cul-de-sac pattern, thereby espousing new
urbanism tenets of permeability emulating traditional street/blocks patterns. One stellar
exception to this typical tactic is Houston, where City officials have opted to implement a
truly gated community, not unlike others found in the suburbs.6 Thus one could argue
that the kind of fencing found in Houston is indeed an integrative method, one which
has to do with "cultural" integration, i.e. import on the site culturally-approved models of
territorial control. In fact, more careful study of many of the sampled sites' edges would
help ascertain whether a certain type of fencing -- principally the block and backyard
fence -- is consistent with similar practices in the surrounding neighborhoods, and
whether it truly constitutes an integrative measure.
Other redevelopments, like that of Boston's Mission Main, have opted for alternatives to
fencing off crime and dangerous traffic. For instance, higher densities of rowhouses
along perimeter streets are intended to reinforce "eyes on the street" principles. The
articulation of street corners is also intended to clearly mark portals of entry to the site.
To control traffic penetration, bottle-neck intersections are designed to slow down cars,
as are narrower internal streets, on-street parking and landscaping. Many of the
redevelopments also refer to the need for streets to become not only traffic connectors
but also shared environments and loci of social interaction (Embark: 1993).
3.1.2 - Street Network
As explained above, streets are an essential variable of the physical integration
process. More than connectors to the surrounding edges, streets are integral parts of
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the intricately inter-linked unit-parcel-block morphological system. Descriptors below
characterize street types favored by designers with the objective to restore, in most
case, the morphological viability of redeveloped environments.
In three cases (Charlotte, San Francisco and Houston), no new streets are added to the
re-designed site. In Charlotte and San Francisco, the original grid was preserved under
the layer of public housing. In Houston, government officials refused to introduce street
patterns in what should, in their eyes, become a gated community. In New York, one
dead-end street (Beach 41 st Street) was re-introduced into the fabric of the development
to provide access to parking areas. In all other cases, a local street network extended
from the neighborhood was created to either eradicate superblock configurations or to
restore a razed or discontinued layer of fabric. Most developments have imported from
the surrounding neighborhood a "traditional" pattern of parallel streets to form a grid of
rectangular blocks. A few other types of street patterns were introduced for less clear
reasons. Cul-de-sacs, for instance, have become exceptional configuration types used
selectively in Atlanta and Seattle. Loops (C-shaped, non-connecting streets) appear
more often in Baltimore, Detroit, Houston and Indianapolis. Boulevards (lanes separated
by a green median, at varying scales) are found in Baltimore, Boston, Detroit and
Seattle. Tree-lined variants, without the median, are found in New York, New Orleans
and San Francisco. There are no cases where back alleys are introduced as part of the
network, except along Detroit's borders where back alley were preserved. Table 3.11,
below, describes and illustrates different types of streets introduced onto the
redeveloped sites: A: Neighborhood; B: Cul-de-Sac; C: Loop; D: Boulevard; E: Circle.
6 According to designer Glenn. Interview (Summer 1997).
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P I Y F
Type A
"Neighborhood"
Type B
"Cul-de-Sac"
Type C
"Loop"
Type D
"Boulevard"
Type E
"Circle"
Most streets of this type are lined by rows of Three cul-de-sacs were created One large loop - connecting Merritts
units on both sides. They are elements of a within the superblock lining 1-75 in to Techwood - was created to
linking system to the adjacent neighborhood. an effort to cluster housing away accommodate the presence of the
from the negative impacts of that Roosevelt tower and perhaps isolate
edge. it from the rest of the streets
network.
Most of these radiate from Hope Circle and One loop (St-Matthew's, off East St.) One street bearing Hope Circle is the most
are lined by rows of townhouses on both occupies the wider portion of block characteristics of a small literal example of "Town
sides. This radiating pattern, even though it between East and Colvin St. The boulevard - tree-lined with Center", i.e. a focal point,
does not replicate models of streets loop is a means of clustering median - connects existing densely surrounded and
configuration from the surrounding edge, housing units so that they are Asquith St. (on-site) to the around which the whole site
permits street parking and the breaking down oriented towards the center of the new Hope Circle and acts as is organized.
of the existing superblock. site and away from Colvin St. an entry gate to the site.
The creation of this type of streets follows the Two cul-de-sacs are created, Loops are introduced solely along One main re-design element
intent to re-instate the grid lost to slum mainly as accesses to parking the train tracks barrier edge. No of this plan is the creation of
clearance. The new pattern however does areas. Near Huntington, residents connection to the tissue across the a Smith "boulevard", which
not introduce the same permeability, thus have opposed a through tracks is possible. serves as spine along the
restricting access from Ward street (the connection to the heavily-trafficked Catholic/institutional core, as
Wentworth edge) and from Huntington Ave. avenue; and near the train tracks, linear public open space, and
(the institutional edge). Nevertheless, this the cul-de-sac becomes an entry to as main entry portal to the
type of network permits the implementation of a cluster of town houses, probably development.
row housing to mirror the grain and scale market rate, which are turned away
found in adjacent residential neighborhoods from that barrier.
like Parker Hill.
All new streets at the McGuire Gardens site
are designed to restore the overall
street/block pattern which surrounds the site.
All streets are not however lined by housing
structures on both sides. Eastce est streets
are often fronted by "sides" or "ends" of
rehabilitated buildings.
All streets were already existing prior to
redevelopment. While none of the N/S
connectors are missing, many E/Wustreets
have been and remain cut-off in favor of large
amalgamated blocks. Built structures line
both sides of streets forming the central
quadrant of blocks or "town center".
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Detroit
Houston
Indianapolis
New Haven
I I Y
Type A
"Neiahborhood"
Type B
"Cul-de-Sac"
Type C
"Loop"
Type D
"Boulevard"
-, ______________________ 
I *
Although not forming a grid inspired by the
surrounding edge, the King Kennedy streets
are nonetheless neighborhood-type
connectors linking site to edges. Even if
Bundy Drive does not offer the usual
characteristics of a boulevard, it's curvy
outline still marks the entry to the site and
acts as a separator between the 2 family
Villages (which themselves incorporate no
streets). One new street , directly north of the
School and North Tower, delineates the
single-family home zone. It is the only street
to cross the site in its length to link opposite
boundaries.
One loop (East 61' St./ Outhwaite
Ave) surrounds the North Tower at
the west edge of the site. Both these
streets are through connectors
elsewhere in the neighborhood.
Type E
"Circle"
The implementation of neighborhood-type The site's central axis is
streets on the Jeffries site follows a weaving highlighted by a boulevard
strategy which enforces the re-connection of with semi-public median
local to surrounding streets. The result is the acting as central common.
re-structuring of the block/street grid typical This boulevard marks the
of that neighborhood, with the exception of entry to the site and
the elderly Village which remains on a gated contributes to differentiating
superblock without any streets. the Family Village from the
Elderly and Special Needs
Villages at the opposite end.
Streets introduced in this scheme are
intended to mirror those found in adjacent
neighborhoods. There are however no
connections toward other street located north
of the site.
The Allen Parkway Village "streets"
enter this category mainly because
none of them are through streets
connected to the surrounding fabric,
except at the Valentine St. gate.
Even Valentine St., which used to be
the only through street connecting
West Dallas Ave. to the Allen
Parkway, was cut-off and deviated
in the new scheme. Crosby St. now
embraces the site in a large loop
and is the second link to West
Dallas.
A loop along the river is meant
to constrain the development
away from that non-residential
edge.
Simply enough, all of Elm Haven's new The only exception to the new
streets are of the "neighborhood" type, i.e. system is a loop which
their trace forms a street/block fabric which accommodates the location of the
proportions relate to the surrounding School and Q House.
neighborhood's. The main connector linking
the site to neighborhood south and north
remains Webster St., roughly dividing the site
in two.
Valentine street, which is
meant as the sole access
point to the gated
development is intended as a
processional boulevard with
median to indeed signify the
entry portal.
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Type B
"Cul-de-Sac"
Type C
"Loo'
Type D
"Boulevard"
Type E
"Circle"
Presumably, all new streets introduced Loops are created to turn the Since the community
at Desire are intended to subdivide the development away from the facilities are presumably
large site according to a traditional harsh industrial river edge and located at the site's
street/block system. the highway. Presumably, some center, a boulevard is
backyards will be exposed to introduced to create a
that heavy traffic. formal entry and a strong
organizing axis. This axis
is reinforced by the
presence of local retail.
Streets on the Beach 41"' site belong to this One loop-type is created at the east
category to the extent that they are edge to link Beach Channel Drive to
extensions (in alignment and dimension) to Beach 3 7 thSt via B. 3 8 th St.
the existing network south of Beach Channel
Drive. These streets - Beach 38 1h, 4 0 & 42 nd
- are however solely used as a means of
access to parking lots on site. The fact that
they are dead-ends is not a-typical: most
streets East and West of the site also abut
the Bay. th
The main axis of the site - Beach 40 St. -
continues to divide the site in two and mark,
as would a tree-lined boulevard, the entry to
the development. The strong symmetry is
reinforced by the centralized agora space.
Introduced is a pedestrian
boulevard which median is
the train tracks. Reinforcing
this public spine are shops
located underneath the
housing.
Most streets proposed are intended to mirror
the patterns found in adjacent low density
neighborhoods. This new pattern is much
permeable, fostering connections across the
transmission line to unite the development.
A few of these are found on the
"west" side of the development to
introduce clusters of row and semi-
detached houses. In subsequent
plans, however, the cul-de-sac
configuration was abandoned in
favor of through neighborhood-type
streets.
The transmission lines right-
of-way - which has to remain
where it is - is a pretext to
create a tree-lined boulevard
with a large median. Houses
are even turned toward this
new linear park, a harsh
barrier turned communal
amenity.
II - - - I iiiiiii lil - - 1- 6 - iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii iiii ii iiii~ 6
Table 3.11 - Diagrams and Descriptions of Street Types (All Cases)
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Type A
"Neiahborhood"
- . 'AOL
3.1.3 - Block Patterns
The most recurrent configuration of block patterns is described as "regular", i.e. a
subdivision method whereby a fabric of orthogonal streets forms a pattern of rectangular
blocks, not unlike what is found in many adjacent neighborhoods (fourteen out of
fifteen)7. The most notable exception is New-York where the single superblock is
preserved and constitutes an alien type of block configuration. The re-introduction of a
regularized residential matrix of blocks and streets is one of the most efficient method of
morphologically integrating project's with neighborhood residential fabric.
Many sites (nine out of fifteen) are re-designed to support irregularly shaped blocks.
Typical "irregular" blocks are unusually large. Their form accommodates the presence
of existing buildings, i.e. streets are deviated from the rigorous grid because of a built
obstacle This is the case of Atlanta, Camden, Cleveland, Detroit and Houston.
Re-connecting the block pattern to the sites' edges is often complicated by the presence
of an important barrier to integration. Thus some designers have resorted to creating a
"zipper" edge. Zippers are large irregular blocks often made of only one row of parcels.
Their form results from the imposed trace of a barrier. In three cases -- Camden,
Houston and Indianapolis - zipper edges shield the community against impenetrable
obstacles like vacant land (Camden and Indianapolis) or highways (Houston).
Structures are oriented so that they are turned away from the negative impact of the
barrier (Table 3.12). In sum, zippers are impermeable tracts devoid of streets and thus
do not constitute connective elements. Nevertheless, they form thick and efficient
buffers against the detrimental environmental effect of barriers on residential areas.
Another method of dealing with the restructuration of the sites' edges is to amalgamate
halved "development" blocks to halved "neighborhood" blocks. This integration method
is used in cities where the development's boundary originally went right through the
middle of an urban block. In six (out of thirteen) cases, halved site blocks are re-
connected to halved neighborhood blocks and thus development units are back-to-back
with neighborhood houses or other uses (retail or community) (Table 3.13).
Unknown is Desire's final configuration. The studied plan remains disgrammatic (July 1997).
143
144
Type B
"Irreaular"
Hy e .111V.---r ,lw4 'TZype C ypee
Atlanta
The majority of blocks proposed for
Mission Main are of the "regular" type, i.e.
they obey a traditional street/block site
subdivision system. These blocks are
oriented EastNVest in a manner coherent
with what existed before slum clearance
and with the pattern found across
Tremont on the Parker Hill. Two blocks
located East of Parker St. are slightly a-
typical, mainly because that part of the
site along the train tracks has obeyed a
markedly different subdivision strategy
through history (see Chapter 4).
Rectangular blocks with minimum
setbacks formed to "fit" existing courtyard-
arranged structures within an orthogonal
street/block grid; new structures
positioned as block in-fill.
One of the main characteristics of the
Mission Main site is the nature of its harsh
institutional and industrial edges. For that
reason, most of those blocks forming the
perimeter of the development are
irregularly shaped and indeed designed as
"zippers". Zipper blocks are rendered
impermeable against an existing barrier so
that housing uses are turned away from
that barrier. IN this case, zippers are found
along the train tracks, the
Catholic/institutional core of Tremont St.
and near the heavily-trafficked Huntington
Ave.
Large, irregularly shaped block purposely
undivided by streets to form blind edge to
development against vacant land.
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Blocks Diagrams Type A
"Rgenular2"
Manipulation of the existing grid to form One superblock remains to support new school,
regularized pattern of rectangular blocks library and existing elderly tower at northern edge of
in southern portion of site; ). Blocks site and thus differentiate from residential tissue;
directly south of Merritts are slightly another superblock is created along 1-75 (streets are
irregular, resulting from cutting off Lovejoy blocked off in favor of cul-de-sacs) and merged with
and shifting Center Str., which is in axis of the dormitories block to form continuous barrier; one
Community Center. block in center of site of different proportions and
form, mainly due to Merritts curve (loop).
1-Quasi-rectangular blocks along Asquith 1-Triangular block resulting from 45 degree local
St, except for 45 degree angle corner to street radiating from Circle;
emphasize "Hope Circle"; non-abutting 2-Trapezoid resulting from the meeting of East
parcels; inner-block programmed as Orleans wth East Fayette street orientations;
passive park and path network; Deviated local street; Pedestrian vista between 2
community buildings to link Fayette with Circle.
2-Unusually small rectangular block with 2
back-to-back rows of 4 parcels.
2-Tr0ezoe&msuntcgaramihrisetcg4ofEas
Baltimore
Boston
Camden
FHII_
iI
-. .-. - - 7 - -
Blocks Diagrams
t---
Type A
"Regular"
A-:U Highly regularized grid of square
blocks built along all faces, following the
rest of Charlotte's pattern. In spite of
"town center", integrity of orthogonal
intersection preserved;
A-2: Variant of regular type: 2 square
blocks amalgamated, i.e. 1 or 2 streets
eliminated to form unusually elongated
surface.
3 fairly regular blocks at northern edge of
site, however a-typical in proportion and
orientation (compared with surrounding
fabric) mainly because new street pattern
composes with layer of existing structures
originally arranged on superblock
configuration.
Type B
"Irregular"
2 irregularly shaped and proportioned
separated by sinuous Bundy Drive.
Type C
"pper"
'4i6%41 ved%
blocks
Type D
"Halved"
All blocks forming the "Family Village" Unusually large rectangular block bordered by M.L. No connective repair along Special
component of the site have regular King, Selden, Gibson and Lodge; no public streets Needs and Seniors Villages
shapes, comparable with the west subdividing area, only private access drives (gated (Gibson Ave.): Special Needs Apts
neighborhood edge; subdivision anomaly for Seniors Village). potentially face backs of Lincoln
caused by lack of critical width between shops.
Jeffries Blvd and Lodge Freeway.
Eastern portion of site (East of Valentine) Western portion of site (west if Valentine) made Residual North and East edges of site, South edge of site, along West
somehow better relates to the form of the irregular for 2 reasons: dead-end streets and along Bayou Highway and 1-45. Dallas: single row of parcelsSouth neighborhood edge: local streets crescent-shaped loop framing existing courtyard- abutting backs (single row) of in-fill(semi-private) align to create similar block configured structures, businesses.
subdivision / proportion. Connection
would be possible, were it not for the
large halved block (Type D).
Mostly regularized blocks, with slightCocrVilg Eatredusnl-
streets) imposed on Concord Village area (border is parking alley);
blocks because of rail road barrier imprint. Concord Village West: block of residual
space impacted by rail road right of way
Eaglecreek Village: Community Center
implanted on residual block edging creek
vacant land.
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Charlotte
Cleveland
Detroit
Houston
Indianapolis
~ ~
i I
I
Blocks Diagrams Type A Type B Type C Type D1i"Regular" "Irregular" "Zipper" "Halved"
I New Haven
New Orleans
New York
San Francisco
Seattle
I
-L
Almost all blocks regularized, especially
within northern portion of site where 4
rows of parcels line all faces of blocks;
Smaller, less homogeneously
proportioned blocks in southern portion of
site.
A few of the new blocks proposed are of
this type, mainly those located in the
median part of the site. They are intended
to replicate a pattern found in adjacent
neighborhood to the East and South.
I __________________________________
Irregular shapes are introduced mainly because
curvilinear loop streets are proposed as framing
elements for the community center core.
One large residual block forms a zippe-
shaped buffer against an industrial and
heavily-trafficked edge. No clues are
provided as to the way plots will be
subdivided, i.e. if back yards will line the
highway.
___ __ ___ __ __ ___ __- i t
One regular block which shape mirrors
that of blocks across the Channel Drive is
introduced thanks to a new access off 38th
Beach st.
1 4 W
The only 2 blocks of the North Beach
development are regularly shaped and
indeed there is no latitude for introducing
a shape other than that suggested by the
rigid grid of streets. A diagonal is
responsible for introducing a variant.
Communal facilities are presumably
located at the strategic intersection.
Regularized matrix in western portion of
site (West of transmission line);
Sub-Type Al: cul-de-sac block
configuration
Sub-Type A2: typical N/S orientation
deviated to render blocks perpendicular to
transmission line.
Single superblock remaining undivided by public,
through streets. The only streets on the site are
semi-public dead-ends against the Bay used solely
as access drives to parking areas.
Eastern portion of the site: blocks edging sinuous
transmission lines linear park and 37h Ave. Park.
___________________________ i i
Irregularities caused by 2
elements: the presence of the
Wexler School in the middle of the
site; and the deviation of Eaton st.
(between Ashmun & Dixwell);
All along the southern edge of
Desire are blocks halved by the
presence of an alley or street: half
belongs to the development and
half belongs to the neighborhood.
Western edge of site (between
Beach 42 "d and 4 3 'd Sts.) one row
of parcels deep; new family
townhouses' backyards are back to
back with neighbors'. The "end" of
same block (along Beach Channel
Dr.) occupied by single parcel for
community facility.
Table 3.13 - Diagrams and Descriptions of Block Types (All Cases)
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3.1.4 - Public and Semi-Public Open Space
The implementation of a network of semi-public and public space is an effective way of
connecting the site to a network of community amenities already existing throughout the
city.
Types of semi-public and public spaces designed for the re-developed sites are varied
in form and function. The more commonly proposed design solution is a space which is
adjacent (and an extension to) the community center (six out of thirteen cases). Some
cities propose neighborhood (or sub-neighborhood) pocket parks to punctuate the
residential fabric (Camden, New Haven, Seattle). Other plans propose to include linear
parks to replace or mask a man-made obstacle to integration. This is the case of Seattle
(the transmission lines) and New Haven (the industrial strip), while New York's linear
park is in fact part of a system of waterfront open space. Two cities -- Detroit and New
York -- use parts of their public space as means of emphasizing an entry to the site.
These processional spaces, designed as tree-lined boulevards, mark the central axis of
the development and regulate the whole of the residential pattern. Finally, two cases
have integrated formal circles to symbolically and functionally mark the center of the
new community or "town". The following table (3.14) describes and illustrates six
proposed types of open space.
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I- - -- - ---1Y 11Open Space
Diagrams
Type A
"Community Center
Extension"
Type B
"Playground"
Type C
"Circle"
Type D
"Neighborhood"
Type E
"Boulevard - Common/
Processional"
Campus of community Playground space presumably
facilities - Cupola Bldg, reserved alongside new school,
Maintenance Bldg and even though no plans showing
Community Center - at it. Linked to other on-site
center of site, each with institutional use - the Carnegie
parking lots. Outdoor pool Library - and forming E/W axis
behind Maintenance. of semi-public/public open
space (with community spaces)
along Merritts Ave.
Type F
"Linear"
The new community center
is located near the
Catholic/institutional edge
along Tremont St. A small
expanse of open space
adjacent to this facility is
meant as an extension of
the existing Mission Hill
playground across Smith
street.
The 2 playgrounds (one is a
large soccer field) are either
existing amenities - the Mission
Hill playground, along Tremiont
- or shared with the Wentworth
Institute, along Ward. Both open
spaces are well-programmed
spaces shared by the
development and neighborhood
residents and are thus meant as
loci for social interaction (or
social integration means).
ff~t It I I J
Ofl~
~olIlThL)I. Octagon defined by surroundingresidential structures. All of thesite's streets radiate from thiscentral point. "Civic" space
culminating a short tree-lined
boulevard with a green median
which signals the entrance to
the development. Small-scale
"hausmannian" solution to
organize a site which is turned
inward.
Rectangular space which Square common surrounded by
occupies +/- one half of a 4 local streets. Smallest of the
block where the Community urban blocks forming the site.
Center also sits. Crisscrossed by pedestrian
paths and bounded by large,
tree-lined sidewalks.
A large playground is located at
the southern fringe of the
development, away from the
circle. It forms a green buffer
between Earle Village and an
edge of vacant land.
The formal space is lined by
buildings and a loggia, and thus
is a well-defined center of social
activity visible from all access
points to the development. The
symbolic value of the circle is
also meant to foster a sense of
self-identity to the place.
The Smith "boulevard" median
is intended as an East/West
linking element to reinforce
the existing North/South
Catholic/Institutional core of
the neighborhood (along
Tremont). A fenced open
space, it also intends to import
a familiar and prestigious
Boston residential image like
that of the Commonwealth
Ave. park/median - a strategy
also applied at the Columbia
Point redevelopment.
L ___________________ I ___________________ 
______________
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Atlanta
Boston
Baltimore
Camden
Charlotte
II -- -
i ,
U F F T
Extension"
Type B
"Playground"
Type C
"Circle"
- _____________________ 4 I
Occupies 1/2 of an existing
rectangular block already
containing the Dike Montessori
School. The whole of the park's
perimeter is lined by trees. Also
doubles as Community Center
Ext. as it sits close to the
communal facilities.
Type D
"Neighborhood"
Type E
"Boulevard - Common/
Processional"
Type F
"Linear"
Oval space surrounded by
higher density townhouses to
create "walls". The park is in
fact a swelling of the Jeffries
Detroit- boulevard (at its North end)
which organizes the site into
formal symmetry: the concept
of a suite of Villages - like beads
on a strong axis. Jeffries
boulevard is culminated at the
South end by the Seniors
Village park.
Free-flowing space as Rectangular site covering three
extension of community urban blocks, bounded by three
buildings. Sinuous edge local streets and an interstate.
follows imprint of adjacent
Bayou Park which isHouston separated from the
development by a highway.
Indianapolis Both examples of this type
occupy residual space on a
slightly irregular block which
also comprises community
Pathwayfnbuildings.g
[he
en
oth
ys.
en
he
r 2
ies
he
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Type A
"Community Center
Extension"
Type B
"Playground"
Type C
"Circle"
Type D
"Neighborhood"
Type E
"Boulevard - Common/
Processional"
Type F
"Linear"
Both sub-types (or variants Very small rectangular park Runs the length of the
on the type) occupy part of centrally located within the site along canal St. on
the block onto which development but too small to what used to be a
already sits ,a community constitute an effective focal vacant strip of
building; in this case, the point Fronts the Wexler School. industrial land. One-
Wexler School and the sided since abutting
maintenance facility. the rail line.
Elongated playground at the
end of the strong central axis.
Form takes advantage of
waterfront views.
Rigorously planned as the
culmination point of a strong,
processional axis which links
the Bay to the channel Drive.
This tree-lined axis is in fact a
local street which
symmetrically divides the
development in two. The end
point is a semi-circular hard-
surfaced agora with central
spray pool.
Naturally elongated
form which follows the
actual imprint of the
beach. In contrast, the
park's straight
northern edge abuts
the development
where the playing
equipment is grouped.
The development's
park is part of a linear
system of waterfront
activities: paths, pier,
etc.
There is no expanse of
publicly-accessed green space
at North Beach. The
pedestrian mall splitting the
site is nevertheless tree-lined
to signify the public character
of that area within the
development.
Existing elongated form with Follows the path of
sinuous edge. One side forms the transmission lines
site's boundary to form a central
Small square common spine.
completely surrounded by
houses on all sides
Rectangular in shape, no streets
crosses it. Acts as a buffer
against traffic on Martin Luther
King Way.
Table 3.14 - Diaarams and Descriptions of Semi-Public and Public Types of Open Space (All Cases)
vV T UI
San
Francisco
Seattle
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3.1.5 - Private and Semi-Private Open Space
The lack of differentiation between spaces that are public or private has often been
identified as a major factor of physical and social isolation. Post-War family high-rises
and superblock configurations embody the impossibility for residents to appropriate
spaces that do not belong and are not exposed to the public realm. This is the case of
Cabrini, where hard spaces in-between towers, belonging to everyone and no one, are
deserted and forbidding. Families living in low-rise developments find it equally difficult
to appropriate parts of an ill-defined courtyard. In Boston, hard-surfaces and overgrown
courtyards are empty except for cement blocks at each open end. Thus the absence of
identifiable semi-private and private open space not accentuates problems of safety and
control, it also points to a stigmatizing contrast with lower- and middle-income suburban
areas.
many public housing residents have been denied access to the powerful statement of
individualism afforded by privatized open spaces. Thus all plans introduce segregated
private open space and/or private access for each household within the community
(Table 3.15). There are three instances when this universal intent is not verified:
1) when rehabilitated multi-family types of housing structures retain a shared system of
private space and access, such as the modernized New York towers or the revitalized
low-rises in Cleveland; 2) when new multi-family structures, such as Chicago's mid-rise
apartment buildings or San Francisco stacked flats over retail, do not provide
segregated private spaces; and 3) when multi-unit types dedicated for an elderly
population opt for controlled means of common access, as is the case in Detroit,
Baltimore, New Haven and Charlotte. The only case diverging from these exceptions is
Atlanta (first phase), where semi-detached townhouses (over flat) and apartment
buildings share backyard space surrounding the in-block parking lot. Above-ground
units, in this case, each have balconies. In all other cases, fenced private backyards are
provided for households living in low-rise rowhouses, townhouses and single-family
detached units.
Most redeveloped or recreated residential blocks, within the community, are subdivided
in a manner which permits to reserve the inner portion for the semi-private use of all
households living on that block. In a few instances, the inner block space is configured
as a courtyard, i.e. a regular space tightly surrounded on all sides by continuous
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structures. Courtyards are remnants of original configurations (Camden, Houston,
York) or new typological imports (Charlotte, Chicago, San Francisco).
New
For most examples, the inner-block is devoted not only to fenced private backyards, but
also to semi-private commons most often programmed as children tot lots. Following
precepts of Defensible Space, the residential block's inner sanctum is a centralized and
safe space easily controlled and accessed by children supervisors. Safety, in many
cases, is also heightened by a fence and a gate to bar entry to those not living in the tot
lot's immediate precinct (Table 3.16).
In practically every case (exceptions being Baltimore, Camden and Seattle), residents
park their car in a designated lot located within the inner-block area. Street parking is
considered unsafe and inconvenient, even if it is prescribed by traditionalists as an
urban practice which favors "eyes on the street" controls. Street parking is reserved for
"visitors". It could therefore be argued that the implementation of segregated in-block
parking areas -- and the absence of street parking -- constitutes an anti-integrative
measure (Table 3.17).
Strategy A Strategy B
Private Backyards Shared Backyards
Fenced Shared
rivate Semi-Privat
Backyards ac1 ards
Jnit
1, 2. 3 Unit
Street Stred
Found in: Houston Found in:
Baltimore Indianapolis Atlanta
Camden New Haven chicago-
Charlotte New Orleans Cleveland
Chicago New York San Francisco
Detroit Seattle
Table 3.15 - Relationshi Amonao Street anTayeffPrvateand SemiPivate
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Open Space: Strategy A (Private Fenced Backyards) and B (Shared Backyards)
Table 3.16 - Diagrams Showing Strategies Tor Active or Passive In-BlOCK Communa
(Semi-Private) Areas
"able 3.17 - Strategies for Creatinq a System of Semi-Private and Private Open Spaces :
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Strategy A Strategy B
Active Communal Area Passive Communal Area
t rivate -,Private
Backyards Backyards
_ _Semi-P, r ate L-emi-nat
Tot Lot Comm
Found in: Houston Found in: Chicago
Baltimore (Not Clear) Indianapolis Atlanta Cleveland
Charlotte New Haven Baltimore Houston
Chicago New Orleans Camden New York
Cleveland New York
Detroit San Francisco
P P
A (Semi-Enclosed) and B (Enclosed)
Strategy A Strategy B
"Individual" Front Yards "Common" or Shared Front Yards
Shared
Entryway
Y, ni
1, 2 3
ni
tree 2
dividual Street
Entryways
Found: Exceptions Found in:
Everywhere Atlanta
San Francisco
Chicago (Apartment Bldgs)
New York (Towers)
Table 3.18 - Strategies for Providing Access to Units: A (Individual Front Yards)
and B (Shared Front Yards)
The in-block space is tightly programmed to maximize the use of a traditional
street/block subdivision pattern. The result is a socially and hierarchically integrated
system of private backyards, and of semi-private tot lots, parking and pedestrian
walkways. Nevertheless, the semi-collectivization of spaces behind individualized units
forms an open space landscape that remains "different" form patterns found in
surrounding edges. Activities within the urban block are rarely programmed in older or
suburban fabrics: children play in more centralized areas and cars are parked on the
street on in driveways. In this context, "integration" is less concerned with replicating
traditional edge patterns, than it is with restructuring the community's social and
physical fabrics.
All redevelopments offer a privatized front yard leading to a private front door. Each plan
states the importance of cultivating a direct link between one's address and one's sense
of safety and identity to the community (Table 3.18). Exceptions occur when a multi-
family residential type is functionally unsuitable to provide private access to each
household. In Chicago and San Francisco, mid-rise apartment buildings and flats
(stacked over shops) share common entries along fagades without setbacks. In New
York and Detroit's high-rises, access is gained through a common exterior plaza or a
central elevator lobby.
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In a few cases, the system of inner-block open space is linked to a community-wide
network of pedestrian paths. This tactic of segregating pedestrian from vehicular traffic
is most evident in Baltimore, Charlotte, Houston, New York and San Francisco.
3.1.6 - Housing Units
The HOPE VI goal of creating mixed-income communities of choice translates into a
varied selection of housing types. The typology tally reveals that: 1) practically every
redeveloped community has broken with inherited patterns of typological hegemony to
offer residents with two or more residential types within the site's boundaries (the one
exception is Indianapolis, where all types proposed are single-family houses); 2) the
most used residential type, notwithstanding geographical locations, is the rowhouse or
attached townhouse (found in thirteen out of fifteen communities). Considering
construction and environment costs, the rowhouse constitutes an economically efficient
type best suited for moderately dense urban residential environments. Rowhouse types
and their variants are aggregated onto small parcels to create homogeneous street
walls at the periphery of the urban block, thereby liberating more private space at the
back. They are typical imports of older residential fabrics, such as those found in Boston
or Baltimore.
The detached single-family house (six out of fourteen)8 and the mid-rise apartment
building (eight out of fourteen)9 also characterize the new housing stock. The
implementation of single-family houses is seemingly driven by a combination of two
forces: 1) "market forces" dictate that culturally approved types are best suited for the
homeownership component of mixed-income strategies; and 2) "morphological forces"
influence the goal of integration by mirroring types which forge the image of surrounding
neighborhoods. Mid-rise apartment buildings -- newly designed (Baltimore, Boston,
Charlotte, Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco) or rehabilitated (Houston, New York) -- are
more often destined to non-family populations, i.e. the elderly (Baltimore, Boston,
Charlotte and Houston) or residents with special needs (Detroit). Their configuration
permits to house centralized services. Mid-rises are also used as "density buffers" at the
site's periphery; they separate new and old fabrics of different scales. This is the case in
The designer for the Desire development could not confirm the presence of single families house on site (Interview, July 1997).
9 Ibid.
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Boston, where a border of mid-rises staves off the dwarfing impact of adjacent towers
on the fine-grained residential community.
Practically all of the infamous high-rise structures (more than seven stories) are
eradicated from the redeveloped communities. Of the forty-nine towers found in the pre-
redevelopment sample, four still stand in Detroit as an elderly complex, and four remain
in New York. Interestingly, New York's was the only example where designers proposed
drastic measures to diminish the vertical impact of towers along with the problem of
shared access at the base. The solution presented a complex modernization scheme:
wings are topped-off and townhouses replace ground floor lobbies. Though abandoned,
along with the HOPE VI grant, the scheme remains a clever compromise between
residents' acceptance of towers as suitable environments and integration necessities
(Table 3.19).
Type A Type B Type C Type D Type E Type F Type G Type H
Single Rowhouse or Semi- Low & Mid-Rise Stacked Stacked Townhouse High-rise
Detached Attached Detached Apartment Bldg Flats Duplexes over Flats or Apartment
Towhouse Townhouse (3-6 Stories) Shops / Bldg
or Duplex Flats over
Townhouses
Found in: Found: Found in: Found in: Found in: Found in: Found in: Found in:
Cleveland Everywhere Atlanta Boston Boston Chicago Atlanta Detroit
Detroit Except in Camden Charlotte Chicago Charlotte New York
Indianapolis Indianapolis Detroit Chicago Cleveland Chicago
New Haven and San New Haven Detroit New Haven New York
New Francisco Seattle Houston San Francisco San Francisco
Orleans New York Seattle
Seattle San Francisco
Table 3.19 - Distribution of Cities Accordinq to Housing I ypes
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3.1.7 - Relationships Between Housing Unit and Site
Almost all housing structures are configured to generate a back-to-back and front-to-
front relationship: backyards abut backyards and front doors face front doors. In New
York, however, this relationship is complicated by the presence of high-rises with no
discernable front or back. Many units therefore have views intruding upon the privatized
maisonnettes backyards below. Other exceptions permit backyards and the end of a
row of units to front a street (ten cases out of thirteen).10 This type of relationship occurs
more frequently where rehabilitated structures retain their perpendicular orientation vis-
e-vis the street network (this is the case in Camden, Charlotte, Cleveland and Houston).
In many cases (ten out of thirteen), private backyards abut other uses like community
facilities or a school. To segregate heavily used school yard and vulnerable backyard,
trees and landscaping create a "soft" barrier (this is the case in Baltimore, for instance).
Almost all of the new or rehabilitated units (at ten out of thirteen sites) have a private
front door. Within Cleveland's rehabilitated Renaissance and Delaney Villages, common
entries subsist. In San Francisco, new courtyard apartment buildings are accessed
through lobbies off the perimeter street. In spite of ground floor maisonnettes and newly
constructed townhouses with private entries, the majority of New York's high-rise units
are accessed via elevator lobbies. In Charlotte, Detroit and Houston, all family units
have separate entries except within structures -- new and renovated -- dedicated for the
use of special needs and elderly populations (Table 3.20).
Cities Back-to- Front-to- Back (or Front-to- Front-to- Housing- Private Shared
Back Front Side)-to- Back Side to-Other Front Door Front
Street Access
Atlanta Yes Yes No No No No Yes No
Baltimore Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Boston Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Camden Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Charlotte Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Chicago n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cleveland Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Detroit Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Houston Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indianapolis Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
New Haven Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
New Orleans n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New York Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
San Francisco Yes Yes No No No No No Yes
Seattle Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Occurrence (13) (all/13) (11/13) (83) ) (2/13) (6/13) (9/13) (9/13) (5/13)
-a
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Table 3.20 -Su-poReainhpBeweuntadn1A1cssecpCiagad
New Orleans
10 Unknown are New Orleans and Chicago, which plans remain diagrammatic.
3.2 - Social and Organizational Variables of Comparison
Vale (1993) notes that "the social meaning of public housing image is a matter almost
entirely divorced from physical qualities of the buildings; it is a matter of who lives there,
not just where they live". It is therefore crucial to introduce social variables of integration
to complement the portrait of physical integration. The income-mix strategy, the success
of participatory methods and the provision of community and social services are
variables whose integrative value is embedded in the discourse of residents,
policymakers, neighborhood leaders and design professionals.
The central theme of social integration relates to "community building", i.e. the
compounded effect of physical redevelopment, of linkages to local institutions (in the
form of public/private partnerships), of social and community services based on self-
sufficiency, and of the creation of access to jobs. The information contained in HOPE VI
plans is insufficient to assess whether social programming has "successfully" spurred
integration. Rather than measuring their impact, this section analyses the guidelines
and methods devised in HOPE VI plans for favoring social integration.
Hope VI designers and policymakers consider income-mixing an efficient social
integration method. Planning for social and economic diversity encourages the creation
of a reliance network that ensures long-term self-sufficiency for site and neighborhood
residents. Income-mixing is viewed as strong a weaving or integrative strategy as the
creation of streets. Nevertheless, participation, mutuality, emulation and
"neighborliness" are difficult and complex constructs to "plan", more so than privatized
backyards.
Methods of participatory planning are almost always part of the redevelopment process
which emulates principles of community planning. The integrative value of resident
participation is viewed differently by the residents and by planning professionals.
Finally, much of the HOPE VI integration discourse is founded on the creation of a net
of social services designed to support long-term self-reliance. Everyone agrees that
social programs are a most integrative means of restoring public housing residents'
ability to move away from despair and access mobility within mainstream society.
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3.2.1- Income-Mix Strategy
The integrative effect of income-mixing is skewed toward the creation of settings that
will attract working families. These households in turn import a work ethic into the
development. Since joblessness has traditionally contributed to the isolation and
stigmatization of residents from mainstream society, it is believed that role models with
jobs inspire and help the unemployed find work.
A direct impact of mixed-income strategies is the net loss of units for very-low income
households. Compilations confirm that at least 1,000 public housing units are lost in the
process of revitalization. Some 8,795 units are in fact demolished to make place for less
dense mixed-income communities totaling 7,709 units of homeownership (17.6% of
total), low- and moderate-income (20%), family public housing (42%), as well as
housing for the elderly (11.6%) and special needs populations (3.9%).
Income-mix strategies present a wide array of unit ratios reserved for different income
tiers. Most plans have made provisions for homeownership opportunities by setting
aside for-sale units. Almost all of these are single-detached or semi-attached
townhouses. Charlotte is an exception: earmarked homeownership units are clustered
into rehabilitated rowhouses. About 40% of the new or rehabilitated housing stock is
reserved for conventional public housing (Table 3.21).
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Market Family Working Families' Projected
Cities Demo- Income Rate Home- Public Low- Moderate- Specialized Senior Off-Site
lition Mix (Rental) ownership Housing Income Income (units) (units) (& Section
(units) (units) (units) (units) (units) (units) (units) 8)
Atlanta 1067 900 360 0 360 180 0 0 0 707
Baltimore 807 338 0 27 189 0 0 12 110 0
Boston 822 585 0 50 n.a. n.a. n.a. 50 70 n.a.
Camden 176 253 0 0 253 0 0 0 0 16
Charlotte 170 239 0 40 102 29 0 0 68 na.
Chicago 1324 923 0 452 286 185 0 0 0 1449
Cleveland 270 170 0 22 148 0 0 0 0 602
Detroit 1438 826 0 32 266 0 0 104 424 1000
Houston 714 500 0 109 110 111 0 0 170 n.a.
Indianapolis 310 210 0 0 105 52 53 0 0 35
New Haven 462 395 0 75 120 54 54 12 80 170
New Orleans 935 800 0 200 425 0 0 175 0 200
Selected 800
New York Bldg 600 0 0 300 150 150 0 0 (112
Portions elderly
across
street)
San 229 355 0 0 185 126 0 0 44 0
Francisco
Seattle 893 1200 0 400 400 400 0 0 0 500
Net Loss: 9617 8294 Projected1086 Gain:
3693
100% 4,3% 17% 39,1% 18,6% 4,3% 11,6%
Table 3.21 - Number of Units Allotted to Tenure Type as Part of Income-Mix Strategy (All Cases):
Total Units Lost to Demolition and Gained in Redevelopment and Off-Site
Replacement
From data collected in the plans, there are three categories or models of income-mix
strategies: 1) a more "conventional" model offering very low-income (public housing)
units, along with market rate (homeownership, mainly) and moderate-income units; 2) a
model where public housing units are supplemented with the help of financial
mechanisms like Low Income Housing Tax Credit; and 3) a model allowing public
housing units to become homeownership (condominium) units12 (Table 3.22). Most
revitalization plans rely on an income-mix model that maximizes a brand of socio-
economic diversity that helps eradicate a "project" mentality.
The categories "Public Housing" and "Low Income Housing" are mutually exclusive: the first category refers to residents with
no or very low income (below 50% of median) and the other refers to earning households (with income between 50-80%
12 median bracket) (Seattle Plan,1994: 4.4).Gayle Epp, at the Mayors Institute on Urban Design Harvard conference (Sept. 1997), identified the "Piggyback" model as the
"way of the future" for mixed-income financing. The idea will be to "piggyback" all public housing on market rate units built
elsewhere in the city. The government would, in this scenario, acquire the role of lender.
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Model I Model 2 Model 3
Public Housing - Public housing Public Housing to
Market Rate and and Low Income Condos - Market
Moderate Income Tax Credit Rate
Boston Atlanta Baltimore
Camden San Francisco
Cleveland
Charlotte
Chicago
Detroit
Houston
Indianapolis
New Haven
New Orleans
New York
Seattle
Table 3.22 - Distribution of Cities According to Income Mixing Models
Homeownership, as stated in Chapter 1, is a key element of the income-mixing rhetoric
of integration. Not only does the integrative value of homeownership rest on deeply
ingrained cultural values and aspirations, it is also considered a stabilizing element
(socially and economically) for the redevelopment and for the surrounding
neighborhood. The idea is that importing market rate units to house working families on
the old project site ensures that: 1) the "public" image is transformed to offer desired
opportunities to appropriate individualized space; 2) leverage afforded by higher
property values will support the long-term financing of very low-income units.
3.2.2- Participatory Methods
The integrative value resident participating in the planning process rests on the desire,
on the part of all actors involved, to transform a community of powerlessness into a
"community of sentiment" (Blakely), i.e. a community which fosters a sense of belonging
and having a voice in shaping the development and neighborhood's collective destiny.
A tally of participatory methods shows that varied types of approaches are introduced
by the planning teams. However, all methods surveyed aim to produce the same result:
optimizing public housing residents' involvement in a process which promotes
transparency and democracy. A wide range of participatory methods include Town Hall
meetings, the circulation of a newsletter, the implementation of on-site HOPE VI
redevelopment offices, the creation and support of tenant councils, interactive
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photography exercises, public meetings, workshops on specific themes (mainly design),
master planning charrettes in presence of all actors, resident surveys, and site tours to
redeveloped communities. Most of these methods refer to activities held during pre-
implementation planning phases.
All plans allude to a series of meetings between Authority and planning consultants (the
redevelopment team), site residents or their representing body, and leaders of the
neighboring community. In some instances, because of tensions between participants,
meeting were boycotted by residents. This was the case in Houston and Boston. The
resident survey features prominently among many plans as the most important
measure of pre-redevelopment preferences and satisfaction. No sample of the
questionnaires were included in the plans.13 Epp Associates of Boston devised an
innovative survey method for the six of the sampled sites where they were involved as
planning consultants (Detroit, Houston, Indianapolis, New Haven, New York and
Seattle). The method invited children to document the "good" and "bad" characteristics
of their surroundings with the help of a disposable camera. The method is somewhat
based on Kevin Lynch's imageability principles, whereby users' perception of an
environment yield clues about its legibility and image. A few cities (Chicago, New
Orleans and Seattle) organized design charrettes where consultants were invited,
during a tightly scheduled few days, to address specific site planning issues and test
solutions before residents and neighborhood leaders.
Based on available data and local newspapers accounts, Houston participatory
experience appears least successful, if success is measured in terms of residents
actually attending planning meetings. Throughout the planning process, the nineteen
remaining families vociferously refused to participate. Led by their representative,
Lenwood Johnson, the residents nevertheless made their views known throughout local
papers. Apart from the fact that APV was almost vacant at the time, the participatory
process was, from the beginning, tainted by complex circumstances: officials were
intent on selling a portion of the site to private developers; preservation guidelines were
overlooked; and a history of racial tensions fed residents' skepticism. In Boston, the
participatory process was also difficult and almost caused the loss of HOPE VI funds
13 Some of the survey's questions to Baltimore residents were reproduced verbatim in Abt's Baseline report of August 1996.
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(See Chapter 5). In Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis, New Orleans, New York and Seattle,
participatory methods were reported to be successful at involving residents in the
decision-making process. The plan for San Francisco's North Beach, on the other hand,
only reports public meetings and workshops. Plans obtained for Atlanta, Baltimore (the
baseline evaluation), Charlotte and Cleveland did not yield much (or, in some cases,
any) specific information regarding their interactive methods.14
3.2.3- Supportive and Community Service Programs
The supportive and community services component of HOPE VI constitutes a key
integrative method. Integration refers to the notion of self-sufficiency whereby
specifically tailored tools permit very low-income and unemployed residents to find jobs
and acquire a degree of control over their destiny. Social programs are meant as an
integrative context within which neighborhood and site residents share services and
thus foster an interdependence among populations. To reinforce this interaction effect, a
majority of redevelopments (ten out of fifteen) specified that community facilities be
located at the edge of the site so that they become symbols of shared intentions to "fit
in" the broader community. The decentralization of community services is an important
variable of social integration. It physically translates into making a legible socio-spatial
connection along at least one edge of the redeveloped site. This edge usually
constitutes a spine of local services, along the lines of the traditional "main street". At
three sites, renovations to existing and centralized facilities reduce the connective
potential of communal spaces.
It is expected that the many programs supported by HOPE VI funds and presented at
length in the plans will be modified over time, in response to shifts in community profiles
and needs. There are three areas of support within each self-sufficiency component of
HOPE VI plans: the social support programs, the community services programs and the
economic development programs.
Among all supportive services guidelines, one common overarching goal is to promote
family self-sufficiency whereby every member has the opportunity to acquire the
14 This however does not mean that residents did not participate in parts of the process: in Atlanta, for instance, local newspapers
describe an intense but successful process.
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necessary tools to become socio-economically independent. Self-sufficiency programs
are designed to enhance and provide coping skills, basic education, training, career and
employment choices, as well as varied housing options. In all cases, the cornerstones
of self-sufficiency are education and training. The Campus of Learners -- a staple of the
HOPE VI program -- is designed to give residents responsibility in making training and
employment choices. Other complementary support services are usually grouped into
an on-site "one-stop" community facility.
Community services are given an important role as the "active" counterpart to support
services. The idea is that in return for the support from subsidized programs, residents
are invited to "give back" by doing community work. The Corporation for National and
Community Service oversees the community service component of HOPE VI in
collaboration with HUD and local Authorities. The nationally recognized Volunteers In
Service to America (Vista) have helped identify and manage the community service
programs in which residents -- youth, adult and elderly -- might choose to participate.
(Table 3.23).
Finally, economic development programs are designed to give residents access to jobs,
on- and off-site. Many plans mention opportunities to implement on-site resident-owned
businesses, usually in the form of business incubators but also in the form of loans.
Combined with job readiness and skills training, economic development programs are
usually developed in partnership with other neighborhood or City programs such as
those promoted in the Enterprise Zone.
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Supportive Services Community Services Economic Development
Youth Family Child Care/ Senior Education/ Volunteerism Programs Entrepeneurship Incubators Credit Union/ Loans
Cities Programs Programs Health Programs Training Skills/ Training
Programs
Atlanta YMCA- Neighborhood Day Care 'Longevity' Computer Vista; Neighborhood Training &
Sponsored Block Watch; Facility by Learning Centers; Resources Corps; Employment Center;
Youth Parents Salvation Residents to Work w/ Businesses @
DvIpmt Training; Army; Service Providers Museum & Cultural
Mentoring by Ga Substance Enrichment Ctr
Tech Volunteers Abuse
Baltimore Self-Sufficiency Child Care Job Training & Vista; Volunteerism for
Educational Young Adults and
Opportunities Adolescents
Boston Child Care Seniors
Outreach
Programs
Camden Homework Life and Coping Child Care; Employment
Center; Skills; Family Medical / Training & Career
Library; Needs Dental Clinic Choices; Basic
Recreational Assessment Education
Activities
Charlotte
Chicago Cabrini House Child Care Vista; Cabrini Youth Job Training ; Resident-Owned Entrepeneurship
Alternative Rehabilitation Training; Corps; Community Resident Employment Businesses Revolving Loans
Academy Victim Policing; Tenant Patrol DvIpt Initiatives
Assistance;
Substance
Abuse
Cleveland Youth Central Family Child Care Job Skills & Vista; 10 hours Minimum Enterprise center Business Incubators On-Site Credit Union
Enhanceme Resource Center (Head Start); Business Service Per Month (Computer/Job in Partnership w/
nt Services Personal Health Care; Training; Basic (Human, Environmental, Readiness/Job Cleveland
(YES); Welfare; Education Educational Needs); Skills/Entrepeneurial Enterprise Group:
Recreational Transportation; Public Safety Training) Recycling Ctr/Food
Activities; At- Legal Aid Coop/Laundromat
Risk Youth
Detroit Vista Econ. Dvipmt One-Stop-Capital Shop
Coordinator;
Houston Mentoring Resource Day Care; Campus of Vista Technical Assistance Micro-Business Business-Loan Fund;
Programs; Center; Health Care Learners; Training; Job Incubator Credit Union
Recreational Transportation; Parenting; Creation
Activities Crime Literacy
Prevention
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Supportive Services Community Services Economic Development
Youth Family Child Care/ Senior Education/ Volunteerism Programs Entrepeneurship Incubators Credit Union/ Loans
Cities Programs Programs Health Programs Training Skills/ Training
Programs
Indianapolis Youth Resident Day Care Literacy Vista Resident Employment
Activities & Capacity Bldg; & Job Training
DvIpmt Transportation; Activities
Services
New Haven Early Family Support Campus of Vista Education, Job Businesses Dvlpmt Revolving Loan Fund;
Childhood & Center Learners; Ecology; Peacekeapers; Training & & Incubator Service Bonding Fund
Youth Community Mentorships; Choir Employment; Youth
Dvipmt: School Program Enterprises
After-
School/Drop-
Out
Prevention
New Youth Resident Health Care Golden Age: Vista
Orleans Empowerme Devlpmt In-Home
nt Housekeeping
(GED/Drop- / Good
Out Neighbor
Prevention/ Network
Life Skills)
New York Youth Resident Day Care; Senior Center Adult/Continuing Vista; Resident-Oriented
DvIpmt Organization Primary Expansion Education Youth Leadership; Job Initiatives Plan:
Capacity Bldg Health Care Tenants Patrol Youth Apprenticeship
/Health Careers
/Employment
Resource Ctr;
Area-Wide Initiatives
San Basic Education; Bridges between Resident-
Francisco Specific Training Residents and Job- Entrepreneurs
for Job & Life Rich Neighborhood Business Dvlpmt
Skills
Seattle Tutoring; Transportation; Child Care; Senior Campus of Vista; Youth & Adult Revolving Fund for
Recreational Parent-Child Ctr Health Outreach Learners; Youth Service Corps; Apprenticeships Resident-Owned
Activities Services; Adult Education Neighborhood Watch; Businesses
Services
Table 3.23 - List of Supportive and Community Services, as well as Economic Development Strategies Proposed in the Plans
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3.2.4- Management Models
Many housing Authorities have elected to contract with private management companies
to manage the new HOPE VI-funded redevelopments. The integrative effect of such a
strategy highlights policymakers' intentions to integrate public housing environments
into a society largely composed of private landlords. Therefore private management
provides low-income residents with a means to "fit in" with the majority of urban
dwellers.
The private management approach assumes that the Authority will retain total
ownership of the development, while the management firm acts as the management
arm of the Authority. In spite of the developments' tactics for income mixing, every
resident -- public housing tenants and homeowners -- benefit from services funded by
the operating budget.
Other Authorities have opted to transfer all management responsibilities to the tenants
who are encouraged to form a Resident Corporation. Most agree that involving
residents in managing their environment has many potential benefits. It is also
recognized that in order for this type of management structure to work, a strong
capacity-building program must support residents and provide them with the training
needed to successfully assume and carry out an this responsibility their own.
In either case, the transfer of responsibility from the Authority to the private
management entity and/or the Resident Corporation is not achieved overnight. All
HOPE VI grantees have proposed that a strategy take into account all revitalization and
responsibility transfer phases -- from pre-redevelopment management, to construction
management and long-term (post-redevelopment) administration.
To facilitate the transfer from Authority-managed to residents- or privately-managed
models, most plans suggest that certain restricting tenancy mechanisms be revised,
mainly the enforcing of ceiling rents and the creation of site-based waiting lists. Current
HUD policy permits rent increases on the base of income levels, so that residents
earning more have no incentive to stay put. Current policy also favors the creation of
Authority-wide waiting lists which limit future residents' choice of where they want to live.
Revisions would allow the creation of ceiling rents so that residents choose to stay and
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invest their disposable income into the broader community. Site-based waiting lists are
said to inspire future residents who choose to live in a specific community to socially
and financially invest more in that environment. HUD policies about rent increases and
site selection are thought to go against the integrating philosophy of the HOPE VI
program which is largely based on the capacity of redeveloped sites to attract residents
of different income tiers and become "communities of choice".
3.3 - Conclusions: Integration Levels
In summary, nationwide efforts to create integrated public housing developments have
yielded three broad types of strategies. These types are founded on the degree of
integrative values embedded in the redevelopment strategies, and are summarized
below:
Type 1: Complete Integration of Project with Neighborhood
Developments belonging to this category have included more convincing connective
and integrative elements in their plans.
Atlanta: One of the few developments to adopt a rehabilitation scheme for historically-
valued structures, the new Centennial Place offers strong indication of physical
integration. The re-created street/block network is at the base of the strategy, even
though that network had to compose with the harsh presence of an adjacent highway.
Boston: As will be further examined in Chapter 5, the re-creation of a street/block
system for Mission Main contributes to reversing the cycle of physical isolation which
has historically characterized the site. The location of a community facility at the edge of
the site also promotes physical and social integration.
Camden: In spite of the creation of a zipper edge along one of its edge, McGuire
Gardens has adopted a street/block pattern which promotes physical links with the
surrounding neighborhoods. There is also an intent to extend the greening of local
streets toward the edge and create a portal of entry to the site.
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Chicago: The Cabrini Extension, according to the still diagrammatic plans, will become
an integral part of a large neighborhood re-structured by streets, a town center and an
extensive system of green spaces.
Indianapolis: Both Concord and Eaglecreek have adopted low density types to mirror
what existed around the sites' edges.
New Haven: The redeveloped site has also replicated a street/block pattern echoing
existing conditions found around the site. The location of community facilities aims at
blurring the site's southern border.
Seattle: The main integrative effort at Holly Park is centered on the re-structuring of the
street network and on the adoption of low-density housing types. The linear park
created alone the transmission line also acts as a structuring spine linking the site to the
adjoining neighborhoods.
San Francisco: At North Beach, the main intent is to create mixed-use site borders that
blur the differentiation between development and neighborhood.
All developments belonging to this type have adopted, as their most integrative strategy,
a street/block network which replicates subdivision patterns found in surrounding
neighborhoods. Most have elected to locate community facilities at the edge of the sites
to promulgate some inter-mingling of development and neighborhood populations. All
of these sites (except Chicago and San Francisco) have "integrated" harsh, adjacent
man-made barriers, either by transferring them into civic assets (the New Haven and
Seattle linear parks); or by concentrating linking devices away from them.
Type 2: "Ambivalent" Integrative Strategies
Developments included in this category have adopted strategies that somewhat hinder
more complete physical and social integration. In Cleveland, for instance, the
delineation of "Villages" or sub-neighborhoods indicates a preference for clustering
residents within large blocks un-penetrated by streets. That strategy is similar to that of
Detroit's where Villages of like-minded groups are delineated by different architectural
typologies. Villages, in these two strategies, are surrounded by high fences signaling a
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differentiation of population and image. In Charlotte, complete integration is somewhat
hindered by the creation of a strongly defined town center which presents a
morphological anomaly when compared to the rest of the city's organization. The
presence of the town center, in spite of its powerful symbolic value for social interaction
and identification, however contributes to create a development turned towards its own
center rather than towards the edges. In New Orleans, centrality is also a strategy which
contributes to orienting the development inwards. In New York, no new streets have
been added to permeate the strongly defined edges.
Type 3: "Anti" -Integrative Strategies
Results have showed that Baltimore and Houston have presented the strongest devices
to perpetuate the differentiation of low-income communities from their surrounding
neighborhoods. In spite of the creation of numerous streets, the Baltimore example has
opted for a site configuration focused on a highly centralized and specialized "circle".
This centrality incurs anomalies like housing structures (along Colvin Street) that have
vulnerable back yards abutting a high perimeter fence. In Houston, a clear intent to
create a gated community has hindered the creation of a publicly-accessed network of
streets, as well as the re-structuring of a mixed-use southern border to face the adjacent
neighborhood.
This last section has highlighted how the "value" of integration translates into
revitalization strategies that range from the most to the least "integrative". While this
chapter has focused on analyzing proposed "solutions" to isolation, Chapter 4 aims to
emphasize the roots of the problem integrative schemes seek to remedy.
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CHAPTER 4: THE PROCESS OF ISOLATION: THE CASE OF MISSION MAIN
"Rightly to estimate the present, we must invoke the past, of which we ourselves are the product,
and its study cannot fail to teach us the importance of perpetuating those elements of true
greatness in New England character bequeathed to us by our Puritan ancestry, and in which their
descendants take a justifiable pride."
Francis Drake (1878).
"I pray you let us satisfy our eyes
with the memorials and the things of fame
that do renown this city."
Shakespeare
The following two chapters form the second part of the dissertation. They are intended as a
detailed study of an "isolation to integration" example, the case of Boston's Mission Main.
Chapter 4 appears in this section of the thesis for one basic reason: so far, research has
focused on the desirability to import values of integration into redevelopment. This chapter
intends to qualify this assertion of desirability and posit that the need to know about the
roots of isolation is equally important. The following analysis shows how deeply embedded
isolation has been in one specific case, in order to better understand, in Chapter 5, the
integrative countermeasures proposed for Mission Main's redevelopment.
Chapter 4 explores two assertions that: 1) the isolation of public housing can long precede
its construction and can continue long after the development is built. And 2) the dynamic of
pre- and post-public housing isolation is part of a broad and complex process of
morphological transformation imposed "from without" by a variety of forces.
4.1 - Introduction: Morphogenesis
Retracing the morphogenesis of an urban neighborhood implies the systematic study of
factors of "change" encoded in the form of the built environment. The "manifestation" of
morphological change is caused by various agents that instill a dynamic of urban
transformation. Change is thus understood as a legible morphological phenomenon in
the context of the city's evolution cycles and trends. A morphogenesis methodologically
identifies the agents involved in the transformation of built environments and examines
their physical and socio-economic impact.
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In the case of public housing environments, the idea of morphological change is closely
related to the idea of deterioration and isolation. The genesis of project isolation has
been well documented but often constrained within the geo-political bounds of the site.
One of this dissertation's goals is to document the morphological genesis of one
specific case -- Mission Main -- not as a delineated project, but as part of a larger
morphological system (the neighborhood) which has evolved since the earliest days of
colonization. The morphogenesis method aims to make clear the process of
deterioration which takes root not only within the Mission Main community, but also in
its surrounding Mission Hill neighborhood. The morphological genesis of isolation has
so far had little incidence in the HOPE VI discourse, even though integration strategies
are presented as "remedies" to reverse isolating conditions.
The morphogenesis method reveals cyclical patterns of evolution -- and isolation --
throughout the history of neighborhood development. In the Mission Main case, the
objective is to highlight which reasons and agents are responsible for the isolation of
Mission Main from the rest of Mission Hill. The analysis points to clues as varied as
topography, policy, cultural values and economic erosion. No matter how long and
detailed the list of "reasons", the main interest of such an inquiry is to ultimately explain
why isolation occurred in the first place. Is the "project" itself responsible for its own
isolation from the rest of the neighborhood? Or is the project just another agent, part of
a larger system of deterioration? Does isolation stem from within Mission Main or from
without ?
The next section (4.2) identifies, studies and illustrates the main agents at play in the
transformation of Mission Hill and Mission Main, through successive development
periods and at different scales of transformation. Section 4.3 explains and shows how
specific morphological elements -- streets, blocks, lots and architectural types --
registered change in the immediate edge of the Mission Main site. This last section
speculates about the effect of Mission Main's construction on the overall pattern of late
19 and 20th century neighborhood change.
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4.2 - Morphoqenesis: Agents of Transformation and Isolation
The morphological portrait of the Mission Hill neighborhood contains visible manifestations
of isolation. These isolating factors are part of a pre- and post-public housing
transformation process. They have contributed, over the years, to the separation, isolation
and deterioration of the Mission Main development along with historically-significant
Roxbury, which is today perceived as a no man's land (Fig. 4.1).
Belowe
Fig. 4.1 - Diagram Showinq The Location Of Current
Barriers Alonq Mission Main's Edges
The most important isolating factors are: 1) a mostly vacant strip of industrial land uses
(inherited from a chronologically- and geographically-determined pattern of income
distribution) immediately adjacent to Mission Main's east border; 2) a barrier formed by
Huntington Avenue, a major thoroughfare brushing Mission Main's west border and
marking the separation between a prosperous institutional area and a distressed "project";
3) the Boston-Providence railway line, a 19t century corridor that crated a trench in the
middle of Roxbury; 4) a barrier formed by the SouthWest Corridor, which runs along the old
Boston-Providence line and severs connections between Mission Main and the rest of
Roxbury; and 5) monolithic institutional areas constituting three of Mission Main's edges
and impeding connections with the rest of the urban fabric.
Section 4.2 highlights the origins of these external forces and explains how they have
successively imposed a pattern of physical and social isolation on the Mission Hill
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neighborhood, both before and after Mission Main was built. Parts one and two (i.e. pre-
and post-public housing origins of isolation) include a brief history of the early formation of
Roxbury in order to show how a mentality of isolation was slowly forged by a topography of
separateness. They also include an overview of the context for public housing
implementation (Table 4.1).
- Introduction: Toporaphy of Separateness
Factors of Pre-Public . Factor 1: Topography of Incomes
Housing Isolation - Factor 2: Huntington Avenue Barrier
= Factor 3: 19e Century Railway Line
E Introduction: Slum Clearance
Factors of Post-Public . Factor 4: SouthWest Corridor Barrier
Housing Isolation - Factor 5: Institutional Encroachment
Table 4.1- Isolation Agents (Pre- and Post-Public Housing
Construction)
4.2.1 - Pre- Public Housing Stages of Isolation
4.2.1.1 - Introduction: The Topography of Separateness
Roxbury, one of Boston's oldest neighborhoods, is located southwest of downtown Boston
and is today roughly bordered by the Fens and the Back Bay (to the north); Jamaica Plain
and West Roxbury (to the west); South Boston and the South End (to the east); as well as
Dorchester and the Harbor (to the south) (Fig. 4.2).
Do to
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Fig. 4.2 - Location Map: Roxbury, Mission Hill And
Mission Main in the Boston Context
In colonial times, the Roxbury settlement was almost completely severed from Boston by
the Harbor. The only connection between both towns (one a waterfront settlement, the
other a Peninsula) was a thin strip of land called the "Neck" (Fig. 4.3). Thus Roxbury was
located just outside Boston's easily defendable door, on hilly and marshy land that for the
next two centuries would remain topographically isolated.
Fig. 4.3 - Ancient Maps Showing The Neck (18th Century (Harvard Pusey Library)
Roxbury' was settled in 1630 when John Winthrop, the first governor of Massachusetts,
came over from England aboard the Arbella with his fellow Puritans.2 The first settlement
was established west of the Boston Harbor, in a region that is part of today's Roxbury. As
soon as 1632, the first meetinghouse was erected on Meeting House Hill3, the elevation
bordered by Dudley street4 (Fig. 4.4). As early settlers were instructed not to build dwellings
The name Roxbury is a distortion of "Rocksbury' (or "Rochebury" in French documents), an appellation mentioned early on in
colonists' accounts sent to England. A striking feature of Roxbury's natural landscape was the pudding-stone, a unique geological
formation; hence the name.
2 The Massachusetts Bay Company was created in 1629 and empowered English Puritans with territorial and governmental rights. The
Arbella was one of eleven vessels bound for the Colonies which left England on an exodus referred to as the Great Migration (Reps,
1969: 119). The first Roxbury settlers who accompanied Winthrop came mostly from London and from a village some twenty miles east of a
city called Nanzig. In England, they had been prosperous farmers whose names were imprinted in the form of Roxbury's early settlement and
today resonate in the streetscape: Eliot, Ruggles, Curtis and Heath.
According to Drake (1878:10) the town's Puritan fathers imported a model of English architecture to characterize the form of the new
settlement and buildings like the first church or meetinghouse. Reps (1969: 128) confirms that the scale, materials and architectural
typologies of European models were imported to the colonies although they were modified to meet the new environment.
4 In his seminal account of Roxbury's history, Francis Drake points out that "no distinct traces of aboriginal occupation have ever been observed
in Roxbury", nor any remnant (material or name) to mark features of the landscape. Indeed, the native right to the territory of Roxbury was sold in
1686 by the descendent of the great Sachem of Massachusetts to Joseph Dudley and William Stoughton for some $50 (Bacon, 1919:4). The
amount presumably refers to the dollar value of the 191 Os.
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farther than a one-half mile radius from the meetinghouse (Drake, 1878: 282), the first and
oldest node of settlement in Roxbury grew outwards, along the spine of Roxbury street, and
in an area bordered by Dudley, Columbus and Putnam streets, and Shawmut avenue.
A --
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Fig. 4.4 - Eighteenth Century Depiction of Roxbury's Town Center on
Meetinghouse Hill (Boston Athenaeum)
The portrait of Roxbury's first settlement corresponds with that of other 17t' century New
England villages.5 It comprised the compact node of dwellings, the meetinghouse and the
militia's training field, around which radiated the agricultural fields.6 Roxbury neither offered
a linear pattern - where a single street formed he spine of the settlement - nor a squared
pattern - where a gridiron of street centers on a square of common (Reps, 1969: 126). As a
"gate" town located at the juncture of all roads leading to Boston, the form of Roxbury rather
resulted in an organic hybrid of both traditional types. The topography of the hilly and
marshy waterfront also imposed irregularities to the overall planning of the village, traces of
which remain in the fabric of streets (Fig. 4.5).
5 Early descriptions of Roxbury in the 163CYs and 165's paint a pretty portrait of a settlement with "pleasant springs issuing forth the rocky hills",
"good fruit trees", "fruitful fields and gardens". Settlers' accounts describe a prosperous 1650's town of 120 dwellings settled onto large streets
(Drake, 1878: 45).
6 Roxbury's military history boasts an active role in the Indian and colonial wars, as well as in the revolutionary battles. The first
Company of Minute men raised in America came from Roxbury in 1775 and with other companies, they distinguished themselves in
the battle of Lexington (Bacon,1919:5).
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From the early days of the Puritan settlement to the first quarter of the 191h century, the
system of streets was the main structuring agent of Roxbury's growth. A somewhat rigorous
system of streets and large homesteads was created and subsequently lent itself to future
house lot subdivisions (Warner, 1962: 37).
Within its first one and a half century since foundation, Roxbury slowly grew along a 'T"-
shaped spine. The East-West axes of this "T' formed the only link between the western
settlements of Dedham, Dorchester and Cambridge with Boston and its harbor. This link
was known as "The Neck", i.e. a thin strip of marsh land, one mile long, that connected
Boston Harbor to the rest of the mainland around Massachusetts Bay. Roxbury was
strategically located at the mouth of this only road to Boston, acting as a vital gateway to
trade and urban activity. The Neck was an important variable in the genesis of Roxbury. Its
trace, marked by the perennial presence of Washington street 7, remains legible in today's
urbanscape. The Neck provided Boston with a natural barrier which today translates into
the distinction between Roxbury's and the rest of Boston's urban characters.
7 Washington, previously Orange street, got its name in remembrance of George Washington's passage through Roxbury in 1789. So
vital was this axis of development that it once grew into a forty-four mile long highway of the same name originating in Boston and ending in
Providence, "perhaps the longest in the world. Along Washington street, the Neck has always been characterized by bustling activity. It was the
site of gallows and busy tavems. The Neck was also a rendez-vous point for selling and buying alcohol during the intemperance days of the late
18 century (Drake, 1878: 65, 258).
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At the confluence of Washington street and Roxbury's other main north/south axis fanned
the roads to Dorchester (Eustis street), to Plymouth (Warren street) and to Cambridge
(Tremont Street) (Fig. 4.6). This point of convergence was roughly located at Roxbury
Crossing, near Eliot Square, so named in remembrance of the influential religious leader
and missionary.
First ment n of t e "Brindley Meadow"
bridge The Estate onto which the MM Site Is
Fig. 4.6 - Main Roads Fanninq From Roxbury's Center, 18m c. (Harvard Pusey Library)
In sum, the order of Roxbury's early development, which occurred along two orthogonal
axes (Washington and Roxbury streets), was catalyzed by two sets of transforming agents:
geographical - the natural topography of the waterfront; an social - imported European
models of land development. These two agents' influential presence was imprinted in the
form of the Neck and in the form of the typical inland village, thereby forming two major
nodes of development within a topography of separateness.
4.2.1.2 - Factor I - Topography of Incomes: Separating Suburb From Industrial Town
One of the most legible manifestations of Mission Main's isolation is found along the
eastern edge of the site where an industrial zone, now mostly vacant, has historically
separated that area of Mission Hill from the rest of Roxbury. This section explains the
origins of this isolating presence which combined the effects of topography and immigration
to form two socially and morphologically distinct areas: the country suburbs of the
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Highlands and the industrial town of Lower Roxbury.
The part of Mission Hill where Mission Main now stands has literally and figuratively
developed, throughout the 19 century, in the shadow of the hills. Above the poorer
segment of Lower Roxbury hovered the wealthier Highlands. A stark social and physical
contrast differentiated the top and the bottom of Parker Hill (Fig. 4.7). The Parker hilltop
housed government employees, firemen, streetcar drivers or Boston clerks in comfortable
houses. This air of prosperity was however not mirrored at the bottom of the hill - where
Mission Main now stands - even though the prosperous Mission Church stood there in all
its might (Woods & Kennedy, 1959:132).
Char untin ton Ave.
Tr
ighi nds
Limits of Roxbu
Fig. 4-7 - Diagram Showinq The Relationship
Between Lower Roxbury and the Highlands
At the turn of the 19th century, the town was visibly divided into two districts: Lower Roxbury,
between Dudley street and the South End; and the Roxbury Highlands, South of Dudley
street and comprising the "Hills" - Parker and Meetinghouse. While the Highlands acquired
the reputation of a country town made of large estates with elegant manor houses, Lower
Roxbury offered a more industrialized and "blue-collar" environment. And while most of the
Highlands estates belonged to generations of founding fathers' descendants and
comprised most of the residential stock, Lower Roxbury was home to a growing population
of mill workers and Irish immigrants settling in a fast growing environment.
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The Highlands comprise the oldest parts of Roxbury. The first node of settlement grew
roughly southward to cover adjacent hills and gently slope toward South Boston and
Jamaica Plain. These hills and slopes were subdivided into numerous estates and farms
that gradually quilted the countryside. In the 1840s and 1850s, Roxbury's marshes between
the Hills and the Neck, were the site Lower Roxbury and the Highlands of a budding industrial
center which grew from the handful of early colonial mills powered by the adjacent tides
(Fig. 4.8).
fiSq.--e
Pattern of Deveopment and Estates Boundarlies 118621
Fig. 4.8 - Diagram Showing the Quilt of Highlands and Lower Roxbury Estates,
with Location of Mission Main (Boston Athenaeum)
At the same time, property costs in Boston's peninsula were growing. Thus land across the
Neck soon became desirable both for the implementation of industry on the marshes, and
for the building of homes or country estates for the investing industrialists. This latter group
discovered in the Roxbury Highlands a seat for living a romantic country life while
181
remaining near Boston's business and cultural center. The suburban model was taking
form. In the next decades, Roxbury grew into a large satellite town settled by estate owners,
commuters to Boston and local industry workers. Roxbury's construction boom started soon
after the Civil War, lulled during the 1873 Depression and took off again with even more
force in the 1890s. The first phase of the boom coincided with the momentous
implementation of the first streetcar railway line along the ancient trace of Washington
street, from the center of Boston to today's Roxbury Crossing (Figs. 4.9, 10, 11).
During the last third of the 19th century, Roxbury was the scene of a substantial suburban
construction boom that was fuelled by a consensual building effort of thousands of
individuals, in conjunction with large utility companies and municipal institutions (such as
transit authorities or water boards). Very few building codes or policies existed at that time
to constrain planning and architectural typologies (Warner, 1962: 37). The main actors of
this transformation - from quilt of country farms to satellite of estates and suburban plots --
were a growing labor pool made of the groups which had traditionally supplied New
England with its immigrant population for the past two hundred years: the German and
German Jews, the Irish and the French Canadian Catholics. Within the Roxbury Highlands,
the prevalent housing model was the detached one-family triple-decker wood construction.
These structures were of generous proportions, heavily ornamented and built close to the
street line on rectangular lots. This model was also used in more dense environments (such
as Lower Roxbury) and perpetuated well into the 20th century. It continues to characterize
large residential parts of contemporary Roxbury districts such as Mission Hill.
The results of this development boom was a town which limits were well defined against
surrounding environments: the Back Bay, the Muddy River swamps, Dorchester, South
Boston and the Bay. The street pattern was part of an independent, self-sufficient network
that grew outwards from the 17th century settlement node. The legible exceptions to this
system were two connecting spines: Tremont street (linking Roxbury to Dorchester and
Brookline), and Washington street (linking Boston to Jamaica Plain and West Roxbury).
Other significant paths included Warren and Dudley streets. Their trace as main axes of
development remains legible in spite of the complex network of streets and blocks
superimposed onto the ancient estates grid (Fig. 4.12).
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Fig. 4.9 - Typical Highlands House: Wooden Triplex, omemented, Front Porch, Planted Yard(Boston Athenaeum, 1902).
Fig. 4.10 - Typical Hiqilands House (Boston Athenaeum, 1902)
Fig. 4.11 - Atop Parker hill: View of Lower Roxbury Triplexes Creeping up the Hill from
Tremont St. (Boston Athenaeum, 1900)
One of the largest Roxbury Highlands estates belonged to merchant John Parker whose
land, covering the whole of what we know today as Parker Hill, was acquired in 1752 when
his father married into the founding Ruggles family. In the 17t century, the Puritans called
the Parker Hilltop the "Great Hill" because it hovered some 219 feet above the marshes of
the Back Bay and the Stony Brook. Parker Hill has been called "the balcony of Boston" by
local historians, and prominently figures on today's list of Boston's Urban Wilds.8
Fig. 4.12 -Roxbury's Main Development Axes Amidst the Dense Fabric of Streets, 1898
(Harvard Pusey Library)
Throughout the 18th century, the Parker Hill slopes were used as pasture and apple
orchards. In 1873, the barren summit was elected the site for a reservoir in order to cater to
the needs of the growing population. After that, the country life character of the land
enjoyed by the Parker squires was permanently altered by the industrial revolution and
immigrant workers crowding the flats below. In 1884, the last Parker landlord sold the
estate to a developer for subdivision and residential construction. The first houses were
built along the older streets, Parker Hill Avenue (1877) and Fisher Avenue (1868), but the
8 The Boston National Areas Fund has designated three Urban Wilds sites in the Mission Hill district: The Parker Hilltop (one of the
twelve most important urban wilds city-wide), the Harvard Quarry on Calumet street, and Allegheney (MHG, 1993 (4)).
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steep grades and the creeping up of industrial uses (along the Stony Brook Valley)
rendered full-scale development difficult. Thus the hilltop remained farmland well into the
20 century.
At the bottom of the Parker Hill estate sprawled the Brindley estate which gently sloped
toward the Back Bay marshes. The property was roughly bounded by Tremont and Parker
streets, all the way to Huntington avenue (Fig. 4.13). The wealthy Brindley family built a
mansion in 1732 fronting Tremont street at the corner of St-Alphonsus, where the Mission
Hill Church now stands. The house, known as Datchett House, was a vast gamble-roofed
wooden house, H-shaped, and containing some forty rooms. In the 18th century, the
Brindley estate was acquired by the Dearbornl" family, who established the grounds as a
"Gentleman's Farm" of gardens and orchards. As mayor, Dearborn was instrumental in
transforming the rural town of Roxbury into the City of Roxbury (1847). He was also
influential in expanding a street network that branched away from the single narrow
Roxbury street to include Warren, Walnut, Dudley and Tremont streets. By 1890, the
Dearborn estate had been subdivided into many blocks defined by Tremont, Faxon, Smith,
Parker, Phillips, Conant, Oregon and Ward streets; as well as Longwood avenue and a few
residential cul-de-sac "courts". These streets, courts and blocks today lay underneath the
Mission Main public housing development, present only in names.
9 In 1912, the Boston Water Department and the City Council had plans to create a community swimming pool and bathhouse on the site of the
no longer needed reservoir. The project was never built. Instead, the Brigham Hospital Trustees built a complex of four Georgian Revival
buildings adjacent to the reservoir and which presented, in 1914 as today, a stark contrast with the climbing developments of wooden triple
deckers creeping up the slopes of Parker Hill (MHG, 1993: May). The rest of the land owned by the City was graded into terraces and turned
into playgrounds and an athletic field, as well as into walks and steps off Fisher Avenue.
10 Henry Dearborn was a founding member of the Massachusetts Horticultural Society (1831) and was involved in the planning of Mount
Auburn Cemetery in Cambridge, as well as Roxbury's Forest Hill Cemetery.
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Fig. 4.13 - Location of the Brindley Meadow -Site of the Datchett House and
Future Mission Main (Harvard Pusey Library)
While the Highlands enjoyed a much different atmosphere with their middle class houses
interspersed by stately houses, Lower Roxbury" was home to the poorer segment of the
industrial workforce. Warner (1962) explains that the geographical manifestation of a
segregation by income patterns coincides with Roxbury's chronology of development. Thus
the Highlands were more densely settled first by estate owners and consequently entered
the suburbanization phase earlier. In contrast, Lower Roxbury developed its marsh plains
later, after the implementation of a diverse array of industries: breweries, foundries, textile
mills, rope walks, piano works, clock companies and lumber yards. Lower Roxbury was
further subdivided into two industrial sub-zones. Zone 1 was delineated by Dudley street
and the Boston line, and formed a continuous industrial belt with the South End and the
South Boston areas. Zone 2 followed the Roxbury Crossing valley of the Stony Brook
where breweries and tanneries were concentrated, and formed another belt with West
Roxbury (Fig. 4.14).
The part of Lower Roxbury known as Mission Hill refers to the gently sloping hill, below Parker, upon which sits the Mission Church, hence the
name. The Mission Main development is part of the Mission Hill neighborhood, even though it is located in the plains below.
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Fig. 4.14 -Lower Roxbury's Two Industrial Zones
The poorest workers who lived in Lower Roxbury were mostly Irish. Between 1830 and
1860, many mill workers' wooden rowhouses were constructed near the factories, in both
zones 1 and 2. By 1870, Lower Roxbury had already turned into a drab and shoddy area
which gained the reputation of being the slum section of Boston's oldest western suburbs.
The poor Irish workers were, at the turn of the century, the heirs apparent to this whole
decaying district, which included the Mission Main area (Warner: 40-2) (Figs. 4.15, 16).
"(...) The Ward between the railroad and Huntington Ave. (...) is inhabited by brewery workers, city
employees and factory hands, some of whom are no doubt held there by the proximity of the Mission Church.
It is nevertheless one of the most squalid sections of Roxbury; and the facts as to conditions of health, housing
and economic status of its population lend emphasis to the statement"(Woods & Kennedy, 1959: 131).
Meanwhile, the Roxbury Highlands, overlooking the poverty plains, remained secured
enclaves of larger lots and houses for the upper-income segments of the population.
According to Warner, Roxbury's pattern of geographical segregation by income levels
followed suburban Boston's broader growth model. This model is explained by a system of
"bands" radiating from Boston's center and populated by different income groups that
homogeneously congregate in the same areas. The band that includes Lower Roxbury
(and the Mission Main site) includes the lowest income segment of Boston's suburban
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Fig. 4.15 - Typical Lower Roxbury House: No Omamentation, Weathered Materials, No Porch(Boston Athenaeum, 1915)
~4d
Fig. 4.16 - Typical Lower Roxbury House (Boston Athenaeum, 1915)
population at the end of the 1 9 century. This group mainly comprised Irish industry
workers who lived in narrow wooden houses of two or three stories, or in small rental units
(Warner, 1962: 65).The richest people, meanwhile, tended to migrate to the outward most
bands into suburbs served by the ever expanding streetcar service (Fig. 4.17).
Mission Main
Sited in Warnes "ad of
rMiddle Class"
Fig. 4.17 -Wamer's System of Locating Income Bands
in Boston's Expandinq Westem Suburbs (1962)
Even if its housing stock was mainly made of cheaply built wooden triple deckers, Lower
Roxbury offered a residential environment that was a step up from the housing conditions
immigrants left behind in Boston's tenements. The triple deckers incorporated diluted
elements of the romanticized rural ideal: the front and back porches, the small semi-private
backyard, the occasionally tree-lined sidewalks. Warner notes that the need to externalize
a rural ideal was a common thread linking all of the income segments' building trends.
Lower Roxbury offered, at the beginning of the 20th century, a homogeneous streetscape of
densely built urban blocks, not unlike the homogeneous rowhouse environments of old
Boston. The sheer number of lower-income residents caused unfettered densification,
higher land prices and lowered housing standards. This tendency to build quickly and
cheaply on land that was densely subdivided for maximum profit proved to be, according to
Warner, the very seed for this section of Mission Hill's subsequent downfall and
deterioration. Developing and constructing methods of the 1870s prompted the
implementation of affordable residential types that quickly became inflexible in the face of
change. They soon became obsolete. This part of Mission Hill destined to become Mission
Main was built as a low-income environment of inherent destructive qualities which would
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soon be tagged, and remain so throughout the 20t century, the slum of Roxbury.
This section has shown that isolation occurred in 1wo stages that can be separated out
chronologically - the genesis of the Highlands and Lower Roxbury happened consecutively
and separately for two population groups; and geographically - the "upper" and "lower"
areas were characterized by two distinct landscapes of buildings and uses. With the
disappearance of the Lower Roxbury mills and breweries in the 1950s and 1960s, the
coarse-grained industrial fabric inherited from the industrialization period (i.e. large parcels
and structures; see section 4.3) came to form a barrier of vacant land along one of Mission
Mains' more impenetrable and deteriorated edges.
4.2.1.3 - Factor 2 - The Huntington Avenue Barrier
A century after its westward expansion in the 1880s, Huntington Avenue has become one
of the most important arteries slicing Roxbury into two distinct parts: the institutional area to
the north (the Longwood Medical Area); and the residential area to the south (the Mission
Hill neighborhood and Mission Main development). Today, the physical distinctness of
these two parts serves to accentuate the socio-economic isolation of the project. Its mostly
unemployed residents live worlds apart from their prosperous neighbors across the avenue.
Originally, Huntington was implemented at an angle from the rest of Back Bay's grid of
streets, in "one of those awkward spots" on the marshy plains of the Muddy River
(Whitehill: 172). Today, Huntington avenue acts as one major catalyst of development of
Mission Hill and Mission Main, and as a barrage which refrains the expansion of its
powerful neighbor.
The story of Huntington avenue's implementation was influenced by three topographic
variables that defined Boston's westward expansion: the creation of the Mill Dam; the
introduction of the railroad system in the 1830s; and the migration towards Back Bay and
Roxbury.
The part of Huntington avenue that most concerns the development of the Mission Hill neighborhood is this diagonal which links
Massachusetts avenue to Tremont street, at the Brigham Circle.
188
The creation of the Mill Dam across the Back Bay was "to change the shape of Boston
more completely than any other single undertaking in its history" (Whitehill: 88). The Mill
Dam was built to provide waterpower for the mills, many of which were located in Roxbury.
This ambitious venture was notably opposed by the citizens of Roxbury who deplored that
the "wet" basin and shipping docks could not serve Lower Roxbury's industries. Morever,
the citizens of Boston dreaded the replacement of a beloved shore line west of the
Peninsula by nauseous marshes (Whitehill: 89-90). A large basin was nevertheless built
and subdivided by a perpendicular secondary dam (now Massachusetts avenue) that
linked the main dam to Roxbury's Gravelly Point. All the mills13 (flour, paints and dyes, and
iron foundries) were located along this secondary dam, within Roxbury's town limit. The
creating of the Back Bay basin thus provided Boston with its second physical link with the
west (Western avenue, now Beacon street), another major artery which apart from
Washington street, made Roxbury an important part of Boston's westward development.
The effect of this reinforced link between Boston and Roxbury served to accentuate the
westward migration of mill workers toward Lower Roxbury, and especially in the area which
would later become Mission Main.
After Olmsted's plans for the expansion of Back Bay's development were implemented in
the 1880s, a westward migration movement transformed the form of Boston's satellite
towns. The migration impetus concerned two main protagonist groups: the dwellers and the
institutions.
A residential migration process was initiated when old neighborhoods such as the North
End became increasingly crowded, especially with immigrant populations. The Irish, by the
1850s, formed a homogeneously settled group of 50,000 housed in increasingly
deteriorating tenements. According to historians, rising property values enticed absentee
landlords to not maintain their buildings, thus catalyzing the gravitation of poor and low-
skilled immigrants into sub-standard dwellings downtown. "In this transition originated the
Boston slums, precisely the housing the Irish needed" (Whitehill: 94). In the 1890s, the Irish
left the North End tenements and moved west toward the mill jobs in Lower Roxbury, which
offered a promise of better, cheaper housing. The "suburb" of Roxbury offered a low-
income version of the Parisian-like Back Bay. The Roxbury section that would be dissected
13 Ibid.: 100. The mills were developed by the Boston and Roxbury Mill Corporation which would later split up (in the 1830s) to make
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by Huntington avenue and welcome Mission Main was, in the 1880s, an unsavory
sedimentation basin for all the sewers of Roxbury. Whitehill describes the area as a
"Stygian morass" made of "the foulest marsh and muddy flats to be found anywhere in
Massachusetts without a single attractive feature... a place that no one will go within a half
mile of in the summer time unless absolutely necessary, so great a stench was there." The
early reputation of that part of Roxbury also suffered from the presence of the railroad
companies' yards, prominently sited between Boylston street (the southernmost limit of the
Back Bay) and the ever expanding Huntington avenue (the easternmost limit of Roxbury).
The train tracks came to create "an impenetrable barrier [...] that has to this day strong
psychological and social as well as physical connotations" (Whitehill: 178).
The institutional migration phase was initiated in 1881 when the Massachusetts Charitable
Mechanic Association built the first of the Huntington Avenue institution, west of
Massachusetts Avenue. Before that, a development impetus was provided by the
implementation of new streets like St-Botolph, which ran between Huntington and the
Boston-Providence rail line. The lots were sold at auction by a development company, the
Trustees of Huntington Avenue Lands, and transformed the Huntington spine into a very
desirable address for "French flats" apartment buildings. The Back Bay atmosphere of
European streets was coming to Roxbury via the extending Huntington Avenue. In 1900,
the prestigious architectural firm of McKim, Mead and White designed a new home for
Boston's Symphony Orchestra on the corner of Massachusetts Avenue. The same year, the
Massachusetts Horticultural Society moved its operations to the new Hall sited across the
Symphony, on Huntington Avenue. In 1902, the New England Conservatory of Music
opened the doors of their new building located on the corner of Huntington and
Gainsborough street. Diagonally across, the Boston Opera House (demolished in 1958)
also chose a Roxbury address. On the other (eastern) side of Mass. avenue (on the actual
site of Christian Science Church Center), Chikering and Sons built another music hall to
create a campus of prestigious institutions located at Roxbury's doors. The next phase of
Huntington's "institutionalization" was initiated when the Museum of Fine Arts, built, in
1907, new exhibition spaces on twelve acres of land between Huntington and the Fens.
Harvard Medical School went further west to implement new teaching facilities on
Longwood Avenue, the future spine of a large campus of medical institutions. Northeastern
place for the Boston Water Power Company.
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University opened in 1938, its campus bordered by Forsyth street, the avenue and the rail
yards. Then Wentworth Institute of Technology also opened, in 1873, a new college
campus which would become the closest institutional neighbor of the Mission Main
community.
Overall, the development of Huntington Avenue into an institutional spine was not planned
as a homogeneous undertaking, but was rather born out of the "haphazard placing of
important institutions on meager sites" with no relation to one another (Whitehill: 193).
Huntington avenue has suffered from the deteriorating and isolating effect of the large tract
of the Boston-Providence railroad yards, which physically and psychologically cut off
Roxbury from Boston, an isolating factor explained in a following section.
4.2.1.4 - Factor 3 - The 19th Century Railway Line
The introduction of the railroad system proved another important variable in Roxbury's
transformation. Railroad lines appeared in the Roxbury landscape in the 1830s: the
Boston and Worcester Railroad and the Boston and Providence Railroad, which ran
diagonally through Roxbury. Their imposing presence in the landscape of the Mill Dam
basin, just north of Roxbury, created water flow problems for the mills and led to the
filling of the entire area -- now the Back Bay -- and the widening of the Neck. In fact,
"the routes followed by these railway lines have materially affected the street plans of
the South End, [the] Back Bay [and Roxbury] districts as we know them today"
(Whitehill: 102). The trace of Huntington avenue was directly influenced by the
presence of the Boston and Providence railroad. Originating at Copley Square in 1875,
the first of Huntington's development phase towards Roxbury followed a southwest
diagonal parallel to the train tracks. Then it suddenly changed direction, west of
Massachusetts avenue, at Camden street (now Gainsborough). The intent was to link
Massachusetts avenue to the Brookline section of Tremont street at Brigham Circle
near the Mission Main housing development. This second phase of Huntington
avenue's development -- an extension from Camden to Parker street -- occurred in
1881 after the Massachusetts Charitable Mechanics Association decided to build an
exhibition hall. They pressured the Board of Street Commissioners who was reticent to
buy Roxbury estates for a new avenue's right of way. The third phase of Huntington's
14 Minutes, Board of Street Commissioners. Aug. 23, 1880.
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Fig. 4.18 - Map of the Back Bay Fens Showing Huntington Avenue, 1911(Harvard's Pusey Library)
extension was again triggered by another petition of the Mechanic's Institute. The group
this time asked for a extension from Parker to Tremont at the corner of Francis5 street. The
new street segment was sanctioned by the Street Commissioners on December 1882.
At roughly the same time Huntington avenue was becoming the central axis of Boston's
westward development, Frederic Law Olmsted was re-inventing the Muddy River contours
to transform them into the well-irrigated Back Bay Fens (Whitehill: 180)." The trace of
Huntington avenue, west of Massachusetts Ave., was influenced by Olmsted's solution to
Back Bay's western expansion of its street grid: the extension frames the south side of the
Fens, in a parallel line with Beacon street. The result is a superimposed order of the Back
Bay kind onto the older Roxbury system of streets, which in that area is orthogonal to the
ancient trace of Tremont street. The street grid that now lies underneath Mission Main is
thus influenced by the direction of the Tremont path (Fig. 4.18).
Huntington Avenu
S et
Fig. 4.19 -Diagram of the Huntington / Tremont
/ Rail Lines Trianquiation
The new Huntington segment was located where it was (i.e. almost adjacent to Mission
Main) because the grade of the marshy land was almost flat. The result was the creation of
a triangular section of Roxbury land that has since been strongly defined by Tremont,
Huntington and the train tracks (Fig. 4.19). Thus ever since the implementation of the
Huntington avenue, the area to welcome Mission Main has been "boxed in" a triangular
15 Minutes, Board of Street Commissioners. Feb. 20, 1882.
16 As part of the Fens system of park design, Olmsted had also deviated Commonwealth Avenue so that its extension would not collide
with the Boston and Worcester line at an odd angle.
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zone bounded by man-made barriers which continue to have an isolating influence on the
site.
4.2.2 - Post-Public Housing Isolation
4.2.2.1 - Introduction: Slum Clearance and Public Housing
"Life in a well-designed and well-managed public housing project is no more like life in a slum than an
automobile is like an ox-cart or a fluorescent tube is like a tallow candle."
"A housing project is a landscaped neighborhood of park like appearance with assured permanency of
character."
Nathan Straus (1944)
To better understand the origins of isolation in the post-public housing era, this section
explains the context for the implementation of Mission Main. It especially focuses on the
impact slum clearance has had on and around the development, thereby making public
housing the main catalyst for present-day isolation.
The clearing of the "Irish shanties" on the Mission Main site occurred in times of acute
social shifts. Ever since public housing policy graduated from the realm of emergency
measures to become a decentralized program of slum clearance, the "submerged middle-
class" pressured the government to act on issues of substandard neighborhoods and the
social instability they festered (Vale, 1996: 311). When the Boston Housing Authority (BHA)
started to demolish mixed-use neighborhoods like Mission Hill, it obeying the 1937
legislative requirement for equivalent elimination by re-building single-use public housing
developments. Mission Main, a 1023-unit venture, was the second "project" built by the
BHA. Even though State and federal law sanctioned slum clearance as necessity, the
Mission Hill residents vociferously doubted the BHA's intentions. Neighborhood houses,
shops and industries were razed, as were the streets. The morphological fabric was
replaced by alien superblocks and bland apartment buildings.
News announcing the construction of a housing project in Mission Hill appeared on the first
page of the June 1939 Roxbury Citizen: "Authority Takes Seven-Block Area by Eminent
Domain". The article proceeded to describe the scope of the venture by announcing that:
"Seven blocks located within the area bounded by the Parker, Ward, St-Alphonsus and Smith
Streets, with land between Parker street at the one side and the Mission Hill playground and
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Dwight School on the other, comprise the territory affected. There are 328 structures on the
site, including 822 dwelling units occupied by 2500 persons. Approximately 18 acres,
exclusive of streets, were involved in the taking".
As soon as government announced its plans to site a low-income housing development in
their community, Roxbury residents were polarized by the decision. The Roxbury Civic
League and Improvement Society held meetings, in the Spring of 1939, to discuss the
Federal Housing Plan as it applied to Roxbury. The League wanted to make sure that the
new federal housing units would be made available to "the low-pay workman, the W.P.A.
worker [and] the relief man, those who really need a home" (RC, 1939: 4(19)). The Society
published an "Open Letter to Roxbury Residents", with a message centered on the dangers
of mass eviction. While the League affirmed its belief in government's provision of low-cost
housing, the manifesto denounced "un-American" tactics of seizing "law-abiding and honest
citizens' property, who "must step in and call a halt, lest our government beat even Hitler at
his game of property confiscation and inhuman cruelty" (RC, 1939: 6(7)). The League
instead suggested selective demolition, rehabilitation and open space creation to provide
"clean, happy neighborhoods". It advised government "to [go] onto some vacant property
and [build] their government tenements" (RC, 1939: 6 (7)).
At the time of Mission Main's construction, the slum clearance discourse was based upon
two conflicting ideas: 1) the government has the responsibility to stabilize real estate values
and tax structures by replacing slums with public housing; and 2) since low-income housing
perpetuates slum conditions, public housing should be decentralized and located on low-
cost vacant sites.17
The Roxbury Real Estate Board of Trade's vice-president, Samuel H. Hermanson, publicly
applauded the Mission Hill housing project as a fair solution to a city in bad need of
rejuvenation. The businessman accused reticent residents (and the Civic League) of
"selfishness" in demanding the incremental rehabilitation of their extant neighborhood: 'You
just can't fix one house at a time... you cannot keep one good apple in with a lot of bad
ones and hope to do business" (RC, 1939: 6(14)). His positive attitude toward the project is
typical of business people who view the reclamation of real estate, even by the
government, as the prime consideration in a housing program (Straus, 1944: 50).
Those who objected to siting public housing on vacant sites outside the city feared an "exodus to the suburbs" which would increase
tax difficulties in inner-cities (Straus, 1944:64). Post-War suburbanization happened in spite of public housing's siting policy.
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A 75-year old "patriarch of the Hill", A.J. Woods, also proposed that rehabilitation be the
basis of the housing program. The elderly gentlemen who at the time resided in a 104 year
old house on the soon-to-be razed site, objected to Hermanson and other outsiders'
"application of the term 'slum' to his beloved district" (RC, 1939: 6(21)). In his diatribe,
Woods voiced his neighbors' worries about the BHA's relocation strategy: "there are 700
children on my block alone. Where are you going to find room for them all? (RC, 1939:
6(21)).
In early 1939, houses in the area to become Mission Main could adequately be described
as "those tumbledown shanties on the other side of the tracks".18 The "slum" definition was
in fact derived from bad sanitary conditions: "58 percent of the homes lacked a bath and 8.5
percent were without a toilet" (RC, 1939: 6(7)). The so-called slum area also contained
historic buildings like the house at 621 Parker Street. It was built prior to the War of
Independence and was part of a large Roxbury homestead extending all the way to
Jamaica Plain and the Muddy River (RC, 1939: 6(7)). Long established residents reported
that most houses were at least fifty years old and were well kept.
Apart from a general reticence to be displaced from a well-liked neighborhood, many
residents were sad to move away from "the sphere of the 'Mother of the Hill', the Mission
Church" (RC, 1939: 6(28)). Nevertheless, the evacuation process went relatively smoothly
through the Spring, and by the end of June 1939, about half of the 679 families had found
other places to live (RC, 1939: 6(28)).
In fact, the evacuation went so well that the BHA maintained its demolition and construction
schedules, a first in the agency's short history. Local papers enthusiastically reported that
"only for the better does the old order pass", even though the legend-laden homes of local
heroes such as James Michael Curley would soon make place for "a modern, clean,
inviting colony of smart new apartments" (RC, 1939: 7(5)). Demolition of the old
neighborhood began in August 1939 on the block bordered by Ward, Phillips and St-
Alphonsus streets, and Longwood avenue. The Boston Street Commission held meetings
regarding the clearing and eventual elimination of Smith, Phillips, Conant and Oregon
18 Straus (1944: 29-30). In demystifying the popular assertion the "There Are No Slums in My Town", Straus cautions against a brand of
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streets, as well as Longwood avenue (RC, 1939: 8(16)). The old street fabric enclosed
between Parker and St-Alphonsus streets would be completely erased. As it turned out,
only Smith street was kept, while all others disappeared. Their name remained, however,
only to identify the new project's "courts". There were a few snags during an otherwise
efficient demolition phase, like protests against employing "alien" and out-of-state workers,
along with property looting (RC, 1939: 9(6)).
The Mission Hill Housing project opened in September 1940 after the BHA and its
chairman, John A. Breen, published a folder-application package detailing tenancy
requirements, the schedule of rents to be charged and the levels of allowed family incomes.
Eligible families had to be living in Boston under substandard conditions. The head of the
family had to be an American citizen and its total annual income could not exceed the
prescribed limits set between $20.19 to $28.65 a week. No minimum income allowances
had however been established. The schedule of rents was based on three rent tiers for
each unit size i.e. families having different incomes but requiring the same amount or type
of space would pay rent in accordance with their own income capacity. In effect, rent would
range from $14. to $25. per month for apartments ranging in size from one to four
bedrooms (RG, 1940: 8(8)).
The eradication of all of the existing streets on the Mission Main housing development was
sanctioned by the Board of Street Commissioners of the City of Boston during sessions
held on August 11, 12 and 14, 1939. On these occasions, the Board, represented by two
Commissioners (Donoghue and Higgins), met with attorney Lewis H. Weinstein of the BHA,
William Carey, the councilor for the Mission Hill district, Mr. Ives, attorney for Boston Edison
and Mr. Hunt of the Public Works Department. In essence, the meeting's minutes report
that Carey asked for more consideration in the closing of Longwood avenue, Conant,
Oregon, Phillips and Faxon streets. The councilor announced "he had an idea that he was
anxious to put before the Authority and if he can get their agreement, he felt that it might not
be necessary to close these streets. He said he wanted time to work out his plans".20 Carey
also expressed doubts about the Board's authority over city-owned street titles. To this,
sentimentalism that taints some Americans' perception of beloved slums.
19 Frictions also arose later on when City Councilors found out that the evicted Mission Hill residents who had moved to the Back-of-the-Hill
district along Heath Street, were being bullied by the construction crew when they resisted moving yet again to make place for the Bromley-
Heath housing development (RC, 1940: 9(12)).
20 Minutes, Board of Street Commissioners. August 23 1939. The Carey "plan" has not been traced at the BHA's archives.
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Weinstein specified that a cooperation agreement between the City and the BHA had been
struck the year before, and which was binding upon the Street Commissioners. In effect,
Weinstein re-stated that the BHA's eradication request materialized "the interest of the
public that these streets be discontinued. [Weinstein further] claimed that it would mean a
saving to the city, in the cost of paving and lighting".' The Commissioners asked the BHA if
compensations for the lost of fee revenues upon the eradication of streets could come in
the form of the widening of Parker street. The BHA refused such a proposition, invoking the
fact that its province was restricted to the public housing site only, and not to adjacent
22streets. At that meeting, Boston Edison asked for damages to compensate for the
relocation of conduits underneath condemned streets. The utility company went as far as to
suggest that the BHA keep Longwood avenue as "a street in the project, but not a through
,23street". The BHA replied that a utility company, such as Edison's, runs the risk of expense
which would not be compensated by the Authority. The main point coming across this
official meeting about the fate of Mission Main's streets is the fact that the Board of Street
Commissioners was not invited to attend early discussions about the project's layout. Carey
describes the pressure the council was put under to approve the October 1938 contract24
between the City and the BHA, which had to be sent to Washington in early November
(Vale, 1996: 345). Carey stretched the vague character of the agreement: "When the
contract was presented to the Council, no specific mention was made of the streets to be
discontinued. The location of the projects was not incorporated in the agreement, so that no
,,26particular streets were sanctioned".
At the August 1939 hearing, Carey asked "that the matter be considered with the greatest
care and that the Board should not act too hastily. There has been too much haste,
already". The Commissioners concurred that even though "[they] and the Housing Board
[sic] are trying to accomplish something for the best interests of the City [and] despite the
fact that [they] were not consulted or were overlooked ....]", all constructive suggestions,
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. Weinstein further added that the City is poised to receive more from the Old Harbor Village in south Boston as a public housing
site, than if able to make collections on properties before the improvement was made (p.212).
23 Ibid.
24 The contract passed in 1938 covered the three first public housing projects, i.e. Charlestown, Mission Hill (Mission Main) and Lenox
street.
25 Vale (1996: 345) reports Councilor Carey's warnings against hasty property seizures and his pleading to Straus and President
Roosevelt on behalf of the Mission Hill neighborhood.
26 Minutes, Board of Street Commissioners. August 23, 1939.
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even at this time [....] should be given some consideration" .27
In October 1939, the Board of Street Commissioners of the City of Boston ordered the
discontinuance of:
- Longwood avenue, from St-Alphonsus to Parker streets;
- Conant street, from St-Alphonsus to Parker streets;
- Oregon street, from Smith to Conant streets;
- Phillips street, from Smith to Ward streets;
- Part between Conant street and Longwood avenue;
- Part between Longwood avenue and Ward street;
- Faxon street, from Smith to Tremont streets (Fig. 4.20).
4.2.2.2 - Factor 4 - The SouthWest Corridor Barrier
Even though Mission Hill's public housing was built well before urban renewal policies were
enforced to transform Boston's urbanscape in the 1950s and 1960s, the form of Roxbury's
neighborhoods did not fully escape its influence. As an agent of transformation, urban
renewal has imprinted much change onto what had traditionally been the industrial edge of
the Mission Main site. The renewal of the Southwest Corridor in fact reinforced the
segregating legacy of the train tracks since Mission Main was largely ignored in the overall
"bridging" scheme. This section describes the way the Southwest Corridor development
nonetheless influenced the morphological fate of the public housing community.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Southwest Corridor was the largest urban renewal and
construction project in the history of Boston. Its breadth touched one-quarter of the
population and seven city neighborhoods, among them Roxbury. The physical component
of the project involved the construction of new housing, three new high schools, a college
(the Roxbury Community College) and recreational facilities such as the Reggie Lewis
Athletics Center located near Roxbury Crossing. The overall design of the corridor would
create parkland that would be part of the Emerald Necklace system and provide local parks
to each neighborhoods.
The Southwest Corridor project was intended as the restructuring and expanding of the
Orange "T' Line. Along the corridor, such ventures like the Crosstown Industrial Park, were
meant as catalysts for Roxbury's economic development.
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27 Ibid.
Fig. 4.20 - Map of the Redemptorist Land and the Mission Main site with Built Environment
1873 (Hopkins Insurers)(Harvard's Pusey Library)
The Southwest Corridor is a rail line located on a wide strip of traditionally industrial land
that was cleared in the mid-1960s to create the Southwest Expressway. This renewal
project gave way to Interstate 95 along a parallel line with the Penn Central Railroad, and
which would go from Boston's center through Hyde Park, Roslindale, Jamaica Plain,
Roxbury and The South End. After numerous public debates and pressure from State
politicians, the local government imposed a moratorium on what had become another
detrimental "highway project". The federal funds awarded for the expressway's construction
were transferred, in 1973, to transit and community development.
For Roxbury, the construction of the Southwest Corridor mainly meant, apart from new
capital improvement, the removal of the elevated tracks on Washington street and the
creation of Crosstown street which linked Massachusetts Avenue (near City Hospital) and
Columbus Avenue (at Ruggles street). Roxbury also acquired the 156-units Madison Park
Townhouses financed by federal and state agencies and sponsored by the Lower
Community Corporation. A large mixed-use urban center was also proposed for Roxbury's
Parcel 18, bordered by Ruggles street and Columbus Avenue, and located between two
public housing projects (Whittier street and the Mission Main Extension, both built in the
1905s). Planners had envisioned a large retail/residential/institutional space complete with
new hotel and entertainment center. In the early 1990s, those visions had not yet been
fulfilled, except for the Ruggles Center. The Ruggles street Orange Line Station, however,
remains a pivotal access to Mission Hill and other Lower Roxbury resident, as well as
numerous institutions' patrons (Wentworth Institute, Museum of Fine Arts, Greek Orthodox
Cathedral).
The main construction area that proved influential for the Mission Main public housing
residents centers on the new Roxbury Crossing Station, sited where Tremont, New
Tremont, Dudley streets and Columbus ave. intersect. At that location, the strip of
tracks/parkland on the north side of the Corridor, parallels a strip of retail/institutional uses
on the south side. Both sides are linked to the surrounding neighborhood by way of street
level "bridges" above the tracks: Prentiss street, Tremont street and the Ruggles
concourse.
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4.2.2.3 - Factor 5 - Institutional Encroachment
in order to understand the isolating impact of institutions on the development of Mission
Hill, two actors must be introduced: the Catholic Church and Harvard. While the first
imposed as strong a "moral" as a physical presence in the neighborhood fabric, the other
imposed a politically powerful expansion strategy which contributed to dwarfing Mission
Hill's residential fabric.
Before 1870, the portion of Lower Roxbury containing Mission Hill was an area lightly
settled mainly because of topographical irregularities such as the Stony Brook marshes
dotted with factories, as well as the steep grades of Parker Hill. Down Mission Hill's slopes,
towards Ruggles street and the Back Bay (still an unfilled marsh in the mid-19th century),
were cheap wooden structures and small brick row houses where lived the "shanty Irish
poor". By then, the Irish made up the largest population segment (nearly 50%) settled on
Mission Hill, which before then had housed a colony of German brewery workers. Later in
the 1890's, Jews became the predominant group settled in the newly filled Ruggles street
marshes.
Shortly after the end of the Civil War, and with the increase of the Irish Catholic work force
in the area, the Redemptorist Fathers bought land at the base of Parker Hill to install their
mission.2 They chose a stately house which had played a central role in the history of
30Roxbury since the earliest days.
In 1869, the Redemptorists bought five acres fronting Tremont Street (then known as the
Brookline Road), just east of the Pierpont/Datchett mansion, now their rectory. Nine years
28 Warner, quoting Drake (1962):93
29 It was a curious incident which occurred thirty years earlier that prompted the Catholic Church to play a prominent role in Roxburys history. In
1834, an angry mob had set fire to Charlestown's Ursulines Convent, rendering nuns homeless. They were invited to stay at Datchett House
where they remained for 2 years before settling in convents as far as New Orleans and Quebec City.
30 The very first grantee of the Catholic Church's property, a large tract of 242 acres granted by King Charles in 1637, was George Alcock who had
come from England with the first band of Puritans. He was the direct ancestor of "Little Women" author Louisa Alcott. In 1722, the property
was bought by Col. Francis Brinley who later erected one of the grandest mansions in Roxbury, the Datchett House, named after the family
country seat in England. Brinley was the Deputy Surveyor General of the Province and a princely host. Fifty years later, the land was bought by
Robert Pierpont whose ancestors were early Roxbury mill owners. The mansion was subsequently dubbed Pierpont Castle and was a
prominent fixture during the Independence War. General Washington, for instance, conducted the siege and Battle of Fort Hill from the
reception rooms, while soldiers camped outside commanded an impressive view of British positions across the Neck in Boston. Celebrations
for winning the battle of Bunker Hill were held in the Castle's ballroom, an impressive hall (44 by 72 feet) spread across two wings. Legend also
has it that Pierpont Castle was the first place where the idea of the Declaration of Independence was advanced. "For a year or so, it was
practically the Capitol of the unformed Republic" (JPG, 1947: 7(2)). At the tum of the 19'h century, the property was tumed over to General
Dearbom, a hero of the Revolution and of the 1812 War. The still elaborate mansion had gardens and orchards growing down the slope where
the Mission Main public housing project now stands.
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later, having outgrown the wooden chapel adjacent to the house, the Fathers laid the first
corner stone to their church a few yards away. That same night, fire fatally damaged the old
mansion-rectory which would be completely razed in subsequent years.31 The 150 year-old
structure was replaced on its natural pedestal above the marshes by the massive
romanesque style church that would be known not as a parish but as a "Mission" Church,
i.e. with no territorial limits to its influence. Thus it "belonged" as much to Lower Roxbury's
Catholic immigrants, as to the wealthier Highlands constituency.
The Catholic Mission Church, during the first half of the 2 0 t century, became a unique
and powerful "moral", symbolic and political entity. The 1870s holdings of the Church soon
grew from church building to a whole 5-acre block which really was a centralized core of
institutional structures: two schools (the Mission Grammar School and convent, as well as
the Thomas Dwight School -- now the Tobin School -- the rectory, St-Alphonsus Hall,
Mission Hill's municipal Hall and the Mission Hill branch of the Boston Public Library. The
area just below the Church campus which would become the Mission Main development
boasted, at the beginning of the century, more children involved in parochial schools than
anywhere else in the city (Woods & Kennedy, 1959: 133). Apart from regular church and
holiday services, the resident priests were active participants in neighborhood life by
hosting an array of social activities for the population: they administered a large boys'
organization, band and choir, a Young Men's Catholic Association and a similar
organization for young women; every year, they produced a sophisticated Lenten drama;
they made extensive missionary tours all over the country, while their shrine drew many
form all over North America by virtue of its reputed cures and its dramatic array of crutches
(Woods & Kennedy, 1959:133).
When the twin pudding-stone towers were added to its fagade in 1910, Mission Church was
visible from everywhere in Boston. Widely known across the country, especially after it was
made a Basilica by Rome, the Church of Our Lady of Perpetual Help became a pilgrimage
destination. An omnipresent symbol of Irish immigrants' pride, the Church has hovered
monumentally over the area to become Mission Main and has solidified its influence as the
very beacon of social and moral life for the Mission Hill neighborhood. Throughout the 20th
century, and in the face of environmental and demographic change, residents of the
The only remaining trace of the Pierpont/Datchett House in todays Mission Hill landscape is a bronze plaque located in front of the Church.
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Mission Hill and Mission Main have retained strong social and physical ties with the
institutional area, now central to the whole neighborhood's activity and identity (Fig. 4.21).
Fig. 4.21 -Mission Church, Tum of the Century
The Mission Church, in sum, has since imposed its mighty presence in the neighborhood,
albeit an "intensely medieval, startlingly unwordly [sic] and remote [one]" (Woods &
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Kennedy, 1959: 133). Thus the role of the Church has been at once active in its social
commitment, and detached in its spiritual influence. Nevertheless, Mission Church can only
be described, today as during the precedent decades, as a social and physical anchor (Fig.
4.22).
The leading presence of the Church is very much legible throughout the morphological
evolution of Mission Hill and Mission Main: the Church and its holdings started out as an
dependence War stronghold to become an influential seat of moral rectitude. The Church's
institutional block is the only area adjacent to the Mission Main development which has
retained the same vocation, scale and presence throughout the successive 19 ' and 20*h
century stages of isolation identified in this section. Although the Catholic block along
Mission Main has limited physical connections (such as streets) between the Mission Main
area and the rest of Roxbury, it nonetheless figures less as a physical barrier than as a
socially stabilizing element among the rest of the dramatic changes imposed on this area.
Harvard is Mission Main's other prominent and influential neighbor. Since the mid-19*
century, the University has steadily consolidated its assets across Huntington avenue into a
small medical city within the City. In the last thirty years, Harvard has held much importance
in the future of Mission Main and has acted as an agent of transformation for the site's
immediate edge. The following summarizes the role of Harvard as a major participant in
forging an isolating institutional barrier along one of the site's edge.
In the 1960s, Mission Park was created out of the political mobilization of the neighborhood
against a mighty and encroaching institution. Mission Park is mixed-income housing
complex of 775 units built in the late 1970s as a compensation for a land trade-off deal
made between Harvard University and the Mission Hill residents. The affordable housing
development is in fact the result of a conflict between the neighborhood residents, intent on
preserving their land and community, and Harvard, intent on acquiring land to expand its
holdings in the Longwood Medical Area.
Mission Park's story began in the early 1970's when Harvard commissioned designer I.M.
Pei for the planning of The Medical Area near Brigham Circle without consulting the
residents concerned. In 1965, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) had granted
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powers of eminent domain to Harvard and the Affiliated Hospitals Center (AFC) (Fig. 4.23).
The same year, the BRA approved the demolition of triple decker tracts next to the Mission
Main project, West of St-Alphonsus street, as well as the re-zoning of the cleared area to
allow a 200 feet building height limit. The ultimate goal of the BRA was to secure Urban
Renewal funds but the venture failed. As a result, the Mission Hill district remained
overlooked and left out from state and federally funded planning areas. Meanwhile, the
implementation of foreign typologies in the form of high-rise private market housing
structures dwarfed the Mission Main housing development and permanently created a
disruption in the district's fabric.
Across Huntington Avenue, the AFC razed the Fenwoood road residential block. When
they learned that Harvard was still land hungry for expansion in the Longwood Area, the
residents formed grass-root organizations like the Mission Hill Planning Commission
(MHPC) and RUSH (Residents United Against Harvard). Inspired by a small group of
activist students from Harvard, the MHPC intended to carry two roles, active and reactive:
as an active player, the Commission wanted to solve problems of urban decay, and as a
reactive agent, it acted as an advocate for residents' legal rights in domains of the
Environmental Protection Act and of the Determination of Need Law. The MHPC also acted
as liaison between medical, governmental, educational, cultural and religious groups.
After years of bargaining between the MHPC and Harvard, a deal was struck in 1977: a
boundary between institutional and residential uses was established, allowing institutions to
be contained in the area Northwest of Huntington Avenue and Northeast of Francis street.
The rest of the Mission Hill district would remain mostly residential. In exchange for this
concession, Harvard provided a replacement plan for neighborhood families and affordable
housing for hundreds of other (±2000 residents) in a thirteen-acre mix-income complex of
four towers, 147 townhouses and 1400 parking spaces. In recognition of the students' work,
the four towers were named after them.
In November 1993, Mission Park celebrated its 15* anniversary in the presence of Mayor
Menino and HUD secretary Cisneros. The local Mission Hill Gazette heralded a housing
venture that sprung "From Strife to Success" and which 15 years later sounds "like an
urban village that's too good to be true" (MHG, 1993: 10(29)). During those years, the
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Fig. 4.23 - Mission Park Housing Development (1993)
community has benefited from varied social programs such as day care, hot lunches for the
elderly, after-school tutoring, a library and a summer swimming pool.
The 1960s and 1970s political dealings between the City, Harvard and the mobilized
Mission Hill residents never involved the Mission Main residents, yet their impact would be
directly felt on the site: the dwarfing towers along St-Alphonsus Street are lasting witnesses
of that impact. Then the Mission Park complex was introduced, as a trade-off for Harvard's
aggressive land acquisition tactics. The result of this trade-off was the consolidation of a
monolithic, single-use and fairly impenetrable institutional barrier along the Huntington
Avenue edge of the Mission Main site. Also bounded by the Wentworth Institute, the
development remains the only remaining piece of Mission Hills' already damaged and
reduced residential fabric, isolated amidst a sea of encroaching institutions (Fig. 4.24).
32 In November 1996, a spokesperson announced HUD's intention to introduce more market-rate units in the Mission Park complex. At that date,
only eight tenants were not covered by the federal Section 8 vouchers that subsidize the rents. The market rate units would only replace those
that become vacant and would not be subsidized by HUD who is implementing a severe cutback and "no new vouchers" policy. All Section 8
contracts for 1997 and 1998 will be respected. The shift in subsidy policy underlines a mix-income philosophy which goal "is to maintain quality
housing and build incentives for self-sufficiency" as well as maintain a safer financial risk level for the complex (MHG, 1996: (11)).
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Fig 4.24 - Mission Main, in Close Proximity to the Lonqwood Medical Area
and Wentworth Institute
4.2.3 - Conclusions
The previous section has highlighted four major factors which have contributed to
imposing a dynamic of isolation. Their origins are deeply rooted and traced as far as
during colonial times. Each factor involved in the dynamic was shown to be separately
responsible for the isolation and, ultimately, the present-day deterioration of the
Mission Hill neighborhood and the Mission Main development.
The segregated patterns of income distribution, during the 18 and 19th centuries, are
embedded in the very topography of today's Roxbury. While the Highlands remain a
relatively well preserved urban neighborhood, the Mission Hill part of poorer lower
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Roxbury has steadily deteriorated. In fact, the residential fabric in that area has all but
disappeared. Then the 19 th century implementation of Huntington Avenue signaled the
beginning of Mission Hill's carving up into specialized districts, leaving the future
Mission Main cut off from the rest of Lower Roxbury. the SouthWest Corridor later
acted as a counterpart to the Huntington barrier. By the end of the century, the isolated
Mission Main was almost completely surrounded by large institutional campuses which
however prosperous, imposed their monolithic presence upon an increasingly
vulnerable piece of the old Roxbury fabric. Showing the extent to which successive
stages of isolation can be identified and separated out as external causes has proved,
if nothing else, that Mission Main is not solely responsible -- as a public housing project
is often suspected to be -- for incurring desolation on Mission Hill. However, in spite of
revitalization strategies (detailed in the next Chapter), these isolating barriers are likely
to remain and thus integration must include provisions to attenuate their negative
impact on the development and neighborhood.
4.3 - The Project's Edge: Morphological Portrait of Change
This section focuses the scale of observation to analyze the way morphological
elements -- streets, blocks, parcels, buildings -- were involved, as a system, in the
transformation of Mission Hill. Ultimately, this part of the chapter shows how the timing
of development construction has related to the overall pattern of other neighborhood
transformation.
4.3.1- Streets and Parcels
Que vous disent les vieiles rues
Des vieiles cites?
Parmi les poussibres accrues
De leurs v6tust6s,
RCvant de choses disparues,
Que vous disent les vieiles rues?33
tmile Nelligan, Les Vieilles Rues, 1925.
The pattern of streets remains the most basic morphological element involved in the
regulation of built environments. In the case of Mission Main, the eradication of the
Loose translation: What do old city streets tell you? Through accumulating dust and dilapidation, remembering things vanished, what
do those old streets tell you?
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street system in the early 1940s is the most important variable involved in the
morphological distinctness between the public housing site and the rest of Mission Hill.
Before 1940, the Mission Main site was founded on a typical grid of streets, blocks and
parcels which was the result of land speculation and subdivision well after main arteries
such as Parker (1825) and Tremont (1831) streets had bordered a piece of sloping
marshland. The first Mission Main street was Smith (1844), which paralleled Tremont
along the Mission Church block. So important was the land of the Redemptorists that
Smith street first developed as a cul-de-sac against the backdrop of their enormous
undeveloped parcel. Ten years later, Ward street (1853) was opened along the Stony
Brook banks, also in a parallel line with Tremont from Parker. Ward street was in fact a
local road destined to serve the mills which were implemented on the banks of the
Stony Brook in order to harness its power. Bumstead Lane (soon to became St-
Alphonsus) completed the square by connecting Tremont to Ward along the Catholic
Church's land. Finally, three parallel streets -- Conant (1869), Oregon (1874) and
Faxon (1874) -- subdivided the residual piece of land which would eventually become
Mission Main. By then, Huntington avenue's diagonal was almost at Mission Hill's door
to complete the streetscape.
Meanwhile, the rectangular urban blocks thus delimited by the growing system of
orthogonal streets were being subdivided into house lots. The parceling of these blocks
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occurred in a typical manner: symmetrical "back-to-back" configuration of rectangular
lots just wide enough for one house. Interestingly, the early gridiron was centrally
traversed by Phillips, a street which connected Smith to Ward, without going through
the Redemptorist Land to Tremont (even though Smith Court connected Smith to
Tremont in the 1870s). The result was a parceling pattern that also included lots facing
transversal streets and onto which "corner store" were often implemented. Thus from
1873 to 1939, the pattern of streets and system of blocks/parcels obeyed the "natural"
densification principles of the 19th century city, i.e. some larger plots were subdivided
into two in order to permit more housing; or some smaller lots were amalgamated to
permit the implementation of uses requiring more space. Thus the pattern of Mission
Main was based on a flexible method of land speculation based on the rectangular
parcel (Figs. 4.25, 26).
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Another interesting feature of this area of Mission Hill is the presence of residential
"courts" or "places", either a primitive form of cul-de-sac street or the remnant of the
European courtyard configuration, and which penetrate the block in order to give
access to very small parcels (often subdivisions of a single lot) oriented perpendicularly
to the rest. This method of subdivision was a profitable way for speculators to maximize
land for a growing population of poor workers who agreed to live in very small and
certainly substandard units. By 1941, when the public housing project was constructed,
not only were these substandard units demolished, but so was the whole of the street
and courts systems (Fig. 4.27).
Fig. 4.27 - Map (1919) Showing Courts Configurations
When viewing the two-dimensional evolution diagrams of the parceling pattern from
1873 to 1992, the main observation is that this area of Mission Hill is now back where it
started. This means that the normal subdivision or parceling process of an urban
neighborhood has been much altered by the implementation of single uses on
consolidated parcels: the St-Alphonsus towers, the industrial strip along the rail line
and the Mission Main development are all examples of that altering process. Thus the
1990s portrait of 63 remaining parcels is reminiscent of a pre-1873, undeveloped area
of the building lower Roxbury area. Indeed, the process of subdivision/amalgamation
has been stopped in 1941 to make place for only one parcel per block on the public
housing site. Thus diagrams now describe an environment which morphological order
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is profoundly foreign and different from its surrounding context. Of course, such
diagrams of morphological order cannot account for the whole story of Mission Main's
separate character. Chapter 5 will cover the policy and socio-economic components of
this process.
4.3.2 - Buildings and uses
After tallying, for each year of observation, the number of built units per category of
uses -- institutional, industrial, residential (one and two family dwellings) and others3 --
results mainly highlight a dramatic drop in the number of single- and two-family housing
structures following the implementation of the Mission Main development.
34 The "others" category gathers all of those uses not included in the precedent categories, i.e. multi-family apartment buildings (such as
the public housing structures), etc.
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Fig. 4.32 - Evolution of Uses (1873-1992) around the Mission Main Site
Contrary to expectations, however, the number of neighborhood stores did not
dramatically drop after the displacement of the existing population. Nor did the number
of industrial buildings (based on the 1947, post-public housing tally). In fact, the
number of stores peaked in the 1950s and there were more industries (and
manufacturing jobs, presumably) present within Mission Main's edges during the 1960s
than at any other time (see 1960 tally). Nevertheless, while stores steadily disappeared
from Mission Main's edges, so did the industrial base which remains practically absent
from the 1990s urbanscape (Figs. 4.28-32). Thus however crude, this graphic shows a
certain stability of the Mission Hill neighborhood's commercial and industrial base, after
the public housing development was imported in the fabric.
Another highlighted point, from this tally, is the increasing then stabilized presence of
those uses "other" then small-grain residential, industrial and commercial. Numbers are
explained by the inclusion, in this category, of multi-family housing structures such as
public housing apartment buildings.
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4.4 - Conclusions
The NCSDPH, in its final report (1992:87) recommended that HUD require PHAs
seeking HOPE VI funds to conduct an analysis of existing physical problems, before
making re-design or redevelopment decisions. This recommendation highlighted the
need to assess how problems of isolation occurred and whether they exercised
influence on developments (and surrounding neighborhoods). In light of findings in this
Chapter -- that isolation is a complex process initiated "from without" the development -
--this dissertation argues that as part of their grant application, PHAs should be
required to conduct a morphogenesis of the project/neighborhood relationship. The
exercise, aimed at identifying forces at play in physical and socio-economic
transformation, would produce a sound analytic base on which to found an integrative
revitalization strategy.
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CHAPTER 5: IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATION: THE MISSION MAIN PLAN
It has been established, in Chapter 3, that the plan to revitalize Mission Main favors
integration. Studying the case of Mission Main in more detail, however, reveals that
designing integration and implementing it are two processes that involve different
sets of realities. This chapter highlights how implementing integration (in contrast
with intending integration) can be hampered by a score of complex factors ranging
from strained political dealings to deeply ingrained misgivings on the part of
residents.
5.1 - Introduction
After reviewing the roots of Mission Main's isolation, this chapter proposes to examine
how strategies to re-design the connection between the development and the Mission
Hill neighborhood will eventually reverse the isolation problem. The previous cross-
national analysis of HOPE VI plans was based on the formulation of policymakers' and
designers' intents to achieve integration. This chapter highlights the way intentions are
transposed into an implementation context. The Mission Main example offers a
glimpse at how very complicated this transposition can get when implementation
"practicalities" parallel planning "ideals".
The following analysis of an implementation process covers the period comprised
between 1993 -- year the HOPE VI funds were earmarked -- and early Spring 1998,
when the same funds were finally released by HUD to the Authority. This five year
period has shaped the revitalization story into an eventful one: three plans have been
proposed by three different design teams but were never sanctioned by residents;
HUD threatened to cancel its grant altogether for lack of efficiency and for over-
budgeting; and deciding upon the limits of the site has caused political controversy
among the actors involved. The story of Mission Main's revitalization is one of
resistance. It very much centers on the desire of residents to resist integration rather
than compromise the quality of their environment and their hard-won power to take
part in the decision process.
The chapter is structured to: 1) summarize the pre-redevelopment context; 2) analyze
and illustrate the three planning phases (between 1993 and 1998) for the new Mission
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Main; and 3) highlight the main factors which have nearly sabotaged the revitalization
effort.
5.2 - Politics and Design: the Pre-Redevelopment Story
When he toured the site in August 1993, U.S. Representative Joseph Kennedy
pledged to the residents of Mission Main that he would actively lobby to obtain Hope VI
funds for the Boston site. The atmosphere on site exuded both "the domestic pride and
resourcefulness of residents, juxtaposed with the urban desolation and despair [of a]
822-unit development plagued by crime, bad publicity, prejudice and a host of other
longstanding problems" (MHG, 1993: 8(1)).
Soon afterwards, in September 1993, HUD announced that the Boston Housing
Authority (BHA) was awarded a $50 million HOPE VI grant that would go toward the
rehabilitation of housing units, and the general upgrading of life for the residents of
Mission Main. The money would be spent on a large-scale rehabilitation scheme
consisting in enlarging units and reducing their total number by one-third to 538. The
plan proposed to remove the third floors of some structures, create private entrances
for 80 percent of occupants, and re-build a street network going through the site. This
latter intervention not only created urban links between the Mission Main and the rest of
the Mission Hill neighborhood, but it also rendered outdoor criminal activity more
conspicuous (and therefore more likely to be stoppable).
The announcement of the Mission Main HOPE VI grant almost coincided with the 15th
anniversary celebration of one of its neighbor, the Mission Park mixed-income housing
complex. Attending the HOPE VI announcement ceremony, HUD's secretary rejoiced
at having "two housing models in Mission Hill: Mission Park, where the tenants and
landlords work together; and Mission Main, where a renovation project got a grant
because of excellent qualifications" (MHG, 1993: 12(13)). The HOPE VI-funded
renovations were expected to begin in 1994 and be completed by 1996.
In keeping with the HOPE VI momentum, a major effort at improving security within
Mission Main was instigated. In September 1994, at the demand of exasperated
tenants, "Operation Clean Sweep" was announced. The program was a collaborative
task shared by eleven different law enforcement agencies, with the broad goal to stop
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trespassing and drug trafficking on Authority's property. The Sweep addressed the
steady erosion of resident's safety by re-appropriating public space lost to adults
involved in drug activity. Most of all, the site's un-defensible open spaces exacerbated
the community's powerlessness. As one resident complained in the local paper: "It's
depressing here ... all red bricks with no greenery. Folks are lost in an asphalt jungle"
(MHG, 1994: 9(30)). By increasing policing, the Sweep renewed Mission Main tenants'
hope of living in a safer environment: "I'm proud to ride down Parker Street without
having to dodge a bullet. I'm glad not to be in dodge City" (MHG: ibid.). The increased
police visibility lasted one year, but police presence was eventually phased out.
"Troublemakers" soon started to move from one side of the development to the other
when they saw police coming, or they hid in the top of stairwells. During the one-year
policing effort, incidents involving heroin numbered seventeen, instead of 170 the
previous year.
In late 1994, and during the Spring of 1995, it transpired that the Mission Main
redevelopment endeavor would be at least $2 million over budget. As the cost of
refurbishing whole buildings proved to be the stumbling block, talk of razing the
development in order to start construction afresh was persistent. Also, revised HOPE
VI policy had relaxed the requirements to re-build on existing footprints. This flexibility
enabled the BHA to fashion a new vision for a new and less dense housing
environment that would be physically and socio-economically knitted back into the
fabric of the surrounding neighborhood. In October 1995, the Boston Globe announced
the BHA's plan to raze then rebuild Mission Main, "a decision that could change the
face of Mission Hill" (BG, 1995: 19(6)). Residents' reaction to the news was mixed.
While some feared displacement and gentrification, others welcomed the chance to
participate in a fresh start.' The BHA soon insisted that demolition would follow a
thorough participatory process: "We're not acting like an architectural army, coming in
and telling people how their homes are going to look" (BG, 1995: 10(6)). In late 1995,
the BHA applied for and obtained extra HOPE VI Plus funds to cover the cost of
demolition and the complete re-building of Mission Main.
In April 1996, the first redevelopment plans showing a completely re-constructed
Mission Main were publicly shared by developers invited to compete for the
1 News of demolition took administrators and Task Force tenants by surprise. They were quick to point out that demolition was
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revitalization scheme. Their re-design plans had been created in accordance with BHA
suggestions. They centered on two options: the first one showed a new Mission Main
re-built within the confines of the site's old boundaries; the other showed a
development that spilled outside its previous limits onto vacant land along Parker street
and into some of the buildings belonging to the Mission Church. The latter proposition
in fact featured a swap of property between the BHA and the neighboring Wentworth
Institute of Technology. BHA-owned blocks between McGreevey and Ward streets
were given to Wentworth in return for blocks they owned between Parker street and the
Southwest Corridor. According to this early redevelopment strategy, McGreevey Way
became a new four-lane site boundary that connected the development to Prentiss and
New Tremont streets, across the Southwest Corridor. Along this important "boulevard"
stood a linear border of mid-rise housing structures to be built onto half-blocks. The
result was a development enclosed within an almost continuous wall of apartment
buildings.2 The swap deal with Wentworth would be completed by further transactions:
vacant privately-owned parcels on the Parker/Gurney block (off Tremont street) would
be acquired by the BHA. The property owners however added their voice to the
residents' in opposing this strategy, fearing a take-over by eminent domain not unlike
the one which permitted to raze the area to build Mission Main in the early 1940s. They
also feared the disappearance of the Fuentes Market on Parker street, one of the last
remaining community staples.
Residents appeared skeptical at best. The developers' propositions and options were
confusing: details of the land swap were sketchy, demolition ratios remained unclear
and, more basically, the size and plans for the rehabilitated units were not explained.
When Mayor Menino decided to announce the name of the "winning" developer at an
April 1996 conference, residents and officials could not ultimately agree on the choice.
As a result, a consortium of two development teams3 was created in order to merge
both their plans into one. The tenants and developers would act as equal partners in
this venture. The partnership was not based on financial investment, but rather on
residents having equal decision power in the planning and implementation process, as
well as in future management of the development.
but one option that would be extensively discussed with residents (MHG, 1995 (11)).
This description is based on a sketch by the BHA. The configuration of the mid-rise structures suggests a double-loaded
corridor organization (MHG, 1995: 4(1)).
The two developers selected were Ed Fish and Arthur Winn. They would subsequently appoint three design firms to form a
HOPE VI redevelopment team: Lane, Fenchman Associates; Stull and Lee, architects; and Chia-Ming Sze, architect. Their
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When the selection of a development team was made in the Spring of 1996, the
Mission Main Tenants Task Force (MMTTF) again voiced its opposition to trading any
land with Wentworth Institute of Technology: "We prefer to keep the land we have now.
[...] If we switch the land, it would put Longwood through Mission Main. We don't want
that" (MHG, 1996: 5(3)). At that time, the Mission Main tenants held two sets of
grievances: 1) they feared the negative environmental impact of moving closer to the
Southwest Corridor train tracks and the probably polluted industrial edge of the site;
and 2) they perceived the swap as a barely disguised attempt by the neighboring
institution to further encroach upon their already isolated territory. While the former
"physical" impacts (such as noise, vibration and safety) could have conceivably been
addressed through urban design, the latter "psychological" impacts remained far more
difficult to control. The Mission Main residents have had historical reasons to be
pessimistic vis-d-vis dealings with powerful institutional neighbors. Tensions inherited
during the 1970s negotiations between the Mission Hill community and Harvard
University over the Fenwood residential area, still bore a legible legacy in the district's
political and physical fabrics. The likelihood of renewed isolating pressures from
another powerful institutional entity appeared very real.
In Spring 1997, the BHA and Wentworth Institute announced they had made significant
progress in reaching a consensus. For the first time, the plans proposed by both the
Authority and the Institute showed the intended uses (and their location) for the traded
parcels: sports facilities, a parking garage and a security building for the Wentworth
Institute, along with a Massachusetts Water Resources Agency (MWRA) sewage
treatment plant and a Massachusetts Bay Transportation Agency (MBTA) power
station. The two slightly different plans4 presented by the BHA and Wentworth
manifested divergent integration philosophies. While Wentworth viewed integration as
an opportunity to consolidate its property, the BHA (on behalf of the Mission Main
residents) saw an opportunity to use the new sports facilities as some sort of bridge
between the residential and institutional communities.5 By the end of 1997, however,
the land swap deal had not yet been made official and remained a sore and unresolved
contribution is examined in details in the following sections.
The main differences between the BHA and Wentworth plans centered on the location of the sports facilities which would either
be sited onto one long suite of adjacent parcels along Ward Street, or be subdivided and spread across Parker Street.
The final land swap deal and its role in the master planning of the new Mission Main development is further analyzed in
following sections.
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Fig. 5.1 - Swap Option Proposed by Wentworth in 1997. A Soccer Field and Recreation Center
are Implemented along Ward Street as a Buffers Between the Institute and Mission
Main. A Wentworth Parkinq Garage is Sited Along the Trains Corridor. In Grey are
the Parcels Ceded to the BHA (MHG. 1997 (3)).
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Fig. 5.2 - Swap Option Proposed by the BHA and the Residents. More Housing Appears
Between Wentworth and Mission Main along Ward Street. The Soccer Field and
Parkinq Structure are Both Relegated to the Edge Nearest the Tracks (MHG, 1997
issue among residents, the redevelopment team, the BHA and HUD (Figs. 5.1 and 5.2)
The Mission Main residents, throughout 1996 and 1997, would adamantly resist
integration strategies proposed by either the BHA or Wentworth officials. Not only was
their resistance based on the potentially negative environmental and psychological
impacts of the land swap deal, they also worried about the exact nature of Wentworth's
intentions. The intended use of the traded parcels (the adjacent Ward-McGreevey
block) remained sketchy, as was the Institute's commitment to be a partner of
integration. BHA officials reassured the residents: "the edge [of the development]
needs to be amenable to residential housing across the street. We don't want parking
there like we have now" (MHG, 1996: 7(12)). But the Mission Main tenants continued to
oppose any integration strategy that would threaten the environmental quality of their
development or undermine their already vulnerable position vis-a-vis powerful and
encroaching institutions.
5.3 - Planning Integration: the Three Plans (1993-1998)
The plan for Mission Main's redevelopment derived from three separate attempts
based on three sets of intents to integrate the development into its surrounding
neighborhoods. While the first plan introduced, in 1993, a rehabilitation strategy, the
other two versions (1996 and 1998) proposed complete re-construction.
First Plan Second Plan Third Plan
1993 1996 1998
"Rehabilitation" "Demolition / Land Swap" "Income Mix / Land Swap"
Abandoned : Too Expensive Deemed too Expensive; On Probation (Dec. 1997) but sanctioned
Income Mix Philosophy Unconvincing; in Spring 1998
Unresolved Land Swap Issues The land swap deal proved un-
resolvable, and was dropped. The site
will retain its 1941 configuration.
Table 5.1- Redevelopment Strategies - 1993-1998
Following is a summary of each plan's content, along with their embedded objectives to
create integration and the reasons which prompted residents to question them.
5.3.1 The First Plan: Rehabilitation (1993)
The 1993 proposal was a strong one. It asserted the bold goal of transcending the re-
development venture at Mission Main and inspiring a reform of the BHA itself. The new
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Mission Main would therefore become a model for the BHA's future interventions in
planning and managing its developments, as well as in delivering services to residents.
The intent was to use the HOPE VI application as a catalyst for change from the
standard public housing way of doing business. The redevelopment goals stated in
1993 have remained the same throughout all subsequent planning phases: make
Mission Hill safe; favor sound and attractive housing; improve BHA responsiveness;
reward personal responsibility; integrate the development into the neighborhood; and
reinforce the community. The proposal was a successful one: Mission Main was
awarded $50 million to rehabilitate its housing stock.
The plan's main re-design goals were to: 1) enforce public safety through the creation
of Defensible Space; 2) enhance the image of the development; 3) introduce a
conventional street system to connect with the neighborhood; 4) reward personal
responsibility in improving the environment; and 5) reduce density to strengthen ties
with the community. In design terms, theses goals translated into the creation of
separate entrances for larger family units, the distinction between public, semi-public
and private outdoor spaces and the modification of fagades to achieve a residential
scale. Within a rehabilitation framework, however, no amount of the most subtle design
decisions would achieve the eradication of the "project" effect, without also attempting
to make the isolated Mission Main site an integral part of the surrounding Mission Hill
neighborhood (Fig. 5.3).
The 1993 plan was designed by the Boston firm of Domemech and Hicks, architects.
Constrained by HUD regulatory framework to build on existing building footprints, the
plan had to reach a compromise with the serious problems inherent to the structures'
configuration. Built in 1941, Mission Main was composed of I-shaped, low-rise brick
apartment buildings with shared entrances off ill-defined courtyards. There was not
much differentiation between the back and the front of buildings, which all looked the
same. Nevertheless, the designers made an effort to hierarchically compose an open
space system: privatized front yards faced other front yards, as did backyards (Fig.
5.4).
But the main innovation of the 1993 plan was to introduce streets that would replicate
patterns found elsewhere in Boston. This strategy meant reopening the streets that had
been razed, along with the rest of the neighborhood housing, during the 1939 slum
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Fig. 5.3 - Mission Main Before Demolition in Summer 1996.
NC gi]
Fig. 5.4 - 1993 Rehabilitation Plan by Boston Architectural Firm Domenech and Hicks. Shows
the Centrality of the Community Center and Its Adioining Common. Tree-LinedStreets Go are Inserted Between Rehabilitated Buildings. Many of the Structures'
"Ends" Face a Main Street (Domenech and Hicks).
clearance. In reality, re-designing a street/block pattern for Mission Main amounted to
drawing parallel lines between rehabilitated buildings, and connecting these lines to the
nearest perimeter arteries. Horadan Way and McGreevey Way acted as main east-
west links while two unnamed north-south streets acted as secondary connectors.
Private north-south ways across the newly formed blocks provided street parking. The
result was a site plan that gave the illusion of a street network that had always been
there.
Locating community facilities in the center of the site (and furthest from the edges)
signaled an intention to have the communal core of the development "belong" more to
the tenants than to the neighborhood. The expanse of symmetrically arranged green
open space attached to the community center also signaled a centrality to a clearly
bound territory. In any case, most of the 1993 plan's integrative efforts -- which hinged
on the introduction of a public/private open space hierarchy - were somewhat
cancelled out by the way the existing buildings remained perpendicular to main streets,
thereby offering building "ends" to the primary streets. And even though courtyards had
been subdivided into privatized front yards on each side of a private street, their
configuration was still legible and announced a "different way" of accessing units when
compared to the rest of Mission Hill's residential patterns.
The integrative design objectives of the 1993 plan were hampered by the constraining
configuration of existing structures. Introducing a hierarchy of open spaces along with a
street network and reorganized fagades did not overcome the negative impact of
repetitively implemented apartment buildings turned away from the edges. But the main
factor contributing to the abandonment of that first plan was the budget. When the cost
of rehabilitating the old "project" buildings was contrasted to new possibilities of
constructing anew, the 1993 strategy had no chance.
5.3.2 - The Second Plan: Tabula Rasa (1996)
After reviewing the rehabilitation costs, the BHA obtained a 1995 HOPE VI Plus
designation which permitted the demolition of existing buildings and the complete
reconfiguration of the site. By amending the policy that tied any modernization efforts to
existing building footprints, HUD fueled a revised version for pubic housing
redevelopment. In accordance with the HOPE VI Plus concept, the influence of the
strategy now extended outside the development's limits to involve neighborhood
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partners in a broader revitalization venture. Not only was HOPE VI the catalyst for
integrating the distressed project into its neighborhood, it now suggested the re-
connection of the neighborhood to the redeveloped community. This shift inspired the
BHA to transform Mission Main into a re-built and integrated mixed-income community.
Public/private partnerships funded by low-income housing tax credits would also be
forged, so that the total revitalization budget included $50 million in grants and $40
million in tax credits.
In April 1996, a collaboration of developers was formed by Edward Fish Associates
(Inc.), Winn Development Company and John B. Cruz Construction Co. (Inc.). The
developers would work in full partnership with the MMTTF during the planning, building
and management phases of the project. In the next months, urban design and
architectural guidelines were established by a consortium of design professionals -- the
Mission Main Associated Architects -- which gathered the firms of Stull and Lee Inc.,
Lane, Frenchman and Associates Inc. and Chia-Ming Sze Architect Inc. The MMTTF in
turn appointed their own firm of design, housing and law consultants, the Association
For Resident Control of Housing (ARCH), which would help them contribute informed
decisions. The overall co-ordination of the design process was orchestrated by senior
BHA architect Hank Keating.
The design team mainly based their new plan upon the phasing of construction. That
way, the relocation of tenants would constitute as important an element of
implementation as the creation of streets. The phasing strategy in turn produced two
options for determining the site's boundaries, which in the spirit of HOPE VI Plus could
expand to include parts of the edges. While Option 1 was constrained within the site's
pre-redevelopment boundaries, Option 2 proposed that the site's contours be revised to
include private property traded for BHA-owned land. Option 2 introduced the idea of the
land swap, a politically charged strategy that would eventually create much tension
among the players involved in redevelopment.
Option 1 presented a design scheme restrained to the actual limits of the BHA-owned
Mission Main property: the quadrangle formed by St-Alphonsus, Smith, Parker and
Ward streets (including the Racine Court area off Tremont Street). The obvious
advantage of this arrangement was a territorial status quo, an option which residents
found reassuring. According to the redevelopment team of professionals, however,
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option 1 exposed Mission Main to further institutional encroachment and gave way to
the reinforcement of the SouthWest Corridor's negative impact (Fig. 5.5).
In contrast, Option 2 extended its re-design to include land located between Parker
Street and the Southwest Corridor. All parcels acquired by the BHA through the land
swap were located between the eastern limit of Mission Main and the Corridor's train
tracks. The idea was that the negative impacts of that barrier were remedied by
changing the vocation of the edge and by implementing a homogeneous residential
zone. Housing built on the new parcels would welcome residents temporarily displaced
during construction on the rest of the site. In return, land obtained by Wentworth would
help consolidate the campus (Fig. 5.6).
The development team favored option 2 because it would link residential uses on both
sides of the Southwest Corridor Park. It would also make the Mission Main site more
attractive and more marketable and permit more rapid construction (BHA, 1996). The
Mission Main residents, however, were concerned by the swap: not only were the
dealings highly complex and sketchy, but they felt that the land they were getting in the
exchange was considerably less desirable.
While each of the two options included the same total amount of housing units (538),
the breakdown by architectural types was different: option 1 offered fewer townhouses
and more duplexes or flats than did Option 2. All new structures consistently comprised
two and three stories. The exceptions were the two 6- to 7-story mid-rises located
along St-Alphonsus Street. These structures acted as a buffer against the
overpowering presence of the privately-owned apartment towers. In each alternative,
the mid-rises were built to accommodate the elderly in need of assisted living services.
The housing program also called for two major design principles: all housing structures
had an entrance facing the street; and, wherever feasible, all units had direct access to
their private backyard (Fig. 5.7).
Both options proposed that Smith street, the infamous drugs "mall", become a strong
neighborhood-scale spine onto which the Mission Hill playground and the new
decentralized community center were grafted. Thus the scale of the tree-lined Smith
"boulevard" and its median would signal the gateway into the new community (Fig. 5.8).
It would underline the historical significance and presence of the Mission Church
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Fig. 5.5 - 1996 Reconstruction Plan: Option I "Status Quo". Mid-Rises Line St-Alphonsus
Street. Smith Street is a Maior Spine Between Community Center and Mission
Church Playground. Street/Block Pattern Recreated with In-Block Parking and Tot-
Lots (Mission Main Architects).
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Option 2 "Land Swap"
Fig. 5.6 - 1996 Reconstruction Plan: Option 2 "Land Swap". Same Building Density and
General Site Configuration. Shows Design Possibilities for Acquired Land Along
Train Tracks. No Uses are Proposed for the BHA-Owned Land Ceded to Wentworth(North of McGreevey Way) (Mission Main Architects).
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Fig. 5.8 - 1996 Landscapinq Scheme Showing Smith Street Median, In-Block Parking and Tot
Lots, and Privatized Back Yards (Mission Main Architects).
TOWNOUS E TOWNHOUSE DUPLEX OVER FLAT DUPLEX OVER FLAT
TYPICAL -LOWRISE ELEVATION
Typical Street Elevation for the 1996 Plan. Shows Individualized Entryways and
Varied Roofline for Different Typologies. THe 1997 Plan Uses Roughly Same
Architectural Vocabulary, Adding Front Porches to Facades (Mission Main
Architects).
Fig. 5.7 -
institutional block for the whole of the Mission Hill neighborhood. Both options also
proposed that a street network reconnect the site with the surrounding neighborhood's
street/block fabric. This network was laid upon the east-west traces of Horadan and
McGreevey Ways and comprised north-south streets to connect Smith street with the
Ruggles area. The result was a highly porous pattern: crisscrossing the site in both
east-west and north-south directions, not unlike the pattern that existed prior to slum
clearance.
The main differences between options 1 and 2 were defined by issues of "control" --
both territorial and political -- over the Mission Main's edges. In option 1, the vacant
parcels facing the Parker street border were not included as part of the HOPE VI
revitalization scheme. Thus control over the type of future uses and when they would
be built depended on Wentworth and other proprietors coming up with compatible
planning guidelines. And while option 2 provided designers with more control in
developing a homogeneous residential territory, the uses reserved for the parcels
acquired by Wentworth remained unresolved. Nevertheless, the designers advocated
for the implementation of option 2 mainly because the re-shaping of the site resulted in
an elongated residential area more strongly linked to the Tremont spine. The new
housing community would thereby turn itself resolutely toward the diversity of services
and resources found along Tremont and away from an institutional barrier that had
remained impregnable and incompatible for decades.
The Mission Main residents mainly saw disadvantages to option 2. In their view,
swapping property with the neighboring institute undermined the control they had
painstakingly acquired, through years of dealing with a troubled Authority, over the fate
of their environment. Giving a piece of Mission Main to Wentworth in return for property
that had historically been reserved for industries, impacted by noisy trains and
bypassed by the greening efforts of the 1970s Corridor project was considered unfair.
The residents, in considering option 1, already voiced their concern over the
introduction of streets on the site. They were not convinced by HUD's bias toward the
positive value of streets as tools for creating defensible space and promoting social
interaction. The only street that remained on the site after slum clearance, Smith street,
had come to symbolize the vulnerability of a whole community vis-e-vis threatening
trespassers.
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Thus even though the design team had been careful in inviting the participation of
residents, in proposing two redevelopment scenarios and in thoughtfully scheduling the
demolition and construction process, no consensus was reached to sanction the
revised HOPE VI plan (Figs. 5.9 and 5.10). Nevertheless, demolition began during the
Summer of 1996 to make way for "first phase" construction, even though no plan had
been agreed upon. Demolition appeared a good way to ensure that revitalization would
occur, in spite of everything and everyone. Meanwhile, the already fragile relationship
among residents, Authority, developers and designers steadily deteriorated, during
1996 and in early 1997, to the point where the planning process was completely halted.
What had started as a promising planning process destined to reverse the stigmatizing
condition of an isolated community, had slowly become an acrimonious struggle over
who "controlled" the implementation of integration.
5.3.3 - The Third Plan: Reaching Consensus (1998)
In March 1997, HUD sent the BHA a letter announcing its intention to annul its funding
altogether if the Authority remained unable to initiate the implementation of a
revitalization plan. At the crux of the threat was the still unresolved land swap deal, an
issue that continued to divide the resident population and the Authority. The federal
government gave the BHA ninety days to reach a consensus and submit a revised plan
that would be based on the creation of a mixed-income community in place of the
isolated Mission Main.
The letter from HUD arrived at a time when trouble within the redevelopment team was
culminating. The residents, rattled by the swap issue, increasingly felt that the urban
design team was siding with the BHA and therefore did not accurately represent or
defend their views. Likewise, the members of the re-design team were feeling trapped
amidst a dispute which had less to do with design than with politics.6 By the end of
1996, the developers had decided to make some changes within the team and to in
fact retain only one of the three architectural firms until then involved in the
redevelopment plan. The firm of Boston architect Chia-Ming Sze produced the revised
plan submitted to HUD and presented it to the residents in July 1997.7 The plan's main
difference from its predecessor was the actual inclusion of a land swap deal that had
6 Interview with David Lee, February 1997. Lee, at that point, already hinted at his dissatisfaction with the process as a whole
and his imminent removal from the re-design team.
Interview with architect Chia-Ming Sze, December 1997.
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Fig. 5.9 - 1996 Demolition Phasing Strategy Common to Options I and 2. Phases I and 2 were
Completed at the End of 1997 (Mission Main Architects).
Fig. 5.10 - 1996 Construction Phasing Strategy. First Phase Common to Options I and 2(Mission Main Architects).
been agreed upon -- in principle - between Wentworth and the BHA. The deal
involved less land than the original proposal but remained, in the designer's view, an
important part of the relocation process.
The other main differentiating features were a revised income mix strategy - whereby
170 market rate units8 were earmarked -- and the introduction of a new housing
typology loosely based on the Boston triple-decker. Sze noted that the introduction of
variants of the Boston triple-decker for the re-designed site was one very important
element contributing to re-establishing trust with the residents. The triple-decker, a
culturally tested housing model typical of Mission Hill, was seen by residents as a
tangible integrative element of the revitalization plan. Sze also introduced the type as a
solution to increase density.9
The third 1997 version of the Mission Main plan, as was its predecessor, was based on
the re-creation of a street/block fabric that was characteristic of the pre-slum clearance
site. In the latest street plan, however, McGreevey Way culminates into a roundabout
driveway to the site's only mid-rise (Fig. 5.11). Blocking direct access to Huntington
ave. responded to residents' fear that this area of the development would be most
exposed to Huntington's traffic. Parker and Conant Streets were also deviated mainly
due to the presence of the proposed Wentworth uses along Ward Street. Asked if he
considered these deviations and cut-offs an impediment to creating a more
straightforwardly connecting street grid, Sze argued that the Mission Main street
network was by then so totally isolated and cut-off from the rest of the neighborhood's
that straight connections made no sense. He added that residents asked for and
welcomed such traffic deviations not only to stave off through traffic but also to keep
intact the sense of territoriality the site's isolation had instilled for generations.
The same relationships between units and streets were fostered: the attached
townhouses (the dominant housing type) lined the streets and were interrupted only to
let cars within the in-block parking area. The communal tot-lots were safely located
behind strategically placed fences, so that those not residing within that block were
8 The revised plan shows that 120 one-bedroom units (market rate rentals) are clustered into one mid-rise multi-unit elevator
building at the St-Alphonsus/Huntington corner of the site. The assisted-living component of the prior plan, considered too
costly, has been eliminated.
The tripl-ec kers also constitute a "design" solution since they are mostly located at row ends and thus are used to clearly
mark street corners.
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Fig. 5.11 - 1997 Plan by Sze Architect. Includes Latest Land Swap Deal. Shows How "Triplex"
Center is Decentralized and Sited on Residential Block.
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Form Emphasized Street Corners. Smith Street Retained as Boulevard. Community
kept out.10 Like the 1996 plan, the Smith "boulevard" continued to act as an entry gate
to the community. The differentiated architectural treatment of street corners underlined
the "identity" statement. The same construction materials proposed the year before
were suggested for the housing structures: wooden frames covered with a variety of
colored vinyl siding above a stucco-like first floor base. The pitched roofline was
articulated to identify individualized entries. The most striking difference from the
previous elevations resided in the presence of front porches along the street, elements
seemingly borrowed from the characteristic stylistic vocabulary of the triple-decker.
During the Fall of 1997, the BHA initiated the construction bidding process for the first
forty-six units located within the first implementation phase area (at the corner of Parker
and Tremont Streets). This process was however stopped when the developers
abruptly announced their intention to extricate themselves from the whole development
process." In December 1997, before the latest version of the land swap and the Sze
plan were agreed upon, HUD issued a default order thereby freezing all funds. The
construction of the first phase was canceled. The November 15th groundbreaking date
announced by the BHA during the Summer was again put off. The groundbreaking
ceremony would have occurred some sixty years after Mayor Tobin stood on a
vanished street corner at the height of slum clearance. With nearly half the structures
already demolished, Mission Main offered another version of a razed site.
During the Spring of 1998, after five years of uncertainty and controversy, the Mayor of
Boston announced that the unresolved land swap deal - the issue which had been the
major impediment to implementation -- would be abandoned in order to free up the still
unreleased HOPE VI funds (BG, 1998: 3(19)). HUD subsequently announced that it
would finally release the $100 million to begin construction.
The latest version of Mission Main's HOPE VI plan is the embodiment of a compromise
among major actor involved in redevelopment. Two major elements were seemingly
responsible for the Spring 1998 breakthrough that will eventually lead to actual
implementation: 1) the restored confidence among residents and designer; and 2) a
10 None of the parking lots are gated and/or electronically accessed.
11 Thic dtricinn is seeminalv rooted. among manv other issues, in the fact that the BHA had not yet issued payment to the
developers and design team since January 1997 (Sze interview).
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decision imposed from the top of the administrative pyramid (the Mayor's office) to
break from the political morass.
5.4 - Makinq Integration Politically "Implementable"
The land swap deal between the Boston Housing Authority and Wentworth Institute
had been at the core of discussions with tenants and much of the revitalization venture
controversy. Most of these dealings have occurred in the political arena, pitting the
BHA-City-Tenants camp against the Wentworth camp. But even among the first group,
tensions have been omnipresent. Throughout the planning process, the land swap deal
featured as the single most important issue to spur a "resistance to integration"
movement on the part of mobilized tenants. While the housing authority and designers
saw the integrative potential of the land swap, residents considered it an isolationist
imposition. What follows is a summary of arguments advanced by all of the actors
involved in the complex implementation integration.
The tenants of Mission Main stood to be the most impacted by the shift of property
limits caused by an eventual swap deal with their neighbor. They were opposed to this
shift from the beginning, mainly because they were weary of giving in to yet another
neighboring but encroaching institution. The edges of Mission Main had slowly eroded
over the years to include practically no small-grained residential uses, thus mirroring
the fate of the Mission Hill neighborhood as a whole. So when the BHA proposed to
acquire land between Mission Main and the train tracks -- land which had historically
remained industrial and undesirable - and move already stigmatized low-income
residents nearer the noisy railroad, residents were quick to object. If the point of
redevelopment, as advocated by the HOPE VI program, was to eradicate barriers
between project and neighborhood, then how would displacing residents near train
tracks accomplish this goal? Moving toward the rail line and the neighboring Alice
Taylor Homes development, almost seemed liked a concerted effort to relegate a large,
consolidated swath of public housing projects nearest the noisy railway lines. To this,
the BHA answered that ceding Mission Main land to Wentworth would mean the
implementation of new equipment - such as sports facilities -- which would attenuate
the barrier effect and connect with neighbors.
'They are telling [us] it will make a big difference if Wentworth builds a soccer field and parking lot
across the street. Why can't Wentworth do that where they are now? How are we integrating the
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neighborhood if we push the housing along the railroad tracks and next to Alice Taylor?" (MHG,
1996 :12).
Mission Main tenants viewed the swap as an exercise in property consolidation
whereby Wentworth would no longer be sandwiched between two projects (Mission
Main and Alice Taylor Homes), and college students would no longer have to venture
into no man's land.12
Not only did tenants feel isolated vis-d-vis Wentworth Institute, they also felt isolated
from the rest of their Mission Hill neighbors. In late 1996, the Civic Association
pronounced itself in favor of the swap and asked to be further included in the
discussion. The Mission Main residents retorted that while they had repeatedly been
left out of neighborhood-wide development discussions for years, they welcomed the
input of the Mission Hill population: "Lets not have Tremont Street divide us. Come
down here or invite us up there" (MHG, 1996: 9). Through a painful implementation
process, the Mission Main tenants discovered allies in their neighbors across the site's
boundaries.
The Boston Housing Authority (and the development team) considered the land
swap an opportunity to take control over land surrounding the redeveloped Mission
Main. They viewed tenants' resistance to move toward the tracks as an unfair take on
the situation. The BHA were unable to convince residents that a "designed" buffer
along the tracks would positively impact the site and the community as a whole.
The Boston Landmarks Commission questioned the developers' goals to not only
appropriate Wentworth land, but also to demolish what remained of Mission Hill's
historic industrial fabric. The land swap deal favored the disappearance of the
Burkhardt stables and the Vienna Brewery, two remnants of Lower Roxbury's rich past
as a 19 th century industrial town. As the Commission put it, "[These] buildings are
historically and architecturally significant because of period, style, method of building
construction, as well as having an important association with the broad architectural,
cultural, political, economic or social history of the city" (MHG, 1997: 9). The
12 This argument was advanced during a public meeting in November 1996, but was refuted by a Wentworth spokesperson
who mentioned its good record as a neighbor by making space available for Mission Main kids for after-school activities. It
however tor ha2vy negotiations to have Wentworth nominate a "liaison officer" to entertain a direct link with its housing
development neighbors (MHG, 1996: 11).
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Commission argued that this patrimony was an economic, social and physical asset
that should be exploited by the neighborhood. Instead of attempting a recycling
strategy whereby structures would create physical and historical connections with the
neighborhood, the developers only had to prove such ventures were economically
unfeasible. On this subject, architect Sze pointed that restoration should be considered
an important element of urban design, especially in a historically rich city like Boston.
These strategies were being completely ignored within the HOPE VI "pro-demolition"
mindset. The Mission Main residents, on the other hand, were open to the concept of
restoration. Early in the planning process, they were interested in keeping traces of
their old project by including Building 19 (their common rooms) in the redevelopment
plan.13
The participatory planning process for the new Mission Main, according to designers
Lane, Lee and Sze, has proved a very complex one. In fact, the whole HOPE VI
redevelopment process has been notoriously bumpy. Residents have had to tackle
extremely complex redevelopment issues, at wildly different scales: from the redefining
of the territory's limits to the configuration of living rooms. Paraphrasing a Mission Main
tenant, Lane pointed that as much as residents want to be involved and consulted
during the planning process, they found it even more important to be consulted often.14
The participatory process, in spite of its many problems and tensions, has given the
residents a strong voice and a deeply felt understanding of their identity as a vulnerable
but essential part of the revitalization process. Residents and redevelopers have
realized, no doubt, the difficulty in interpreting and translating the integration values of
various actors into a single, "implementable" solution.
Sze, the only remaining architect on the re-design team, talked of the all-important
issue of establishing a relationship of trust between professionals and residents. The
Mission Main residents, he said, are "street smart" citizens used to being victims of
ever-changing policies and arrogant policymakers. Therefore they are "angry, tough
and extremely savvy".15 The BHA's unilateral decision to introduce the land swap
element into the HOPE VI revitalization scheme - and to impose it on the residents - is
at the very heart Mission Main's notorious problems. From a master planning
13 According to Sze, December 1997.
14 Interview with J. Lane, October 1996.
15 According to Chia-Ming Sze, December 1997.
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standpoint, said Sze, the idea was a sound one, since new adjacencies created by the
deal would mean an increased control over the environmental quality of the Mission
Main edges. Also, the swap deal meant important economic and social advantages
when it came to devising a relocation strategy for the site. Securing land across Parker
Street ensured that residents displaced during the demolition and construction phases
could temporarily move into newly built units on site, and thus avoid relocation into
other neighborhoods.
But before the land swap deal was resolved, the BHA decided to go ahead with the
demolition phases and started to tear down units. Therefore displaced residents16 had
to be moved according to a relocation strategy that did not take the swap opportunities
into account. Interestingly, many displaced tenants were re-housed during 1997 at the
rehabilitated Bromley-Heath public housing development, on the other side of Parker
Hill. Sixty years earlier, those residents of the "slum" site that was cleared for Mission
Main had relocated to the same Back-of-the-Hill area, only to be displaced again when
the Bromley development was constructed in place of another Roxbury slum.
Apart from trust between residents and professionals, Sze mentioned that another
important factor involved in successfully developing low-income residential
environments, is understanding the difference between master planning and housing
design, between the "ideal" and the "reality". Master planning, he said, is not unlike a
list of good but abstract intentions informed by a series of constraints, while the
architecture of housing remains grounded in the more immediate reality of standards
and needs. The fate of the Mission Main plan may have been influenced by the team's
failure to fully grasp this difference.
5.5 - Conclusions
Mission Main's latest redevelopment scheme, as compared with the national sample,
harbors much integration value. In spite of the presence of harsh impenetrable barriers
and ever-present factors of isolation, the scheme has included some of the strongest
means of physical integration, like the creation of a street network and the import of
culturally-approved typologies. Yet a consensus, among design professionals, authority
16 - r . n ammininn nn th e cita when demolition started durina the summer of 1996. The BHA had before
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and residents regarding the meaning of integration and the way to encode it in the plan,
was never reached.
Tensions mainly revolved around the politically sensitive issue of altering the
development's territory. For nearly four years, a complex land swap deal pitted
residents against the Authority and their institutional neighbor. Until the end of 1997,
the deal prompted HUD to put a lot of pressure on the redevelopment team and the
tenants, to the point where it threatened more than once to cancel the HOPE VI grant.
Looking more closely into the Boston case revealed how implementing - rather than
intending - integration is a complex task which rests on fragile political foundations.
The Mission Main experience served to stress the importance of translating integration
values into a solution that can be not only physically and economically feasible, but
also politically implementable.
that frozen the admission process into the vacant Mission main units (Sze interview).
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CHAPTER 6: EVALUATING INTEGRATION
In view of the previous analysis and results, two questions emerge as foundations for
future research: 1) should integration constitute an equally feasible and desirable
goal for all HOPE VI public housing revitalization strategies? And 2) how can
designers and policymakers evaluate HOPE VI revitalization to assess whether
integration has actually occurred? In the event that HUD continues to fund evaluation
reports on HOPE VI implementation over the next ten years, this chapter proposes to
formulate evaluation guidelines.
6.1 - Can -- and Should -- Integration Occur Everywhere?
At the end of Chapter 3, it was established that "full integration" did not characterize
all of the fifteen revitalization strategies surveyed; nearly half of them contained
measures which characterized their level of integration as "ambivalent" or non
existent. The degree of integration for a HOPE VI revitalization venture is linked to
two main issues: the geographical determinants of "feasibility", i.e. the impact of pre-
redevelopment conditions on re-design; and the "desirability" to have integration be
the legible basis of a relationship between site and neighborhood.
6.1.1- The "Feasibility" Issue, or the impact of pre-redevelopment isolation on
the degree of planned integration efforts
Throughout the revitalization plans examined for this dissertation, the meaning of
isolation refers to poor and vulnerable tenants living in "projects" that are
disconnected from often equally distressed neighborhoods. This perceived similarity
of pre-redevelopment conditions, as explored in the first part of Chapter 2, is due to
the fact that many developments are sited near or adjacent to isolating barriers:
highways, vacant land, industrial uses or even institutional borders. These barriers
have contributed to the erosion of connecting edges. Thus the isolation of public
housing has manifested itself in ways not solely imputable to the "project" or even to
the barriers that have subsequently isolated project from neighborhood, but also to
underlying attitudes -- wittingly "isolationist" or not -- about the location of public
housing within the city.
All of the public housing studied in this dissertation is isolated. In the more difficult
cases, the isolation is caused by barriers (a pre-redevelopment condition defined as
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type 1, in Chapter 2). In other cases there are merely isolating configurations (type
2). One way to gauge the "feasibility" of integration is to understand whether types of
isolation incur revitalization strategies that produce similar levels of intended
integration. For instance, a harsh barrier suggests that isolation along that edge will
be difficult and costly to overcome. Efforts to physically connect the project with the
neighborhood along that barrier are not reasonable. Conversely, higher degrees of
integration could be achieved where isolation factors (such as disparity in site-
neighborhood configurations) are more easily remedied. In these cases, re-
connecting would be relatively easy. However, there is no clear correlation between
types of pre-redevelopment isolation conditions and the degree of integration
invested in a revitalization strategy.
Or v i D u -Rede - ------ -ond--s
Result A: Result B: Result A: Result B:
Lower Degree of Higher Degree of Lower Degree of Higher Degree of
Planned Integration Planned Integration Planned Integration Planned Integration("Ambivalent" or "Anti" ("Full" Integration
Integration Re-Design Re-Design
Strategies) Strategies)
Baltimore Atlanta Cleveland Camden
Charlotte Boston New York Chicago
Detroit Indianapolis San Francisco
Houston New Haven Seattle
New Orleans
Table 6.1 - Relationship Between Types of Pre-Redevelopment
Conditions of Isolation and Degree of Planned Integration
Table 6.1 confirms that in five cities, isolating barriers were found to hinder "full"
integration; yet similarly difficult conditions in four others did not stifle more
integrative re-design strategies. In other words, although Atlanta, Boston,
Indianapolis, and New Haven have -- along at least two of their edges -- harsh
barriers that lessen the potential for through connections, re-design plans
nonetheless proposed a sort of "hybrid" integration strategy. For example, the
isolating impact of an interstate highway is solved by orienting residential structures
away from it. At the same time, permeability is advocated along the more
"connectible" edges. According to this model, Boston's Mission Main belongs to the
first type of pre-redevelopment conditions: there are train tracks and impenetrable
institutional edges that have physically and socially isolated the development from
the rest of the Mission Hill neighborhood. Yet the intent of the re-design strategy is to
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re-weave the street/block fabric so that the site better mirrors and connects to the
surrounding context. In contrast, similar pre-development conditions were highlighted
in Houston's Allen Parkway Village: two edges are lined by isolating highways.
Nevertheless, the intent was to create a gated community legibly distinct from the
remaining residential edge.
For those cases where isolating conditions were less difficult to overcome, a higher
degree of planned physical integration was implied, with two exceptions: Cleveland
and New York. In Cleveland's south section, a superblock "Village" was proposed;
and, in New York, high density structures surrounded by parking lots and fencing
were retained. Both strategies were less integrative.
Two conclusions may be derived from studying the impact of isolation conditions on
planned integration efforts: 1) in spite of isolating barriers with a potential to impede
integration, some redevelopment strategies have nevertheless focused on forging
links with remaining edges; and 2) the physical presence of isolating barriers is not
solely responsible in determining the degree of "feasibility" for full site-neighborhood
integration. Nevertheless, the negative impact of harsh barriers on adjacent
redevelopments suggests that it is probably more reasonable to reinforce (by design)
a physical separation along that particular edge and concentrate integrative efforts
along other edges with better connection potential. Finally, factors more complex
than topography are at play when assessing the feasibility of integration, such as the
"desirability" for integration.
6.1.2 - The "Desirability" Issue
A certain degree of consensus exists about what constitutes isolation and
integration. But the "level" of integration resulting from HOPE VI revitalization is a
much more complex matter. It refers to the notion of "desirability" of fostering
connections between development and neighborhood. It is not clear whether the
desirability to create communities that are more fully or less fully integrated is more
dictated by designers than it is by the residents who were living on the site during the
planning phase. In Houston, residents were clearly opposed to designers' schemes
for street connections. By contrast, in Baltimore, it was the designers who elected to
use a town center to turn the community inwards and away from the deteriorated
arnc Nevertheles, this dissertation has established, in Chapter 3, that the maioritv
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of the sampled revitalization plans (nine out of fifteen) are based on strategies which
favor (or translate a desire for) a level of full integration. What about the other six
cases? The following summary revisits the elements which have helped define
integration, in order to understand these instances when integration was not a
desired result of revitalization.
Implementing Streets
Contrary to Louie's (1994) findings which stated that "a common attitude towards
streets is not shared" among HOPE VI grantees, this dissertation has found that
streets are universally considered the most integrative physical and social elements
of revitalization. Almost all of the plans promote the theory advanced by Jane Jacobs
more than three decades ago vis-a-vis streets: they promote social interaction and
are means of control over one's dwelling environment. Streets and their built walls
(the streetscape) are extensions of urban life. Many of the plans studied for this
dissertation have alluded to the character of streets envisioned for the new
community; they have described the scale (i.e. the proportion between dimensions of
building height and street width) and their positive role in fostering social integration.
For instance, a large boulevard with a green median acts as a magnet for positive
and productive cross-meetings within the site. Strategically located, it is also a
clearly legible conduit both out to the edge and in toward the community. Smaller
and tighter neighborhood types of streets announce privacy and exclusivity within a
well-defined territory. They mirror links to the surrounding edges.
But the integrative value of streets, especially those to be implemented on sites
which never had them, is viewed differently by many on-site residents who see
human and vehicular traffic as threatening to the already fragile on-site social order.
Although it is not clear whether the neighborhood residents share their skepticism,
some on-site residents often voiced their concern about streets as undesirable
elements of integration. In Boston, residents insisted on restricting the porosity of the
proposed street network, especially at the strategic corner where the site is nearest
to the heavily-trafficked Huntington Avenue. There have been no clearly defined
public streets on the Mission Main site for decades. In fact Smith Street, the site's
South limit along the institutional Mission Church block of Tremont St., has been
used as one of New England's most active outdoor "malls" for drug dealings. Thus
the redeemina social value of streets, as advanced by designers, contrasts with
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residents' negative experiences of such spaces. Nevertheless, the redevelopment
scheme for Mission Main is based on the creation of neighborhood streets. In
Houston, however, residents have steadfastly resisted the implementation of through
streets, as did developers. The latter players wanted to import the sense of
"exclusivity" that characterized other suburban gated communities and to use it as a
means of attracting the middle-class into the redeveloped mixed-income community.
This dissertation has provided designers, policymakers and residents with a
qualitative interpretation of the integrative value of streets within the HOPE VI
revitalization context. More quantitative analysis should be conducted to measure
how newly implemented streets are indeed valued by development and
neighborhood residents, and are used to foster a socio-spatial contact between
residents on- and off-site. Such measures could be based on Whyte's (1988)
methods for evaluating patterns of pedestrian street use and frequency. Measures to
test the quality of streets could include locating conversations or play, or relating
frequency to sidewalk width or street type. In sum, the quantitative evaluation of
street use should focus on understanding the complex congruity among variables
like street type, sidewalk width, setbacks and congenial congestion.
Hierarchy of Open Space
Another key element of effective physical integration is the provision of a hierarchical
system of open space. Authors have suggested that large open spaces in public
housing have contributed to the isolation of residents, mainly because they could not
be appropriated. Appropriation comes from adequate programming and scaling. A
smaller, more human scale is preferable if the goal is to foster positive human
interaction. Exploring the origins of an isolationist public housing mentality, in
Chapter 1, has confirmed that large, unmanageable open spaces (or no-man's-
lands) have contributed to isolation and have created barriers to social integration.
All of the plans surveyed reflect consensus that too much open space hinders
integration. Open spaces should be broken up and arranged hierarchically. The
integrative value of well-programmed and scaled open spaces is heightened if what
is proposed for the new community replicates patterns found in the edge, or attempts
to build continuity with that pattern. While many plans have alluded to the sites' pre-
rpdAvelooment conditions (and portions of their adjacent neighborhoods'), it remains
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difficult to address the degree of similarity between what exists outside the
development and what is proposed as part of HOPE VI. However, results have
shown that in providing differently scaled public or semi-public open spaces, there is
an effort to connect with the fabric outside the development. Similarly, in providing
semi-private and private open spaces, there is an effort to replicate patterns found in
neighboring residential environments or at least to import a culturally accepted way
of separating the private from the semi-private realms by providing fenced back
yards, for example. This take on open space hierarchy (which is implicit in every plan
surveyed) is directly linked to Oscar Newman's Defensible Space argument
according to which the traditional street/block subdivision pattern offers clearly
identifiable micro-districts or territories that may be easily appropriated by residents.
In sum, there is a clear consensus among designers, policymakers and residents
that a socio-spatial connection between development and neighborhood will occur in
tightly programmed on-site open spaces. It is thus a demonstrated assumption that
designing clear boundaries for private and public spaces is a highly desirable means
to foster social, cultural and physical integration. This dissertation, however, found
that the inventory of such open spaces is rather limited and skewed toward family-
oriented activities: in-block tot-lots are favored, but alternatives for adult interaction
are rarely proposed. Nevertheless, the high desirability for a hierarchical system of
open spaces -- while tested in redevelopment efforts during the 1980s -- must be
carefully examined within the context of HOPE VI revitalization and its future
evaluations.
Mirroring Morphological Elements
Generally, physical integration is implicitly founded on the notion that the proposed
morphological elements (buildings, open spaces, streets and blocks) mirror
elements found within the development's surrounding edges. That way, a continuity
of re-structured morphological fabrics ensures that residents may interact in a
homogeneous environment without harsh boundaries. Another implicit integration
principle is that mirroring is a two-way process. Morphological elements of the
neighborhood will eventually replicate (through revitalization) those of the revitalized
developments. According to this framework, Baltimore and Houston are both at the
"anti-integration" end of the scale since, in the former case, centrality is favored and,
in the latter case, fencing is advocated. These two strategies favor an enclave
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mentality based on the idea that legible "exclusivity" is more desirable to mixed-
income groups than more integrative design measures, such as the porosity of
street/block patterns. At the higher end of the scale -- the full integration level -- San
Francisco promotes a mix of uses as a means of fostering physical continuity and a
socio-economic connection to the surrounding retail area.
Further research should provide policymakers and designers with guidelines to
evaluate whether choosing to import "similar" or "different" morphological patterns in
the re-designed community has a positive long-term effect on integration.
Fostering Self-Sufficiency and Social Interaction
The location of community centers offers another way of estimating the integrative
value of HOPE VI plans. Most developments have opted to site their communal
facilities so that they may also be shared by neighborhood residents. Thus locating
community centers at the edge of site contributes to blur the psychological boundary
between "us" and "them". From the plans, it is not yet possible to determine to what
extent these facilities will indeed be shared by the whole community and thus
instigate a culture of sharing and inter-dependence. Perhaps this lack of detail
regarding such an open system reflects public housing residents' reluctance to "let
go" of their exclusive use of hard-won communal facilities. At present, most plans
concentrate on the immediate needs of the resident population. Subsequent studies
should be conducted to measure the socially integrative value of shared community
facilities.
The retail or economic development component of revitalization closely relates to the
location of community facilities. In a few of the proposed plans -- especially in San
Francisco -- provisions are made to include a retail component to specifically cater to
the service needs of on-site residents. In a minority of examples, small community-
oriented businesses such as laundromats, dry cleaners or food coops are proposed
as on-site job opportunities. On-site local shops such as groceries are however
never proposed, even on those plots closest or adjacent to an existing
neighborhood retail corridor. Thus the idea is to rely on the neighborhood, whose
economy will benefit from the presence of the new development, to supply residents
with their most basic needs. Future research should study the impact of new
redevelopment on the economic restructuring of surrounding retail districts so that
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this most important element of HOPE VI revitalization becomes less dependent upon
uncertain market forces.
Participatory Process
One major intent of the HOPE VI program is to create models of revitalization that
reflect the way government intends to provide shelter to low-income Americans in
the next century. Building low-income housing developments, in the earliest years of
government involvement, meant giving temporarily poor middle class Americans a
place where they could regroup before accessing the American Dream of owning a
single family house. But sixty years later, external forces of change have put
pressure on this concept to the extent that public housing developments are now
perceived as symbols of social and physical distress. As a result, HUD is now
investing in ambitious and holistic integration strategies.
The HOPE VI demonstration program is a renewed attempt to tackle public housing
as one element of a larger neighborhood revitalization strategy. Not unlike a
revamped Urban Renewal program, HOPE VI is about the rejection of old public
housing designs in favor of a clean slate for community planning. The participatory
process has been an essential variable of this revisionist way of tackling public
housing. Every sampled project has had an extensive strategy to involve residents in
planning their environment, from the design process to the implementation of social
programs. This strategy always involved the creation of a consultation structure
whereby steering committees, made up of a representative body of residents, filtered
the information to the rest of the on-site population. This system provided a strong
voice to public housing residents about every aspect of redevelopment. Designers of
HOPE VI plans have integrated residents' views into their plans as a matter of
routine. Nevertheless, this dissertation suspects that success in committing to
resident involvement has been highly variable. The examples of Houston and Boston
have highlighted the complexities of HOPE VI implementation and their impact on
professionals' relationship with residents. More research is needed to take stock of
those factors which shape the success of a profitable participatory process.
Since this dissertation does not evaluate the success for HOPE VI's community
partnerships, further research should provide data on: 1) the extent to which PHAs
have had the capacity to successfully manage a redevelopment scheme of this
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magnitude; 2) the quality of the collaboration and support offered to residents by
HUD, Mayors' offices and local government agencies; 3) the quality of the
relationship between the remaining on-site residents and the developers; 4) the
quality of support to the redeveloped community from residents, institutions and
business interests within the surrounding neighborhood; and 5) the level of
involvement and participation of residents and representative bodies in managing the
new community and forging ties with their "off-site" neighbors.
6.1.3 - Opting for Separation Instead of Integration
Louie (1994) previously highlighted a significant difference between "integrationist"
and "separatist" trends in early HOPE redevelopment schemes (50% of each in her
sample). This dissertation has also underlined that different approaches suggest a
different take on the meaning of integration, but to a much less polarized degree.
This may be because in the last three years, HUD has covered a lot of ground to
detail the meaning of integration and the strategies it favors to achieve that result. By
adopting New Urbanism principles, HUD has taken a strong stance in favor of
traditionalist design, which is mainly based on the recreation of a traditional
street/block pattern. In fact, HUD's decision to award grants now seems predicated
on the correspondence between proposed schemes and New Urbanism principles.
This dissertation has nevertheless found that two cases -- Baltimore and Houston --
included anti-integration measures such as surrounding the site with a high fence.
And since permeability is considered another important means of fostering socio-
spatial connections, fencing becomes a sensitive issue. It should be noted that the
desire to surround a vulnerable territory with a fence may be viewed as a positive
means to spur social interaction within the site's population. A gated community is
understood as a secure environment where responsibility, mutuality and individuality
are heightened.
Separation by fencing also becomes a means of creating exclusivity, a residential
quality found in suburban areas and which certain income groups may find desirable
if they are to settle in inner city projects, albeit revitalized and transformed into
mixed-income communities. The Baltimore Hope Circle is a morphological element
which very efficiently conveys this comforting sense of exclusivity amidst an urban
area dotted with neighboring projects.
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In sum, opting for a certain level of separation instead of full integration -- by fencing
or other design initiatives -- should not simply be viewed as a desire to maintain
territorial control. The manifestation of ideological and cultural complexities is equally
important in choosing a strategy and demands careful analysis.
6.2 - Evaluating Successful Integration: Preliminary Guidelines
Future research in public housing integration should establish evaluation measures
to help policymakers and designers know whether integration has occurred with the
help of HOPE VI funds. This dissertation based its findings on data extracted from
"proposed plans", i.e. revitalization schemes that, in most cases, were really
expressions of intent and remained in the earliest phases of implementation and
construction. There is no evidence, so far, that these proposed efforts for public
housing integration are going to produce, in time, successfully integrated
communities. This is why the evaluation of the revitalization schemes is the next
crucial research step and must yield knowledge at two levels: 1) policymakers should
measure whether greater integration has occurred and has had an impact on the
site, its edges and the residents living on- and off-site. And 2) the evaluation should
indicate whether greater integration mainly stemmed from architectural and urban
design strategies (which are funded with at least 80% of HOPE VI grants) and
whether these integrative design measures were effectively matched by sustained
commitments for socio-economic progress of low-income residents.
Vale (1996) proposed that the success in public housing redevelopment should be
measured on seven different fronts: design, implementation, tenant organization,
management, surrounding neighborhoods, socio-economic programming and
resident satisfaction. By combining the Vale framework with the analytic categories
presented in previous chapters (i.e. physical, socio-economic and organizational
variables), the evaluation of HOPE VI integration success may follow the following
guidelines:
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1- Physical Criteria
Assess the Integrative Qualities of the Plan's Physical Elements
The evaluation of integrative measures should be based on how residents perceive
the physical qualities of their re-designed environment. Any evaluation of design will
most likely contain social aspects such as residents' attitude toward and satisfaction
with their re-configured environment. Such surveys should allude to residents'
capacity to identify which physical elements are most responsible for facilitating their
integration with the neighborhood. Data should yield knowledge about improvement
in two areas: 1) the site scale, i.e. "outside" the housing unit; and 2) the projected
image of the development.
At the site scale, the evaluation hinges on measuring the integrative impact of streets
and blocks, town centers and a hierarchy of open spaces. For instance: Do streets
allow residents to feel better "connected" to the neighborhood by favoring mobility
toward service centers or public transportation? Do they constitute a safe place for
children to play and adults to interact? Are some scales -- neighborhood or
boulevard types -- better suited for certain types of social activity? Are "town centers"
the loci of intense social interaction? Even though they were not the focus of this
dissertation, issues related to the quality of housing units' interior configuration
should also be included in the evaluation process.
For questions about redevelopment image, on-site residents should be surveyed as
well as neighborhood residents living within edges. They should be asked, for
instance: Does the way the redevelopment looks make it "a better fit" into the rest of
the neighborhood? Does it look like a residential environment one could compare to
another found nearby? Are specific elements of the re-designed environment
responsible for reducing the negative impact of the "project" image?
Finally, any evaluation of the impact of physical integration measures on residents
should take into account the level of participation which was invested in their
implementation. Do residents feel that their suggestions have actually "materialized"
in the site plan? Were they given the opportunity, during implementation, to voice
their preferences in design matters such as the choice of building materials or
colors?
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The evaluation should also tackle the issue of demolition and the reduction in
density: Has it positively affected the quality of the built environment, within and
without the revitalized site? Has it contributed to blurring the project-neighborhood
differentiation? Has it had an impact on the collective memory of those residents who
remained through the pre- and post-redevelopment cycles?
In sum, evaluating how integration has actually occurred through design necessarily
carries a measure of subjectivity that has much to do with how residents perceive
their environment, and how they feel their involvement was valued during the
planning and implementation process. All of the above implies the need for detailed
"before" and "after" resident surveys. In most plans studied, resident surveys were
referred to as an important source of information on the socio-economic and
demographic portrait of on-site populations. It was not always clear whether the
satisfaction of residents about their environment was as thoroughly investigated. In a
few cases, planner Gayle Epp complemented the survey data with an analysis of
pictures children took of the places they most liked or disliked within and without the
development. This method of investigating space perception constitutes a promising
tool to establish a comparison with "after" images. It is hoped that the necessary
data to conduct a "pre" and "post" redevelopment comparison exist everywhere; that
the input of those who resided on-site before redevelopment has been duly recorded
so that it may serve the a posteriori evaluation of the HOPE VI venture.
2- Socio-Economic Criteria
Assess Improved (Post-Redevelopment) Neighborhood Conditions
The success of integration should be measured against conditions found in the
surrounding neighborhood. The evaluation of the post-redevelopment socio-
economic context should inform policymakers whether integration measures have
resulted in residents experiencing comparable, worse or better circumstances than
their neighbors: Are there more jobs available for low-income residents within the
development's edges as a result of HOPE VI partnerships? How many graduates of
the HOPE VI-funded training programs have gotten a job and retained it? Are
neighborhood services (community facilities or local stores) located in the
development's edge frequented by as many on-site as off-site residents? One
assessment method would consist in identifying a control group in a public housing
development within the same city, with similar demographic portraits and pre-
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redevelopment conditions but without HOPE VI funding, and to instigate a long term
comparative analysis that would encompass pre- and post-redevelopment cycles.
The evaluation should also take into account whether integration has improved the
level of residents' safety on- and off-site. For instance: Do residents feel it is safe to
travel toward the neighborhood and interact? Do external forces -- such as criminal
activity -- hinder residents' potential to forge relationships with their neighbors?
Finally, evaluators should take careful stock of the pre-redevelopment socio-
economic context (before establishing a comparison with "post" conditions) in order
to verify whether HOPE VI-funded programs have effectively reinforced existing
resources or were stifled by already deteriorated structures.
Chart the Effectiveness of Socio-Economic Policy Objectives
The HOPE VI program has made it clear that socio-economic programming was as
important a measure of integration as were bricks and mortar. Thus an evaluation of
the integrative component of HOPE VI self-sufficiency programs should verify that
central goals like education and job training effectively paid off for the residents. For
instance: Did educational partnerships with local institutions (within the Campus of
Learners framework) materialize into job opportunities for residents? Do income data
for post-redevelopment on-site residents translate into an increased proportion of
employed residents? More importantly, did HOPE VI-funded opportunities for finding
employment translate into residents' choosing to remain on the site (and also invest
in community building), or did it afford them the choice to leave the site and access
opportunities for upward mobility elsewhere? What happened to those former
residents who did not gain apartments in the redeveloped sites?
One of the more prevalent program objectives was to break the policy of income
concentration and implement a policy of mixing incomes within the site. Income
mixing is viewed, in all of the surveyed cases, as a strong integrative measure. The
proportion of income groups is however highly variable, especially where the number
of very low-income (or public housing) units are concerned. Further research must
evaluate whether the reduction in the number of units for very low-income
households has negatively or positively affected the housing market, as well as the
on- and off-site Dooulations. More difficult to measure will be the alleged
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psychological impact "working" families will have -- as inspiring models of self-
sufficiency -- on their unemployed neighbors. Finally, future evaluations should
inform whether the goal to import undifferentiated architectural types to house
households of all income levels fostered a sense of equally "belonging" to a
homogeneously empowered community.
Measure Resident Satisfaction
Resident satisfaction, in the end, constitutes a "meta-criterion" which encompasses
all of the others (Vale, 1996: 336). A satisfaction survey is important inasmuch as it
measures the way integration has impacted the satisfaction of residents with their
environment, as well as impacted their potential for bettering their economic
situation. A resident satisfaction survey would help ascertain whether the improved
environment inspired residents to stay put, and even to recommend it to others as a
"good" place to live and raise children. For instance: Do residents feel they are
"better off' living in the redeveloped community than they were before, or would be
elsewhere? What particular component -- physical or socio-economic -- of the HOPE
VI "package" has enticed them to stay, or provided them with opportunities to leave?
3- Organizational Criteria
Evaluate Timely Completion and Implementation
Whether or not the redevelopment venture was completed according to schedule
and within the budget's constraints does not necessarily tell much about the
integrative effect of HOPE VI. It is rather a measure of administrative success in the
face of countless pressures and tensions. Future evaluations of HOPE VI
implementation should identify explanations for the variation in the quality and
efficiency of the administrative process: Was the confluence of administrators',
professionals' and resident representatives' personalities an important factor in
favoring timely and within-budget completion? Was the presence of an outside
private developer key in bypassing the constraints associated with public housing
bureaucracy?
Assess the Progress of Management and Maintenance Conditions
One major innovation of the HOPE VI program is implementing models of
management partnerships among authorities, residents and private entities.
Evaluating these practices should verify whether the quality of the management
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team's response to residents has improved compared to the pre-redevelopment
period. Has the privatization of management, in many cases, incurred a measurable
rationalization (i.e. significant savings) of administrative and upkeep costs?
Residents should be able to identify which areas of maintenance have sustained
more improvement: landscaping, trash collection or unit upkeep. In the end, the
evaluation of maintenance and management practices should give redevelopers and
others involved in the administration of public housing detailed knowledge of the
alleged efficiency of management privatization models.
Estimate Residents' Capacity for Empowered Organization
As emphasized in the above section on physical criteria, the evaluation of the
positive impact of integration rests on assessing whether HOPE VI improved the
participatory process and confirmed residents in their role of empowered decision-
makers. For most of the redevelopment strategies sampled, the role of tenants in
redevelopment was made central and the overall participatory process was depicted
as productive and positive. Even though 80% of the HOPE VI grants were
earmarked for physical change, a "spill-over" effect of these kinds of revitalization
efforts can produce improved mechanisms for resident participation and "[lessen] the
social costs of distant and top-down management" (Vale, 1996: 332). Nevertheless,
the post-redevelopment evaluation process should concentrate on finding out
whether the level of participation has been sustained well after the HOPE VI plan
was implemented, and whether residents have built upon their improved organization
to attract additional outside resources.
* * *
The redevelopment of severely distressed public housing, as part of the HOPE VI
program, is a highly complex endeavor. HUD's goal is not only to tackle revitalization
on an enormous scale -- so far $2 billion have been invested -- but also to overcome
60 years of entrenched negative images that the words "public housing" conjure.
The complexities of revitalization derive from many aspects involved in defining the
"isolation to integration" paradigm. This dissertation has illustrated that isolation is
not necessarily caused by the "project" itself. Outside forces have historically
manifested their influence and been encoded in the socio-economic and
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morphological fabrics of the larger neighborhood. One such force was identified as
an isolationist attitude toward the siting of public housing developments and toward
physically segregating their lower incomes populations. Coupled with the negative
impact of topographical barriers near the site, this attitude has contributed to the
formation of isolated and stigmatized environments of despair. It remains essential to
conduct a careful historical and morphological analysis of public housing sites and
their edges in order to identify the roots of the isolation problem the HOPE VI
program seeks to eradicate.
HOPE VI embraces the universal goal of reversing public housing isolation and
implementing integrative re-design strategies. Although integration efforts can be
clarified and categorized, this dissertation has highlighted that their manifestation
incurs variable integration "levels" throughout the nation. The many cultural, political,
social and physical issues involved make the "desire" for integration a highly charged
variable of implementation that may influence strategies for either promoting
integration or for enforcing separation.
Time is the most evasive component of the HOPE VI process. With many
revitalization projects still in the planning or in the earliest construction phases, the
evaluation of the program's success in reintegrating very low-income environments
and populations into the urban mainstream has yet to be completed. It is hoped that
HUD's costly efforts to eradicate isolation and stigmatization will stand the test of
long-term sustainability. Breaking the "project-box" mentality by broadening the geo-
political and physical limits of the public housing site to include neighborhood
resources is a promising ideological shift that nonetheless needs constant re-
assessment.
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